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The Concept of Revelation 
In choosing an experiential approach to the concept of revelation 
and, in preferring this to either an informative or an instructional 
view, I have faced head-on a central concern for Christian theists. 
This appertains to the epistemological problem raised by the assumption 
at the heart of belief in revelation, that God can, in some way or 
another, be known by men. For to say that God has revealed Himself to 
his human creatures implies some kind of knowledge of God. I have 
rejected attempts to describe this in terms simply of degrees of commit- 
ment, evinced by Christian faith and attitudes, and attempted to show 
that the concept of revelation, as traditionally understood, requires 
an apperception of reality which enables the verb to know to be suitably 
used. 
My method has been to use Wittgenstein's concepts of a language 
game and a form of life to demonstrate that it makes sense to say that, 
in Christ, a knowledge of God is possible. I have argued that certain 
fundamental propositions, implicit within the Kerygma of the Apostolic 
community, provide the basis for intelligible talk about man's encoun- 
ter with his Creator. 
After analysing different sorts of knowledge claim, I reached the 
conclusion that knowledge by description best suits the demands of the 
kerygmatic language game. This coheres with my argument, following 
Wittgenstein, that it is in the learning of an apposite language game 
and adhering to the rules prescribed by its autonomous grammar that 
understanding of Christian propositions can be gained. 
To elucidate this, I discussed Kant's view concerning the place 
of reason in reaching a posteriori judgements. I introduced Popper's 
notion of a 'third world of ideas' to justify the Christian's claim 
that ideas relative to the kerygma and didache etc have stood the test 
of time. Such ideas might be accorded a certain objectivity. 
(1) 
Is the question of God's existence begged in the language game? 
To answer this I examined a number of views about the verb 'to exist' 
and adopted Russell's suggestion that it operates in a second order 
manner. I explored his thinking about significant inexistent objects. 
1 proceeded to relate these problems to Wittgenstein's discussion of 
sense and reference in respect of what he says of the 'mystical' and 
about significant yet meaningless propositions. Yet the main thrust 
of my argument was to seek to explicate the notion of man's response 
to God (who is thus taken to exist and to be active in communication 
with man), by pointing again to the fact of the form of life of 
Christian belief. I concluded that it is here that all that can 
intelligibly be said of God making Himself known, and being known by 
believers, must be grounded. 
(ii) 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONCEPT OF REVELATION - INTRODUCTION 
1 DEFINITIONS 
So that I may introduce the definition of revelation which I 
intend to adopt in this study, I shall begin by quoting a few relevant 
authorities on the subject. aThe oxford English Dictionary establishes 
the primacy of a religious connotation for the word. For it speaks of 
it, firstly, as 'the disclosure of knowledge to man by a divine or 
supernatural agency; ' and, secondly, as 'something disclosed or made 
known by divine or supernatural means. ' The, dictionary proceeds, 
thirdly, to give vrider,. neutral definitions: 'A striking disclosure of 
something previously unknown or not realised. Disclosure of facts made 
by a person; exposure of something previously disguised or concealed. ' 
Linking each of these definitions, clearly, is the central idea of 
bringing into the open, for men to understand, something which 
previously had been opaque. Since I am, concerned with the Theistic 
concept of revelation, it is with the first two definitions that I 
shall especially have to do. 
I turn next to the ways in which the word 'revelation' is used in 
the Bible. My informant is Dr James Packer who says: 
b"The English 
word freveall from the Latin revelo, is the regular Authorised Version 
rendering of the Hebrew gälä and the Greek apokalyptö, which corres- 
ponds to gälä in the Septuagint and the New Testament. Gälä, 
apokalyptö, and revelo all express the same idea - that of unveiling 
something hidden, so that it may be seen and known for what it is. 
Accordingly, when the Bible speaks of revelation, the thought intended 
is of God the Creator actively disclosing to men His power and glory, 
His nature and character, His will, ways and plans - in short, Himself 
- in order that men may know Him. '? Packer intimates that he subscribes 
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to the older Protestant view of God communicating truths about Himself, 
termed 'propositional revelation, ' rather than to the newer view which 
understands it to be essentially non-verbal in character. His under- 
standing of the theology of revelation thus focuses upon the Law, the 
Prophets and Christ as being conveyers of truth concerning God. He 
represents that Theistic tradition which holds the Old and New 
Testaments of the Bible to be the spoken 'word of God' to man. 
Finally, c James Barr may be cited as one who endeavours to 
elucidate the concept of revelation, from a modern theological position. 
He argues, "It is man who developed the biblical tradition and man who 
decided when it might be suitably fixed and made canonical. If one 
wants to use the Word-of-God type of language, the proper term for the 
Bible would be the Word of Israel, Word of some leading early 
Christians. " He goes on to draw a distinction between the contro- 
versial status of the #events' or 'acts of God' depicted in the Old 
Testament, and the 'external phenomenon (Jesus) who existed in the 
world. ' He asks whether, given the sheer magnitude of the Christ- 
event within Christian belief, and assuming the term 'revelation' is 
to be used, does it not lead to a position that there was only one 
solitary real revelation, in the full sense of the word? Barr points 
out that there is a difference also between, what he calls the 
surface account furnished by the Bible and our understanding of what 
was happening. Further, "even in the surface form of the Bible, the 
reportage of divine communications to man is only one part; the forms 
of many books is that of a man-to-man communication, of which many 
parts, but not all, report communications from God to man. The Pauline 
letters are letters from the apostle to the churches, not letters from 
God to St Paul. " Thus Barr thinks that the traditional conflict 
between propositional and personal revelation can be by-passed. It is 
necessary to recognise the right function of propositions (along with 
-3- 
non-propositional verbal communications). Sometimes the question is 
of a kerygmatic or response-demanding function, as against a neutral 
information-giving one; sometimes it is a parabolic or indirect 
function, as against a direct one ... Genre-mistakes cause the wrong 
kind of truth values to be attached to biblical sentences. Literary 
embellishments then come to be regarded as scientifically true 
assertions, kerygmatic words of grace and promise come to be taken as 
text-book doctrine. " Is Revelation antecedent to, or consequent upon, 
the compilation of Biblical means of communicating what are said to be 
divine ideas: through Law, Prophets, Christ-event? Barr draws our 
attention here to a further aspect of the matter. There are those who 
conceive of Revelation as being orientated towards the future, 
concerned with what is hoped for and believed in on the strength of 
human understanding of religious principles. Those who see revelation 
as being antecedent to its manifestation in the Biblical literature, 
take a different view (presumably that of Packer). 
The theological position I intend to take up is one which has 
been influenced by 
d 
Pannenberg in so far as he speaks, generally of 
. revelation as 
history and, particularly, of the 'Christ-event' as 
being the focal point of that revelation. His emphasis upon the 
kerygma - the proclamation of the early church about Christ's saving 
acts - will be adhered to. I shall attempt to show that it is in this 
proclamation, and in its attendant societal ramifications, that 
intelligibility may be given to the idea of God disclosing Himself to 
His human creatures. Thus my approach to the concept of revelation will 
be a Christian Theistic one. It will, further, be an experiential one. 
This is not to exclude the possibility of speaking of information of, 
or instruction from, God. It is to pursue the notion, implicit in the 
kerygma, of a disclosure-response relationship. 
In*attempting to define revelation, therefore, as divine activity, 
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directed towards mankind, the idea of God disclosing Himself emerges. 
Such disclosure is to be understood as a personal revelation by God. 
To whom does He reveal Himself? Clearly, a necessary condition for 
such disclosure is that there should be those to whom the revelation 
is made. It would not make sense to speak of God, albeit deemed to be 
Creator of the world, as disclosing Himself to other than intelligent, 
self-conscious beings, capable of receiving and understanding the 
disclosure. According to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, God reveals 
Himself to man in various ways and through specific actions on His part. 
2 PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THIS EXPERIENTIAL VIEW OF REVELATION 
There are a number of presuppositions which such a view of 
revelation demands. I shall draw attention to two in particular. These 
are the presupposition that God exists. and the presupposition that He 
communicates with man. 
a. The Existence of God 
The first of these is implicit in the proposition that God actively 
reaches out to man in self-disclosure. I am here taking God to be 
objectively real, one capable of revealing Himself to man. My 
experiential view of revelation necessarily implies "belief-in" God by 
those who claim to believe that God has thus disclosed Himself. It 
follows that, in speaking of human reaction to belief in this 
revelation of God, the belief in question must, logically, be belief in 
a God who exists. I do not wish to associate myself with the views of 
eD Phillips and others, who appear, to dodge the issue as to the 
objective existence of God. B. Williams calls Theists to task, and, 
rightly so I feel, when they appear to interpret the existence of God" 
in terms of human experience alone. On such a view, '; the question 
arises: If man ceased to exist, would God cease to exist? When the 
notion of the existence of God is reduced to certain kinds of human 
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experience, as Phillips seems to want to say, the logical answer to 
this question must be 'yes'. My conception of the existence of God 
as an objective Being, on the contrary would yield the answer 'no'.. 
It would be logically possible for God to exist even if no human 
beings existed. So, in saying that the concept of revelation is to be 
understood, not principally as information about, or instruction from, 
but as experience of God, I do not wish to imply in any way that it 
can be cashed solely in terms of experiences which men have. On the 
contrary, I want to try to establish that the notion of God, viewed as 
objective Being, having a relationship with His human creatures, can 
be shown to make sense. A necessary condition for an experiential 
concept of revelation is the idea of a personal God. To explicate* 
this idea we may adopt -f Farmer's definition of God as Absolute 
Demand and Final Succour. Farmer speaks of the believer's apprehension 
of 'absolute, sacred, unconditional values' which are felt to make 
demands upon him, even to the extent of the sacrifice of life itself; 
inseparable from this is an awareness of God as a source of ultimate or 
final succour, one who will in no circumstances desert or fail the. 
believer. In using the concepts of a Will which impinges upon my will 
and a Refuge to whom I can flee, Farmer demonstrates the personal 
nature of the God in whom Christians believe. It will'be intelligible, 
then, to speak of experience as an area of human apperception wherein 
knowledge by acquaintance, involving the possibility of warmth, 
affection and trust between people may be seen to obtain. This will 
enable the concept of "belief in" to be given substance, in relation to 
the concept of the development and growth of personal relationships, 
understood within a Theistic context. It is in the light of these 
concepts that the concept of revelation itself, interpreted in 
experiential terms, may find some anchorage. 
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b. Communication Between God and Man. 
The view of what I take revelation to be presupposes, secondly, 
the possibility of communication between God and man. To presuppose 
such communication, we must firstly notice that the idea of communi- 
cation itself is, to some degree, a paradoxical one. For, on the one 
hand, what is communicated must be new and unfamiliar. If this were 
not so, A would have nothing of significance to say to B. Indeed, were 
he to repeat what B already knew, it would not appear to be a genuine 
or, at least, worthwhile communication. To communicate to B, A must be 
in possession of information or, radiate the effects of an experience 
such that B would stand to receive something which he has hitherto not 
known or experienced. The notions of freshness and originality are 
relevant to the concept of communication. - What is communicated, be it 
descriptive facts or an impression of something achieved, or an 
experience of grief or joy, will provide to the recipient of it some- 
thing unknown by him previously. On the other hand, the communicator 
has to invoke the old and the familiar if he is to communicate whatever 
it is he is seeking to convey. For, if he is to be understood by the 
one whom he wishes to inform or influence in some way, the medium of 
communication has to be intelligible to both parties. Hence A must use 
words, gestures, facial expressions, and the like which B already 
understands for successful communication to take place. Thus it is 
clear that there is a paradox resident in the concept of communication. 
The paradox is heightened when the new and unfamiliar being 
communicated is conceived to be transcendent. There is a danger that, 
in this instance, the notion of communication would become incompre- 
hensible. It may be wondered whether the idea of transcendent know- 
ledge, said to be communicated to man through God's revelation, has any 
coherence. For while it is the case that any communication whatsoever 
requires freshness and originality, if it is to be taken to be genuine 
-7- 
communication, that which is communicated must also belong to a class 
of communicable subjects. Can we speak of the transcendent as being 
included in this class? It will be part of my task to try to examine 
the concept of transcendence as understood by Theists. In trying to 
find some intelligible way of speaking of God, who is said to be 
unbounded by space and time, clearly talk of communication with man 
raises difficulties. 
Philosophical Issues which Arise from my Experiential View of 
Revelation 
a. Man's cognition of God 
Cognitive awareness of God by man means a knowledge of God. If I 
can show that it is logically sound to use the verb 'to know' in a 
Theistic sense, the question as to the nature of the knowledge laid 
claim to by believers arises. It could be immediate knowledge:, some 
form of direct perception perhaps, or an experience where memory is 
invoked or, yet again, a self-conscious awareness of one's mental 
state. It could, alternatively, be inferential knowledge of the kind 
provided by science, by history or by a 'reading off' from a particular 
situation a piece of putative knowledge. For example, I infer from 
Smith's sudden expression of joy that he has received the good news 
he has been awaiting. Each of these direct or inferential forms of 
knowledge are empirical in that they each relate to putative states of 
affairs. If I am to succeed in speaking of man's knowledge of God I 
shall have to show some affinity between such knowledge and at least 
one of the kinds of knowledge which has been discussed. 
Would it be possible, for example, to speak of men knowing God in 
a way which is similar to their knowledge of the world? The world is 
'there'; it is not brought into existence by men; they perceive and 
experience within an existent system, and their perceptions and 
experiences are dependent upon this objectivity. May we speak of 
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theistic knowledge as knowledge of an object? Such talk, within 
Theism, is sustained. Yet Theism does not conceive of God as an 
empiricist would conceive of the world. For its view of the self 
disclosure of God points to a personal element. According, therefore, 
to the doctrine of revelation, God is to be known through his personal 
communication with man. So, on the one hand, a Christian's knowledge 
of God may be compared with a man's knowledge of the world but, on the 
other hand, his knowledge is taken to be some kind of acquaintance of 
a personal nature. 
It will be possible to say from this distinction, that Theistic 
knowledge has elements of knowledge by description as well as of 
knowledge by acquaintance. In so far as there are constative propo- 
" Bitions included within Christian talk of revelation, it is a. kind of 
knowledge by description. 
b. Man's Conative Response to God 
However, when the personal nature of knowledge of God is empha- 
sised, some kind of knowledge by acquaintance is implied. An 
experiential view of revelation requires the concept of man's conative 
response to God to lend the necessary personal dimension to the know- 
ledge in question. The believer is said to apprehend knowledge of God 
by conative response, that is by trust in, and commitment to, God. 
There may be said, then, to be a dual character of theistic knowledge: 
it is both cognitive and conative, for it is objective and personal in 
nature. 
We may, next, consider how this knowledge is gained. It might be 
thought to be an achievement, a hard-won success whereby the. believer 
eventually is victorious. Ryle's idea of 'know' as a success verb, as 
distinct from 'believe' which has a logical affinity with 'wonder' 
'ponder' 'consider' etc. would seem to be appropriate in this case. It 
might, however, be considered justified true belief. Here appropriate 
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evidence would be needed to support the knowledge claim. Or it might 
be said to be causal. Here the emphasis would be upon something 
inducing the knowledge in question. For example my belief that there 
is a table before me is induced by the existence of a table: its exist- 
ence is the cause of my having a perception of a table. Whichever of 
these concepts of knowledge might be thought to be relevant to the 
concept of revelation, a place for reflection upon putative. facts seems 
to be essential. For Theistic knowledge embraces knowing 'that' as 
well as knowing 'how', and each of these suggest a learning process. 
The Christian claims to know 'that' in respect of putative historical 
propositions, and he demonstrates that he knows 'how' in the observance 
of the rites and ceremonies of his religion. 
" So there is an epistemological element in talking of God disclosing 
himself to men. From what. I have said, it is plain that problems are 
raised as to the nature of the knowledge claimed by believers. Part of 
my task will be to attempt to seek logical justification for the 
Christian view that, in Christ, knowledge of God may be experienced. 
c. Knowledge of other minds 
A further problem relates to philosophy of mind, or psychological 
philosophy. If, to some extent, the epistemology of revelation centres 
upon constative propositions, the psychology of belief would seem to 
bear more upon the conative element. There might appear to be a 
problem raised by the notion of One who is taken to be Bodiless Agent, 
or Spirit, being said to communicate with sentient beings. I do not 
think a logical difficulty resides here, although there is clearly an 
empirical puzzle in trying to envisage non-corporeal agency relating 
to corporeal selves. The logical difficulty, I believe, resides more 
firmly in the area of attempting to identify god. To discuss these 
issues, I shall consider dualist views of a Cartesian nature, while 
duly treading cautiously in the light of Pyle's stricture concerning 
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the fallacy of the 'ghost in the machine'. In attempting to grapple 
with the problem of speaking intelligibly of the idea of god, I shall 
look at the assertions of Brentano and Russell to the effect that the 
concept of intentional inexistent objects is coherent. Further, I 
shall investigate Wittgenstein's use of the term 'the mystical' and, 
tentatively, attempt a link with what he says about non-cognitive 
avowals within the context of an 'autonomous' grammar. 
d. The Nature of Religious Belief 
It is, however, in my analysis of religious belief itself that a 
key to understanding might be provided. For it could be said that 
religious belief, in the context of the concept of revelation, forms a 
kind of 'deposit' whereby putative events recorded in the Bible (and 
possibly elsewhere) are accorded the status of divine 'disclosure to 
men. Belief, is seen to be the existent attitude amongst men whereby 
the truth of the recorded and experienced godly motions is vouchsafed. 
To the sceptic (the agnostic) who chivvies the believer for his resort 
to fantasy and escapism, it could be retorted that in the existence of 
religious belief itself (and here I have Christian belief particularly 
in mind), there is a significant empirical phenomenon, by which know- 
ledge claims concerning relationship with God can be examined. Hence, 
it is religious belief itself (or the particular view of religious 
belief which I shall favour and seek to justify) which may be said to 
be an entrance both to explanation and understanding. ' 
To elucidate the view which I intend to adopt, I must first draw 
attention to the fact that it is customary to separate knowledge from 
belief. One is thought to operate in the area of assurance and 
certainty; the other in the less pretentious area of conviction and 
hope. If such a distinction is drawn between a knowledge claim and an 
assertion of belief, a considerable philosophical problem arises when 
an attempt is made to bring together,, in some way, these two states. 
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Can a man who says that he knows that r" be told that 
he simply 
believes it; or can a sincere believer be credited with knowledge when 
he asserts what he holds to be true? My experiential view of 
revelation seems to require that I bring together these apparently 
diverse epistemological elements. I propose to do this by stressing 
the idea of religious belief as being essentially human response to 
divine disclosure, not some kind of theory about the world. 
What kind of belief is meant when the idea of the disclosure of 
God and man's apprehension of that disclosure is spoken about? To 
believe the Christian gospel is both to entertain a proposition, (or 
series of propositions) which bears upon the kerygma and to evaluate, 
in some way or another, the facts which it proclaims. 
9Price has 
distinguished an evaluative from a factual connotation of religious 
belief. He points out that the former is not a necessary condition of 
the latter. Since a Christian holds a warm, affective attitude towards 
Christ, because of what he believes God has effected for him through 
Christ, he evinces an evaluative 'belief in' God. He shows approval by 
his attitude of belief for the retrospective, present and prospective 
benefits which he takes to be effected on his behalf (and on behalf of 
others). The answer to my question therefore as to the nature of 
Theistic belief is that it is 'belief in' rather than 'belief that'. 
It is not by believing that Q so much as believing in the kind of God 
of whom the kerygma speaks, that the Christian might be said to 
demonstrate his convictions about God's disclosure to him. (However, 
belief 'that' God exists and 'that' He has performed saving acts for 
man is entailed by such). Such a view coheres with the conative 
response of which I previously spoke. 'Belief in' can be seen to be a 
prior requirement for apprehension of the cognitive awareness (implicit 
in the notion of encounter with God) to become viable. There are thus 
constative and commissive elements present in Theistic 'belief in'. 
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I shall depend heavily upon the philosophy of Wittgenstein in attempting 
to argue that 'belief in' may, given the acceptance of certain presup- 
positions, lead to 'knowing that. ' It will be my contention that the 
kerygma, which I have already identified as the particular feature of 
written Christianity, generated within the Apostolic community a 'form 
of life' whereby men believed that they had encountered God. I shall 
take the kerygma, in its sense of proclamation of the Christ-event 
(the saving deeds and words of Christ and His fulfilling the Law and 
the Prophets of the Old Testament) to have the force of a fundamental 
proposition. As such it is not a hypothesis, but determines all-that 
can be said about the Christian view of divine self disclosure and 
human apprehension of it. It will be, then, by examining the. 
'autonomous grammar' of the kerygmatic language game that the problem 
of how, if at all, 'belief in' may lead to 'knowing that' will be 
resolved. Further, I shall use another of Wittgenstein's concepts, 
that of religious belief as a 'picture' which the believer holds 'for 
ever before him' to indicate the logical status which revelation maybe 
shown to have. 
Before concluding this introduction, I shall say a few words about 
how I understand 
hWittgenstein 
on these matters. I believe that, in 
part at least, he meant by a 'form of life' the essential 'acting' 
which a society or group of people perform and, importantly, in so- 
doing, evince certain fundamental propositions which lie at the bottom 
of their language game(s). By fundamental proposition, he meant 
certain assumptions which are 'there' like our life (for example all 
human beings have two parents; objects do not appear, disappear. and 
re-appear without due cause). A fundamental proposition, being at the 
bottom of all that can conceivably be said about a particular matter, 
cannot be treated as a hypothesis. It is not an empirical proposition, 
subject to verification or falsification. 
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I intend to argue that the Apostolic community and the fundamental 
propositions embedded in, or relative to, the initial proclamation of 
the Christ-event (the kerygma)O'coinprise a 'form of life' which can 
illuminate the traditional Christian Theistic claim that Cod has made 
Himself knoi1n to non 'in Christ'. That counts as an explanation, and 
what characterises the Christian experience of God, ` therefore, are 
determined by the autonomous grammar of the (Kerygmatic) language game. 
The latter Phrase (language game) of course refers to an area of 
discourse, of which Wittgenstein spoke in his "F'YÜlosöphical 
Investigations". The 'depth' or 'autonomous' grammar will be unique 
to a Phrticular''gärae' l in. so far as it grows out of societal needs 
and actions which stem from the form of life, and its fundamental 
propositions. To discover what sense, if any, can be given, therefore, 
to the: proposition that then may have an experience of God, whereby 
they tray coherently speak , of knowing God, I nha21 eine the salIe$t 
characteristics of a specific area of discourse - that of Biblical 
revelation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CHRISTIAN BELIEF AS 'UNCONDITIONAL COMMITMENT' 
Since I do not subscribe to the view that an experience of God 
means, what 
aT. R. Miles (and others, like D. Phillips and D. Cupitt) 
interpret it to mean, an experience which can be explicated solely 
0s 
that which is, in some way or another, an expression of unconditional 
commitment, I do not intend to begin with individual volitional 
statements. Rather, I wish to use Wittgenstein's phrase 'a form of 
life' to suggest that the Christian experience of the individual 
believer can only be understood in relation to the language used by 
a community of believers in which those beliefs have their home. 
Miles' wish to avoid errors which he thinks derive from the false 
dichotomy between material/immaterial, body/mind etc., while 
important for intelligible speech about the 'self', leads him, I 
feel, to go beyond what is warranted by the Christian tradition. 
He too readily rejects any talk of experience of an objective God, 
whose existence and communicating activity are presupposed in my 
experiential view of revelation. Like Miles, and others of a 
similar persuasion (e. g. 
bPhillips), I want to try to discover 
whether speaking of men having an experience of God can be given 
intelligible expression. 
By commencing with cWittgenstein's notion that a language- 
game reflects a form of life in which it is grounded, I hope to 
build upon the supposition that it is in the kerygma (the primitive 
proclamation of the Apostles concerning Christ's person and actions) 
that the meaning of what a present day experience of God is, can be 
discovered. Like so many contemporary exponents of belief, Miles 
considers the cultural milieu of our day, and the interpretations 
of experiences which such cultural influences inspire, to be so 
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different from the situation of Old Testament and Jesus' days, that 
ipso facto any talk within the Biblical narrative of encounter with 
God, considered to be encounter with an objective Being, to be hope- 
lessly overtaken by more enlightened thinking. So Miles takes his 
cue as to what might be meant by an experience of God from contem- 
porary views of a psychological and sociological nature. Whether 
this is the correct procedure to take or not, I shall be concerned 
with the logical implications of saying that to explicate what it 
means to speak of an experience of God is to explore the logic of a 
particular form of life. This is both the communal life of the 
early Christians about which we read in the flew Testament, and 
especially in the Acts: and those fundamental propositions and the 
'grammar' associated with them which determine what can be said. 
If it can be established that it is here, in the dynamic experiences 
which the presence of Christ stimulated in those who met him, or 
were the recipients of the kerygma, that the paradigm for Christian 
experience may be found, I believe that a certain objectivity may be 
lent to the subject. This does not mean that the concept of 
unconditional commitment, which Miles holds to be constitutive of 
religious belief, is not a necessary condition for the view I wish to 
expound. If the concept of revelation requires the ideas of 
encounter and response to make sense of God being said to reveal 
Himself to men, such unconditional commitment by believers would be 
demanded. And such commitment indicates the commiss: j'e aspect of 
'belief in' which provides the key to Theistic understanding. I 
differ from Miles in attempting to find the meaning of religious 
experience within that language (especially as conveyed by the 
Rerygma and its doctrinal derivatives) of which the form of life of 
the early Christian community was the exemplar. This may appear to 
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say no more than that I hold the New Testament picture of Christian 
experience in high esteem. And that would be true. It is, however, 
in the logical possibilities of conceiving of the early church as 
the promulgator of a language-game, which provides for those 
believers who play that game today, the kind of language wherein 
religious experience may be clothed in some sort of realism. I shall 
discuss Quine's dictum that the "roots of reference" are to be found 
in language and ally this with Wittgenstein's dictum that meaning is 
to be sought in looking to see how words are used, within a particular 
language game. It is precisely in this regard that I wish to argue 
that religious experience, an integral part of the New Testament 
story of that community which owed its being to the kerygmatic 
proclamation, is to be understood. Thus what I conceive religious 
experience to be, in Christian terms, cannot logically (given the 
stipulations I have made about the original linguistic foundation 
for Christian talk) be spoken of solely as certain feelings, atti- 
tudes or aspirations which 'unconditional commitments induce, and 
which do not require objective reference beyond the self to expli- 
cate. There is no attempt in my view to provide "evidence" (such 
a bafa to Miles' understanding of what religious experience 
requires to justify it being so called) to try to "prove" that the 
apostles met God in a way which would be open to empirical enquiry. 
My point is, rather, to emphasise what it makes sense to day, given 
my view that cultural differences between our society and that of 
the early church need not vitiate the contention that the language 
of theological insight (the perception of something new for them, 
and for. )us when apprehended through belief in Christ) contains an 
avenue whereby speaking about experience of God may be given 
intelligibility. I differ from the sort of philosophical approach 
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followed by 1-ölest therefore, principally in my wish to anchor modern 
talk of Christian experience in the logical ground established by the 
apostolic kerygmatic language game, which has as its central axiom, 
what Pannenberg calls, the Christ-event. By this he means, not only 
the facts of Jesus' life (such as they might be considered to be, 
after due notice has been taken of theological scholarship) but the 
theological understanding which permeates the New Testament literature. 
For Pannenberg, the resurrection of Christ (which he takes to be a 
physical event) gives a uniqueness to these ideas concerning Christ 
which emanate from the post-Easter insights of the apostles. Thus 
what can be said of Christian experience can only be said when the 
"Christ-event" itself is seen to be constitutive of that experience. 
This means that for a modern believer to speak authentically of 
Christian experience of God, he can only do so by acclaiming the 
Lordship of Christ. For so to acclaim Christ is to indicate, 
assuming sincerity and understanding on his part, participation in 
both a form of life and in a language which shows what Christian 
religious experience means. Its meaning is bound up with the idea 
that God has revealed himself to man, for it is by encounter with 
the Christ of the kerygiaatic proclamation, and through response to 
such encounter, that revelation is irradiated for the believer. 
His 'belief-in' God enables him to experience something of the 
meaning of divine disclosure, of which the apostolic community 
claimed to bear testimony and about which they so fervently and 
resolutely spoke. My contention is, therefore, that Miles is wrong 
to dismiss the notion of encounter with something outside the self 
on the ground that it could never be known whether this were the 
case. I also think that he is wrong to invoke the spectre of 
Cartesian dualism or the censoring by Ryle of the idea of the 
'ghost in the machine' of the mind-body problem, in order to show 
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that religious experience is, in the last analysis unconditional 
commitment, demanding nothing beyond the self to justify it. 
Here Miles endorses Flow's agnostic criticism of Baillie and 
Farmer, who speak of experiences of God through prayer etc. Flew 
wants to know what difference would be made by simply imagining 
the presence of God in such circumstances. Unlike Miles, who is 
reduced to speaking of experiences which could be explicated without 
reference to God (although he speaks of the believer's unconditional 
commitment to God), I am trying to say something quite different. 
My view is that the kerygma of the Apostles, with its consequent 
form of life and language game emanated from something which, to 
quote Wittgenstein, is "there, like our life. " Their prior 'belief 
int God enabled them to discern the revelation of God in Christ. 
So, today, it would be possible to speak of an experience as being 
'consequent upon', i. e. the outcome of, 'belief in'. 
Miles rightly speaks of an experience being either an experience 
of (e. g. of Smith being a talkative man or of Eastern bazaars) or 
experience with (e. g. with children, with machine-tools). tie points 
out that 'I had an experience of Smith' seems odd. He later uses 
this to reject 'I had an experience of God' and argues that 
religious experience can, in no circumstances, be said to be of or 
with something or some-one beyond the self, that is beyond one's 
feelings, attitudes, aspirations etc. Religious experience is 
bharacterised by comnittai, devotion, social action etc. I do not, 
of course, deny any of these characteristics as being elements in 
the Christian's repertoire of his religious life. To be a Christian 
in the sense of responding sincerely to the 'Christ-event', however, 
could be said to be an experience of something new. Feelings and 
volition will be involved. Yet the doing of the act whereby assent 
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is given to that which the apostles wrote of Christ 
is to participate 
in something more. My point here is that the Apostles could 
; not (and 
I take this to be a logical point as well as an empirical actuality) 
have written or spoken of this 'new creation', this 'something more, 
if they had not been gripped by the Christ whom they encountered 
in 
the person of Jesus. It was the apostles' belief that the awareness 
of newness and innovation came from beyond themselves, yet had as 
its source an historical personage whom they had seen and heard. 
That'is the heart of the matter. Miles' talk of commitment is 
insufficient to make sense of what the Christian Faith purports 
to 
provide. The Apostles' experiences are a paradigm for our experiences. 
I cannot have their experiences but I can respond in a similar 
fashion, and believe about Christ and in Christ as they did. From 
this it might be said that I am speaking of 'experience by proxy' or 
second-order experience, in that modern believers are conceived to 
know certain statements about Christ and certain theological 
formulations. To adopt this view would be to revert to an informa- 
tive view of revelation, rather than the experiential view I am 
seeking to uphold. My argument is that if it be accepted that the 
roots of reference are to be found in language, and if meaning is to 
be defined as use, the particular use to which a Christ-centred 
language game is put by believers, and the meaning which is 
explained through a specific act of identification with the apostolic 
kerygma, and all that it implies, are the means of speaking 
intelligibly of an experience of God. 
The apparent circularity of my argument which would confirm 
Miles in his view that there can be no way of speaking intelligibly 
of God, understood as objective BeingXsvealing Himself to man, may 
be avoided when the logical implications of assenting to the kerygmatic 
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language game are scrutinised. Wittgenstein said that what differen- 
tiates believers from unbelievers is the use of different pictures. 
These pictures reflect different world views, ways of seeing things. 
Since they are totally different, an unbeliever cannot contradict a be- 
bliever or vice versa. One is either committed to a particular 
world view or not. This argument appears to support miles' contention 
that religious experience is not about something external to the 
believer but a matter of commitment. I do not dispute the necessity 
of commitment, as I have said. I do contend, however, that the 
commitment in the case of a Christian believer is to the Christ event 
which, imprinted in language as it is (in the New Testament) 
necessitates participation in a form of life. The structure of the 
language associated with this form of life cannot, logically, function 
without the concept of encounter and response between God and man, 
given expression by the 'Christ-event'. It is here that my experi- 
ential view of revelation joins hands with the informative and 
instructive views. For religious experience, understood in this 
Christian sense, can be said to be commissive (as Miles shows), 
performative (assent to a language-game and to its logical entailments 
and contraries), necessitating knowledge ('of' facts about Christ, 
theology etc, and 'how' to relate these to worship etc) and 
dependent upon 'belief in' Cod, as a prior condition. It is in the 
sine qua non of this particular participation in a form of life, 
however, that experience of God has its significance. It would not 
be possible to play that language game, in my opinion, without the 
apostolic affirmations about God-in-Christ having a perlocutionary 
force for the believer, and so he could not, logically, be said to be 
participating apart from, not merely an assent to the Christ-event, 
but some newness of life for which the phrase experience of God 
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would, given the constituttlv*i concept of God which determines 
religious belief, be appropriate. There is more to it than uncondi- 
tional commitment, important as that is. 
If this attempt to tie the concept of religious experience to 
language which purports to reflect divine revelation to man, be said 
to open the way to a 5nfinit7 number of creeds which lay claim to 
particular disclosures by Allah, Brahma, Ormuzd or whoever, no 
problem seems to me to ensue. It is incumbent upon those who claim 
to be the recipients of a divine disclosure to say how such a 
disclosure was made manifest to them or their forbears and how they 
were able to determine that it was indeed what they hold it to be. 
Given the view that Christian Theism owes its existence to a form of 
life and the language game of Christian belief, it follows that it 
is that area of discourse, and not another, which will provide the 
logical basis for what can or cannot be said about revelation, as 
understood by Christians. A(y problem has been to try to find some 
means of showing how experience, understood in its normal usage, may 
be said to be a word which can be used in a rational way when that 
of which men are said to have experience is a self-disclosing God. 
Therefore, whatever other assertions of divine revelation may be 
made by those of other faiths (about which I do not consider it to 
be part of my task here to comment upon), the view I as espousing 
is (as any other claim to divine revelation in other faiths would 
be) rooted in a particular linguistic context. Christian Theism is 
rooted in that area of discourse which has as its focal point, I 
believe, the apostolic proclamation of the Christ event. And that 
event, incorporating theological interpretation of the putative 
historical material as given in the New Testament, provides a 
pivotal reference by which talk of religious experience can be said 
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to find some justification. 
I OTE 
Throughout this chapter, I have referred to different concepts of 
religious belief: that it is unconditional commitment; that it is 
culturally determined; or that it is in need of modern appraisal. I 
have chosen the view which sees Christian belief as being; explicated 
by reference to its appropriate form of life and language game. In 
drawing attention to views which I do not share, it may be observed 
that I touch upon, but do not develop, some of the alternative 
interpretations of religious belief which are discussed by Stuart 
Brown in "Do Religious Claims Make Sense? " SCM, London, 1969 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FOCAL POINT OF THE LANGUAGE GAME TO WHICH 
'BELIEF IN' RELATES: THE KERYGMA 
aPannenberg tells us that it is in the 'fate of Jesus' that the 
Christian may find a secure basis for a faith which looks to the 
future for its final vindication. In the resurrection of Jesus from 
the dead, the God of Israel has shown himself to be the one God of all 
men. 'The God of Israel has substantiated his deity in an ultimate 
way and is now manifest as the God of all men. With the resurrection 
of Jesus, the end of history has already recurred ... If the fate 
of Jesus Christ is the anticipation of the end, and thus the 
revelation of God, then no further revelation of God can happen. 
This does not mean that nothing new happens after Christ. The history 
after Christ is determined in essence by the proclamation of the 
revelation in Christ. " Pannenberg goes on to assert several 
important inferences in respect of our understanding of the concept of 
revelation. Meaning is provided for all history through the Christ 
event, so that while the totality of history demonstrates the deity 
of the one God, it is through that one particular event that the 
purpose of history is disclosed. This is because the end of history 
is anticipated by it. Yet our present position is that of openness 
to the eschaton, the end, which has already been revealed in the 
Christ event. As such it cannot be overtaken by any later event. 
The eschatological nature of the Christ event enables us to discern 
the self-revelation of God in it. Pannenberg then shows how the 
report of the fate of Jesus by the apostles, the kerygma, enabled 
them to convey the revelation of God to their generation. So for us 
today, it is through the kerygma, the proclamation which tells of the 
revealing history centred on the Christ event, that we may apprehend 
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the eschatological self-revelation of God. We are privileged, 
through this proclamation of the Christ event, to know about the 
universality of God's revelation, something of which Israel with its 
recognition of Yahweh's revelation through occupation of the land, 
reception of the law and of the prophetic voice, had less awareness. 
It is to be observed that Pannenbergs thesis entails two 
distinct kinds of knowledge: historical knowledge and some form of 
knowledge by experience or by intuition. (Both are knowledge claims 
wherein putative 'knowing that' is indicated. ) If A is a serious 
believer he may be said to know certain things. He knows that the 
Apostles recorded various events relating to the life of Jesus of 
Nazareth; and what those events were; in addition, he knows the 
substance of teachings attributed to him and those said to be by 
Apostles, including Paul. Beyond this, he believes that he has 
acquired a grasp of those insights to which the Apostles bore witness. 
Through a religious experience of some kind he has achieved intuitive 
understanding and he has evinced his response to the kerygma. In so 
doing he has shared in a way of life lived by a community of people 
in this age, and in previous ages. 
So we may establish the constativo and commissive aspects which 
the kerygma requires. For B, an agnostic, neither of these aspects 
of knowledge would be laid claim to, although in principle it would 
be possible for him to acquire historical knowledge of the faith. It 
would not be possible for B, as an unbeliever, to claim the kind of 
insight spoken of by As based on a kerygmatic understanding of that 
historical knowledge. Undoubtedly, we may say that A possesses know- 
ledge (necessarily of at least some historical facts and, indubitably, 
knowledge based on some sort of intuition or experience which his 
response to the kerygma has brought) which B does not possess. Here 
we see that 'belief in' is a pre-requisite for playing the theistic 
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language game. The "depth" grammar of the 'games may be said to 
include both the Christ-event and the kerygma of which Pannenberg 
speaks. It would make sense to say, given this fundamental difference 
between the knowledge-claims made by A and B, that A conceives the 
transcendent to be revealed through the immanent (in the sense that 
empirical criteria are appealed to, to make such claims) while B 
recognises no ouch transcendent reality. A understands what it means 
to say that God's revelation has occurred through historical events: 
part of his stock of knowledge, as a believer, resides in the 
historical element. Yet he would insist that it is through his 
response to the Christ-event, the kerygma, that he has embarked upon 
a path which looks ahead as much as it does to what has gone before. 
Pannenberg's concept of God as the Power of the future, who is ahead 
of every present age, and through whom the eschatological ideas 
expressed by Jesus and Paul are said to be capable of fulfilment, 
provides a necessary complement to his concept of revelation as 
history. We are thus able to grasp the possibility of the historical 
as being, although linear in its space-time aspect, cosmic when seen 
in its totality. That is to say, when viewed sub specie aeternitae, 
from the position of the revealing purpose and activity of God, 
futurity as well as pastness focus on the eternal in the present. 
Although from a human stand point the future may be said to be open 
in a way in which the past is not, the end has been glimpsed in what 
has already occurred. Isere Wittgenstein's pointer metaphor is 
appropriate. To which I refer in some detail when considering the 
concept of the INTENTIONALITY OF GOD. We can plot the logical 
bearings which this understanding of the Christ-event necessitate. 
It is here, too, that the idea of appropriation through belief, 
provides the basis for further belief. Such beliefs include the 
conviction that the events reported have present and future signifi- 
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cance for the believer, and for all who share his faith. Pannenberg's 
concept of revelation as history thus enables us to recognise the 
possibility of making sense of indirect, inferential knowledge as 
counting as knowledge of the transcendent, insofar as the concept of 
'belief in' is given full play, as required by the kerygna. 
It will be observed that I have itemised the historical element 
as being the avenue for speaking about the transcendent. Since it 
is only through the report of the Christ-event, by the proclamation 
of the kerygma, that revelation is claimed to have been conveyed to 
those who would respond to it, it may be said that what would other- 
wise have been unknown to man, was made known through this medium. 
This must be taken to be so, for the Christian Faith is about God 
meeting man through the Incarnation. Pannenberg's definition of 
revelation as history points to this understanding of the transcendent 
being beyond knowledge, rather than beyond description. Inherent in 
his thesis is the hint of 'something more'. His stress upon the 
forward-looking aspect of the kerygma indicates that Christiana 
await a fuller knowledge of God than that already conveyed through 
the Christ-event, as far as its historical aspect is concerned. A 
glimpse of what is yet to be - the 'eschaton' seen through the events 
of history - has been gained. it is in the believer's response to 
the message of the kerygma, as much now as in Apostolic days that a 
realisation of the eternal dimension is possible for him. The 
commissive aspect of 'belief in' is thus to the fore. In this way, 
a grasp of what is meant by the transcendent emerges. In the 
possession of the insight which knowledge of something new brings 
with it, the believer may be said to be appraised of a deeper under- 
standing than more knowledge that certain historical events are said 
to have occurred could bring. His "belief in" God thus embraces 
both constative and commissive elements. He 'believes that' in the 
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kerygma the proclamation of God's word to men has been effected; and 
he 'believes in' the One who both proclaimed that word and became the 
focus of the proclamation itself. 
It will be seen that the believer is in the position of 
supplementing knowledge claims about past events, which are of 
necessity claims about closed events, with claims to an understanding 
of what is the case in respect of present knowledge, which embraces 
an openness towards the future. His claim to know X, through response 
to the kerygma cannot be logically separated from his knowledge about 
the past. His claim to possess knowledge of revelation as history, 
or of a transcendent Being made known through immanent events, 
entails an understanding of the Christ-event, in its past, present 
and future senses. So Wittgenstein's criterion concerning the 
learning associated with a language game is fulfilled. Without a 
basic historical knowledge he could not, logically, be in a position 
to respond to the kerygma. As in any other piece of knowledge 
which is inferentially acquired, the believer must rely upon 
experiences which he has. On the one hand, these will be experiences 
of learning history. This reflects the constative element of belief. 
On the other hand, they will be experiences which have enabled him 
to be aware of having responded to the Christian message. Hero the 
commiasive element of belief is seen. By paying heed to the report 
of those historical events he has gained an insight as to their 
import and bearing upon his life. 
All of thin Wittgenstein would want to place within the borders 
of a specific language-game. I have talked, in effect, of the "depth 
grammar" of sentences appropriate to Christian theology. The 
autonomous grammar of the 'game$ determines meaning. I have implied 
that there is a "formt of life" which the language of theism reflects. 
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In aligninC historical events with present experiences and expectations 
of future events, I have indicated the "logical space" covered by the 
interior structure of this particular language Came. This has been 
demonstrated by recognising the constative and commissive elements of 
Christian belief, and that knowledge which a believer may be said to 
possess by dint of his response to the Christian report of those 
events. What it makes sense to say, then, is that the transcendent 
expressed in the immanent is not solely related to history, but to an 
apperception by each generation of believers of what is the case in 
respect of their having reached out beyond knowledge of putative 
historical events to an awareness of new insights gained by their 
belief in the proclamation (kerygaa) of those events. 
I shall now examine Quine's view that the roots of reference 
are to be found in language and argue that, as a complement to 
Wittgenstein's understanding of the autonomous grammar yielded by a 
particular language game, it is in the language employed by the 
Apostolic Kerygma (and its attendant 'form of life' and its societal 
foundations) that the meaning of Christian propositions concerning 
revelation is to be discovered. 
bThe 
concept of the kerygma as a report of apostolic observations 
could 'serve to pick out what witnesses can agree on'. Sentences are 
to be found in the New Testament kerygmatic material (whether in the 
Gospels, the Acts or the Epistles) which may be said to express 
'socially shared' experiences. It is thus through language that their 
referential aspect may be inferred. And the notion of today's 
believers being able to gain some sort of inferential knowledge of 
God through response to the proclamation enshrined in the appropriate 
language, once again fulfils Wittgenstein's criterion of finding 
meaning in usage and his stress upon the autonomy of the 'grammar' 
concerned. The societary aspect of the kerygma (one with which 
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Bultmann and the Form Critics are especially associated, through their 
stress upon the early Christian communities as the source of the 
established kerygmatic message) gives to the inter-relatedness of 
theological doctrines a significance which solitary pronouncements 
would not Cive. For example, Pauls credal statement "Christ died 
for our sins" presupposes not only theological elucidation but 
historical description and discussion, against which the claim may 
be examined. "Most sentences do not admit separately of observational 
evidence. " Quine goes on to tell us that both the evidential and the 
semantical relations are complex when we study 'observation sentences'. 
lie points us away from ideas to language, an apparent difference with 
Popper here. This it is in the understanding of sentences, based 
both upon socially acceptable empirical data and ostensively learned 
rules, that a selection can be made as to what is the case. We may 
all share in the study, and sifting, of language to help us arrive 
at the truth. 
So it would be possible to say that the Apostles, as witnesses, 
agreed upon reports of observed events which they proclaimed (the 
kerygma) by word of mouth and by writing. This provided the constative 
element. All who heard or read their proclamation were invited to 
increase their knowledge of the nature of things by making a positive 
response to that to which their words (observation sentences) directed 
them. So demonstrating the commissive aspect of 'belief in'. To 
dismiss such response as being merely a favourable value-judgement 
or merely assent to certain propositions is to minimise naked under- 
standing of language. Logically odd religious language may be; in 
the discernment achieved through openness to its depths of meaning 
new knowledge may indeed by imparted. I have argued that the know- 
ledge-claim which the concept of revelation as history makes, is not 
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to be reduced simply to a claim to one's having an experience. It is 
a necessary condition for one to acquire knowledge of the transcendent 
(understood to be in the nature of revelation as history) that one 
should experience firstly a learning of certain putative facts (the 
CONSTATIVE aspect of belief) and, secondly, experience some kind of 
recognition of the significance of those facts (the commissive 
response of belief). However, to say this, is to say something other 
than to say that the alleged knowledge resides in the experience 
alone. My quotations from Quine were intended to underline the belief 
held by Christians that, in the kerygmatic report of events vouch- 
safed by an agreed verdict of the Apostles, loboervation-sentences' 
were being provided. Quine's demonstration of the relationship of 
evidential and semantical elements in language, and their social 
grounding, enables us to appreciate the necessity of a careful study 
of what has been and is said by Christians. The fellowship of the 
church - then and now - is the society which has produced a language, 
some of it having a special connotation within the boundaries of 
that language, dependent for its very existence upon 'observation 
statements', the report of which both instituted the fellowship and 
has sustained it since then. To say that a believer's inference 
through experience of 'observation-statementsf and response to the 
shared insights of the kerygma is a linguistic matter is to say no 
more than one would say of the communication of any experience what- 
soever. Quine has much to say about the way that 'children acquire 
an understanding of the relation of words and sentences to external 
objects. ' He analyses the learning process which enables a child to 
select and classify appropriate linguistic phrases and sentences to 
enable him to communicate acceptably in the society to which he 
belongs. Compare here Wittgenstein's emphasis upon the learning of 
rules and the contextual nature of language. There is an empirical 
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checking system to help him sort out what is dcerod to be pertinent to 
, 
the situation he meets* Thus in learning to understand 'red' a child 
firstly barns that it is a ratter of ci,,; ht not of some other sense. 
-. e as to find how much to count, how biZ a patch, and what aspect of 
the patc=h - r, ot confusing shape with colour. Shade too is significant 
and the de, Tee of orange gern tted to allow of 'red' Win, - defined* 
-, Luine insists, however, that it is 'present inpirgerr, ents t which 
suffice for observation sentences: 'It is raining', $This is red', 
'That is a rabbit'; although each of these are dependent or, onots 
earlier trainin in the use of language, they are of a different sort 
of sentence to those which make a remark about ancient Egypt or about 
the nucleus of an atom. He would not, therefore, accept my attempt 
to describe Judaeo-Christian historical propositions as observation 
statement,. Yet it in not only 
, uine's 
W'ittgennteinian rev-ark that 
the road to reference is through language, but his stress upon the 
necessity that there should be witnesses to establish the veracity 
of a report of observations, which has led no to discuss his 
philosophy. In his exposition of how a child learn; to relate 
language to experience, Quine speak, of ontological sophistication. 
This phrase may be applied to his ingenious exploration of the logic 
of referring,. lie cautions us to adopt a method of relativo 
empiricism: "Don't venture farther from sensory evidence than you 
need to. " He concedes though that even in the case of bodies 
"those prototypical objects of reference" there was no intention of 
copying Russell and Carnap in attempting to translate talk of bodies 
into talk of sense impressions. "I asked how, given our stimulations, 
we night have developed our corporeal style of talk., " %uine 
elucidates the physiological factors in the stimulation of human 
responses. lie states that ho has speculated on causes, not juzti- 
fication. s. By a study of cemantical relations within las aCe, 
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clues to fundamental causes may be discovered. And interestingly, 
Quine asserts "One could ask, in the same spirit, how we developed 
our religious talk ... If we managed to reconstruct these causal 
chains of language learning, we would find that every here and there 
the learner had made a little leap on the strength of analogy or 
conjecture or confusion; but then the same seemed to be true of our 
learning, to talk of bodies. In short, I speculated on causes and 
not on values. " Here Quine concedes the point made by Hudson that 
there does appear to be, in the last analysis, an elusiveness in 
respect of physical objects as regards the attempt to ground what we 
say about them in sense experience. It is in his linking of obser- 
vation statements to a report which must have social approval for 
it to be valid, that his analysis seems to bear upon the coherence 
of the concept of revelation as history. I realise that I have 
gone well beyond what Quine himself would accept as viable obser- 
vation statements. I do not think that I have tried to make any 
substantive claims in respect of theistic historical propositions. 
What I have attempted is to show how the basic Wittgensteinian view 
concerning meaning as use seems to gain support from Quine's 
discussion about the roots of reference in relation to language. 
Also this accords with Wittgenstein's teaching that the autonomous 
grammar of the game and those fundamental propositions upon which it 
rests determine what can be said and wherein meaning is to be 
discovered. If I have succeeded in arguing some plausibility for 
the view that in the apprehension, through the written and spoken 
work, of both the apostolic witness and the kerygmatic pronouncement, 
intelligibility can be given to the concept of revelation as history 
I shall be satisfied. 
From what I have just said, it is clear that "belief in" under- 
stood in its constative and commissive aspects provides a criterion 
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for a believer to become alive to the transcendental claims implicit 
within the kerygma. It would not be possible for him to claim any 
sort of reception of the revelation implicit in the Christ-event and 
at the same time dis-believe in it. There is a finality about human 
response to the kerygma, going beyond psychological states or moods, 
which encapsulates the essence of what is entailed in Christian 
belief. As regards Wittgenstein's notion of having compelling 
reasons for knowledge-claims, A would be able to speak of such 
reasons. Although historical knowledge cannot be said to be knowledge 
of God, it may be considered to be preliminary to the further know- 
ledge which kerygmatic understanding will bring. Albeit, inferential 
and not direct knowledge is here to be understood. His claim to know 
'something more' than that yielded by the historical facts alone is a 
recognition of the comnissive nature of theistic language. It has 
perlocutionary as well as illocutionary force for the believer. If 
we are to discover the meaning of this language we must follow 
Wittgenstein's advice and see how it is used, and more: to discover 
by the system of representation, that meaning which the autonomous 
grammar of the 'gare' yields. We shall then notice that, within the 
language-game played by the Apostles who reported the Christ-event, 
and in its subsequent conveyance through kerygmatic proclamation, 
the claim to know the transcendent through experience of the immanent 
is frequently made. I am in effect arguing that the apostolic 
conviction for what they understood to be the Christ-event formed 
the basis of'all that they had to s about revelation. 
How far may the concept of response to the Christ-event or, to 
hark back to Pannenberg's thesis, the notion of revelation as history, 
be considered to be 'fundamental propositions in theistic discourse? 
We have seen that the Christ event is the sine qua non of Christian 
belief. It follows that there can be no intelligible talk of what 
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constitutes belief apart from it. For talk of such is grounded 
logically in the 'grammar' of the 'game'. To be sure, we cannot 
adduce empirical evidence for that which is beyond empirical enquiry. 
This does not entail the proposition that the concept of revelation 
as history is necessarily self-contradictory or incoherent. While 
Wittgenstein (in the forward to the TRACTACUS) speaks of drawing a 
boundary around what can be said and at the end of that work cautions 
us to remain silent of what cannot be spoken about (the "mystical"), 
he also informs us that a proposition shows how things stand, if it 
is true. We have had occasion to emphasise that a "form of life" has 
been expressed in the kerygmatic beliefs of the early church. We 
have seen how today the Christian community enters into that form of 
life by its understanding of the language employed amongst its 
members. Quine's analysis of the referential elements to be discovered 
in the language of a particular society, ultimately traceable to 
approved facts, provides further support for this approach. One may 
thus visualise a kind of chain connecting the linguistic formulae of 
today's believers with observation statements reported through the 
kerygma by the Apostles. Tentatively, I would offer the suggestion 
that in its perlocutionary impact upon the believer, the kerygma to 
which he responds as he believes, provides a basis for a claim to 
inferential knowledge. I would further suggest that the necessity 
imposed upon the believer through the acceptance of the kerygma is 
logical necessity. The finality of the observation-statements which 
form the substance of the apostolic report does not allow of 
variation of what can be said. Theologians discuss at length the 
problem of what we can know of the life and words of Christ. Even 
CBultnann accepted the kerygma, at least in its existential challenges 
he had to accept that the early church proclaimed X for it to be 
possible to say that we can respond to X today. 
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dCan 
we have the logical insight that 'there is no such doubt in 
this case? ' Can the proposition that I may gain an inferential know- 
ledge of God through the Christ-event; or more truly through response 
to the keryrma (in so far as the kerygsa establishes the concept of 
an encounter response relationship: belief in Christ is thus a non- 
negotiable condition for 'knowing') be deemed to be a 6undamental propo- 
sition for theism? A fundamental proposition in the sense that one 
must begin with not doubting it if one is to play the theistic 
language-`-ane? It is important to say that it is not that a believer 
asserts that he knows that p which is being examined. For clearly 
such assertion can be said to reflect his state of mind: it would 
be subjective and untestable. Rather, the assertion amounts to 
absolute conviction that this is how things stand. In Wittgenstein's 
words, the believer for ever holds a picture before him. His world 
waxes and wanes as a whole. His weltanschauung determines his 
attitude to all that happens in his life. To deny that he has 
gained, by experience, an inferential knowledge - an indirect grasp 
of not only reported events but an insight into the meaning of them 
- would be to deny everything which acts within his world. For 
it 
is thvough such acting that his talk of knowing God, revealed in 
historical events, shows how the focus of everything is upon the 
Christ-event, into which he hass entered Ey faitht. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BELIEF IN' AS A KEY TO 'KNOWING THAT 
A Christian Belief conceived to be a 'form of life' 
Will 'belief in' lead to 'knowing that'? The question seems to 
be demanded by an implicit assumption in the concept of revelation. 
For if revelation is taken to be the disclosure by God to man of 
something new, some new knowledge which he cannot otherwise obtain, 
it is clear that a knowledge claim is being made. Of course, on an 
informative view of revelation, the knowledge in question would be 
factual knowledge pertaining to something which is deemed to be the 
case. The putative historical events of the Judeao-Christian 
tradition would fit into this area. If an instructive view of 
revelation is in mind, we should be directed towards injunctions and 
moral ideas as being the new knowledge which was being imparted to 
us. Since my experiential view of revelation requires encounter with 
God to authenticate it, there would appear to be a need to establish 
someone who is known. To say that the question is "Will 'belief in' 
lead to 'knowing whom"? might therefore be more apposite to the 
subject. I am substituting a relative pronoun for a demonstrative 
one. Yet if I claim to know someone I must be able to single out 
one individual rather than another. In that sense, whom I claim to 
know must be akin to claiming to 'know that'. 
For if I am to sustain my experiential view of the concept of 
revelation, with its emphasis upon human encounter with God, and the 
prior assumption of God's self-disclosure towards man, I must in some 
way be able to show how one might intelligibly speak of knowing Dod 
through believing in him, constatively and comnissively. Two 
important questions immediately raise themselves, 1. Who or what 
is 
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god? That is, how are we to identify Him as an object of possible 
knowledge by men? 2. In what sense is the verb to know' being used, 
in this context? If the constative element in the 'belief in' god 
which Christianity affirms takes care of 'knowing how' we are to 
worship and obey God (being informed of such through the kerygma), 
it would seem that the commissive element points towards some kind of 
"knowledge by acquaintance'. (Commitment, however, could be to a 
moral code, not necessarily to a person. ) For, it might be said, it 
is precisely a claim to encounter with God, through the response to 
the kerygma (belief in) which Christian Theism makes. Encounter means 
to meet something or someone. It is with this in mind that I have 
put stress upon the form of life which may be said both to exhibit 
how a community of people act out their belief in God, and to provide 
a clue as to how a knowledge of God, through come kind of encounter 
with Him, may be understood. So the Apostles, in promulgating the 
kerygma, and in responding to the One whom it proclaimed, demonstrated 
their knowledge of God through their form of life. 
The concept of a form of life thus holds within it all that can 
be worked upon to provide an intelligible 'surview' (to use 
Wittgenstein's word) of the concept of revelation. It yields the 
autonomous grammar which those fundamental propositions implicit 
within the kerygma of necessity (and so logically) create. Learning 
to play the Christian Theistic language game involves learning rules 
whereby the 'depth' grammar (which demonstrates the interior logic 
of Christian talk about Ood, interpreted and, given content by, the 
proclamation of the Apostolic kerygma) may be understood. Such 
understanding becomes possible where there is explanation and where 
the experiences gained by believers through worship and fellowship etc. 
are thereby illuminated. The fundamental proposition, at the base of 
all that is said within the game, concerns the concept of god which 
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is seen to be constitutive of religious belief in general and, in so 
far as it centres upon the person of Christ, of Christian belief in 
particular. My contention is, then, that by adopting Wittgenstein's 
concept of a form of life and by arguing for the logical coherence of 
what is said by those who comprise the community who exhibit that 
form of life, light can be shed upon the concept of 'belief in' god 
which I have proposed as a means of constructing an intelligible 
Theistic epistemology. The twin components of the kind of 'belief 
in' which the kerygma requires (and which is thus demanded logically 
by Zo"r determined bil those fundamental propositions which lie at 
the bottom of the language game) are the constative and commissive 
elements of that belief. There must be, therefore, both indicative 
and imperative propositions to which one is called to assent and, 
without such assent, one would not be, logically, in a position to 
entertain the proposition that, in Christ, God might be encountered. 
I have forwarded the notion of a causal nexus or gradation of 
necessary conditions for being able to say that God can be knownt 
The apex is knowledge by experience - encounter with a god who is 
conceived to have revealed Himself, through acts of self disclosure 
to man, so that that which may be thought to lie beyond knowledge 
can be known. The route to this experience is then seen to be, or 
may be shown to be, those stages of assent and commitment, whereby 
beliefe in God gradually (though not perhaps necessarily so) takes 
on, or rather acquires, that dimension of understanding where a 
knowledge-claim can, justifiably, be made. The unbeliever may, 
logically, 'put himself in a position to ascertain what this know- 
ledge purports to be (and how it may be said to relate to other 
areas of human knowledge) by studying the documents and observing 
the practices which make up the Christian (body of belief) and by 
assenting to the proclamation itself. Freedom of the will and the 
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necessity for faith are two essential features of the psychology of 
belief. One may or may not respond to the demands and promises made 
by the kerygma. Without faith, understood to be the commitment 
aspect of 'belief in', knowledge of God would, logically, be impossible. 
a 'If-any man'will- do his. (God ºa. )'1: 1U, he- shall know of the doctrine. ' 
It remains to be shown, of course, how one may intelligibly use the 
verb 'to know' in this context. It also remains to be shown how 
one can make sense of the proposition that believers can aake a valid 
knowledge claim in respect of that which, in normal empirical usage, 
appears to be beyond knowledge. Central to this problem, is the 
problem of identifying 'god' and thus of trying to speak coherently of 
the concept of the transcendent form within a finite existence. One 
may indeed 'know of the doctrine', if by that is meant the teachings 
and ethical demands of Christianity. To agree with the proposition 
that 
b'no 
man at any time has known God' however, and then to try to 
make sense of the proposition 'the only begotten Son has made him 
known' clearly takes us beyond learning about Christ's life or 
discovering what the moral precepts taught by him are. It takeetus 
firmly into the area of human experience of personal encounter. We 
are invited to look in the direction of the Son in order to attain 
knowledge of the Father. 
Personal encounter usually presupposes bodily presence. Yet 
writing letters, speaking over the telephone etc* es*iiblish personal 
encounter also. One might be said to 'believe in' the writer of a 
letter or the speaker at the other end of the telephone. Such 
'belief in' clearly implies 'belief that' such a person exists. In 
encountering someone through the medium of written or spoken word, 
one in committee 'to the belief and one constatively receives infor- 
mation. ? Might there be here a suggestion for Christian belief? 
Even though bodily presence is not effected, the believer is persuaded 
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that through the written 'Word', he is being communicated with. His 
reading of the Bible has perlocutionary force for him. Integral to 
the subject matter is God in Christ who is declared to be the 
ctauthor 
and finisher', 'the Alpha and Omega' of all that is written. Belief 
in Christ yields constative and commissive results. One is learning 
new truths and being persuaded thereby to commit oneself to the 
$sender' of the 'letter', the speaker of the 'message#. All of this, 
of course, begs the question of the actual identity of the alleged 
provider of the knowledge. The evidence for such a One is often said 
to be the experience which is generated through response to the 
revelation. It is deemed to be an experience whereby encounter with 
God occurs. Such a notion coheres with the ideas found in the kerygma. 
The Apostles proclaimed their encounter with God through meeting 
Christ. 
We are being asked, then, to consider a knowledge claim 
concerning God's revelation of Himself to mankind which, in order to 
be corroborated in personal experiences, requires 'belief in' God, 
and adherence to the constative and commissive elements included 
within that 'belief in', I have tried to illustrate the matter by 
reference to a letter and a telephone call. Logically, 'belief in' 
in the sense demanded by the kerygma conceives-of some-one at the 
other end of the revealing process. It cannot rest with human agency 
alone, so that the speeches of Peter and Paul in the New Testament, 
require the concept of divine agency to give them sense. However 
the ideas of the New Testament are viewed, the end is the same. So 
we might apply "Popper's view of a "third world" of ideas, which he 
suggests might have a certain objectivity, if found to be seminal 
in the production of new information and understanding. We might 
use 
0Quine's view as to language being the arrow, as it were, to 
take us to the 'roots of reference'. Here we would think of 
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Wittgenstein's plea to seek for understanding in the use to which 
words are put within a language game. We would think, further, as I 
have done, of the form of life which is reflected in the game. Cr, 
again, we might sift the historical data and utilise New Testament 
scholarship to try to ascertain probable or possible events, through 
which 'belief in' God is given empirical anchorage. In each or any 
of these we would need to bear in mind the logical structure of the 
language game to determine the rationality of using the concept of 
'belief in' as a vehicle for talk of encounter between believer and 
God. And prominent here would be the notion of God being said to 
take the initiative in making Himself known. The question which was 
begged above, therefore, must find an answer of sorts in the sphere 
of trying to make sense of an unseen agent who is said to act 
nocaningfully in human affairs. 
B General and Particular Beliefs 
In speaking of the possibility of 'belief in' opening an avenue 
to 'knowing thatIq and in acknowledging that an evaluative 'belief 
in$ (trust in and commitment to God) requires some kind of factual 
'belief in$ to complement and elucidate it, a further distinction is 
called for. When surveying our beliefs, we may notice that some 
are general beliefs and some are particular ones. The former relate 
to ideas and evaluative concepts; The latter to putative facts. 
Since ideas may, necessarily, be ideas about non real objects, the roc 
need to establish a specific objective criterion to support such 
beliefs will not be demanded. Ideologies, thus, in their broad 
principles display general rather than particular beliefs. By con- 
trast a belief 'that' such and such is the case will be a particular 
belief which will be subject, in principle, to verification or 
% 
falsification ('Price's 'The eat is in the cupboard' where a belief 
is entertained and subsequently tested by looking in the cupboard). 
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Theistic beliefs concerning God's activities in the world are clearly 
general beliefs insofar as they express theological ideas. It would 
be possible to adduce beliefs, within Theism, which might seem to 
possess a similar status to the kind of belief in an intentional 
inexistent object of which Brentano writes. Or the propositions which 
are said by Russell to make sense while lacking existential import 
('The present king of France is bald') and those of which Wittgenstein 
speaks which lack sense but which 'do not reduce to gibberish' (the 
proposition of logic; attempted references to the 'mystical' which 
might seem to qualify for the caveat 'what we cannot speak of we 
should pass over in silence') might also have a comparative signifi- 
cance. These comparisons I try to make when discussing the philo- 
sophical problem of discussing God as Bodiless Agent acting in the 
world and the cognate of that, the problem of how man might know 
such a God. 
While recognising the general beliefs which are to be found 
amongst Christians and, while appreciating the less exacting criteria 
which these beliefs require insofar as empirical justification is 
not needed for them, it is none the less in respect of particular 
beliefs that my experiential view of revelation, I think, will be 
explicated. My reservation concerns the implication of a confusion 
between empirical and logical aspects of what I wish to say. For I 
have argued that the kerygma provides the starting point for a 
Christian understanding of revelation. Now insofar as I have looked 
to fundamental propositions and to a form of life as being constructed 
by the kerygma, I want to stress the conceptual patterns of the 
concept of revelation. In other wor' ds, my preoccupation has been 
with what it makes sense to say as a consequence of the acceptance 
by believers of those ideas implicit within the Christian Theistic 
language game. I have grounded my attempts to find logical coherence 
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for the notion of God communicating with man in something other than 
empirical events, per uze. It might appear confusing, therefore, if 
I attempt to erect particular beliefs of. a factual nature, and hence 
empirical ones, as come kind of episterological feature of my venture. 
But this fear is ungrounded when it is seen that it masks a further 
confusion. To speak of those fundamental propositions which lie at 
the bottom of the kerygmatic language game and which provide the 
Christian form of life with its authentication does not entail the 
exclusion of certain consta: Uie*c propositions which are, by definition, 
empirical propositions. I have exhaustively shown that belief in 
God, the corner stone of the Theistic edifice, comprises a constative 
as well as a comnissive element. Further, it has been seen that 
'belief in', while prior to, does not deny, 'belief that'. Where 
the waters are muddied a little is in the possibility of running 
togetherpputative historical facts, relative to Christ and the early 
church with theological propositions which are herneneutical and 
thus interpretative rather than factual. What I am striving to 
clarify is the central place taken by the kerygma - the proclamation 
of the Apostles - which has Sao be understood in an historical 
context if its meaning is to be explicated. It is in this connec- 
tion that Pannenbergs phrase, the Christ-event, is applicable. ttr 
point has been to say that there are particular propositions as well 
as general ones in the Christian language game. It will be becoming 
clear, I think, that the logical oddness which the word 'God, ' 
suggests provides a clue to understanding in respect of both types 
of belief. For one cannot function without the other. If I em to 
understand what it means to say that God has revealed himself to 
men -a general belief -I must apprehend how in the proclamation 
of the Christ event (in part - the empirical -a particular belief) 
such disclosure has been effected. To conclude and sum up we may 
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say that the notion of God itself expresses a general belief, while 
within the kerygma there are particular beliefs which comprise an 
empirical nexus of putative events. Thus there is a sense in which 
I cannot be in error in respect of beliefs about God. I can be 
mistaken, demonstrably, about specific beliefs attaching to the 
kerygma and, indeed, to the Judaeo-Christian portrayal of certain 
events. It is the task of the Christian language game to provide 
meaning for the idea of God in relation to human experiences, and 
thus to show how general beliefs may be provided with an objective 
determination through various particular beliefs. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHRISTIAN 'ACTING' AND SPEAKING: A "FORM OF LIFE"? 
Will it do to speak of Christian Theistic belief and practice - 
as proclaimed in the kerygma and evinced in the Apostolic community 
- as a form of life? I believe that it will, for reasons which 
I 
shall give. To enable me to do so, I shall discuss four philosophical 
commentators upon Wittgenstein's use of the phrase. These are: 
aJ. F. M. Hunter, whose views are given in a paper "Forms of Life in 
Wittgenstein's Investigations"; 
bP. Sherry, in his paper "Is Religion 
a Form of Life? "; 
CW. D. Hudson, in his book 'Wittgenstein and 
Religious Belief' and subsequent comments upon such; and 
d11 le Roy 
Finch in a chapter entitled "Forms of Life" in his book "Wittgenstein 
- the Later Philosophy". Before indicating where differences 
between these philosophers lie, a note of agreement is apparent. 
They all accept that, whatever Wittgenstein meant by the expression 
'form of life', is bound up with his understanding of the term 
$language-gamer. Although Hunter refers to one interpretation which 
identifies it with a language game, he rejects this interpretation, 
and in this he finds support from the others. What does each 
philosopher consider Wittgenstein to mean by a form of life? 
Succinctly, I shall list the differing views of these writers. 
Hunter opts for an understanding which puts emphasis upon what 
is typical of a living being: "typical in the sense of being very 
broadly in the same class as the growth or nutrition of living 
organisms .. ." He favours this interpretation in preference to 
ones which perhaps imply a more set or formal communal pattern of 
activity. A form of life, then, implies growth, development, 
individuality: it possesses a dynamic character. In so far as I 
favour a vibrant, evensif communal, expression of religious belief 
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as evinced by the kerygmatic order of living, at that point (only) 
would I borrow something from Hunter's interpretation. 
Sherry emphasises the 'surroundings' of a 'form of life' to 
explicate its meaning. He draws a logical distinction between 
these, 
which Wittgenstein alternatively names 'customs', 'institutions', 
'context', 'culture' or 'common behaviour', and a form of life as 
such. Context gives to a form of life its significance and together, 
surroundings and form of life provide a 'given' element. At this, 
what seems to me, incontestable level, I concur with Sherry. When 
he goes on to emphasise human response to particular expressions of 
forms of life and seeks to find grounds for justification in such 
expressions, I part company with him. At this point, he appears to 
come near to Hunter's view of the typical activities of living 
organisms as being representative of forms of lifer at least in their 
manifestations in human experience. 
Hudson is concerned to illustrate what he conceives a form of 
life to be by reference to religious belief. Against Sherry 
particularly, who holds that religious belief embraces a number of 
forms of life (e. g. of hoping, praying, forgiving etc. ) Hudson takes 
religious belief itself to be a single form of life. Hudson, 
accordingly, defines a $form of life' as a language-game which 
possesses 'ultimacy of intelligibility and justification $* He 
stresses that it is beyond being justified or unjustified and it is 
grounded in action. Hence by playing a language game, one accepts 
certain fundamental propositions which determine all that can 
intelligibly be said within it. Herein lies the ultimacy which 
removes from hypothetical consideration those actions which find 
their meaning in what is said of them. e"It is how we speak, rather 
than that we speak which constitutes a form of life in my view", 
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Hudson remarks. It will be clear from what I have said, that I have 
lent heavily upon this interpretation. 
Finally, Finch defines a form of life as social and cultural 
behaviour in a particular aspect $in so far as it is meaningful'. 
Forms of life are interwoven with language: the inevitable setting 
of language is some human activity which is meaningful in the terms 
in which the language with which it is carried out is meaningful 
To put the matter differently: a form of life is a possibility of 
meaningful action shared in by members of a group .. ." Language 
games and forms of life(ennobt coincide. Our system of reference is 
human social life and behaviour: Finch finds a comparison between 
what Wittgenstein calls forms of life with what sociologists call 
'social' or 'institutional' facts - only for Wittgenstein they are 
not "facts" but units of meaningful action which are carried out 
together by members of a social group .. . 11 This emphasis upon 
meaningful action is, I think helpful, in so far an it coheres with 
what Wittgenstein has to say about explanation being provided from 
within the depth grammar of a language game -I have tried to argue 
that the kerygmatic language game provides just such explanation of 
what experience of God might mean for believers. 
Incidentally, Finch criticises 
fWinch's 
view that a form of 
life needs to be associated with epistemology. "There is no 
epistemological basis or content to the notion of forms of life. " 
I take this to mean that there is what Hudson calls an ultimacy 
about a form of life which places it beyond the need to be justified 
or unjustified. In any case, Finch's emphasis upon meaning as being 
grounded in social action is consistent with my understanding of 
Christian communal activity as an indicator of assertions about God 
which are made therein. 
It might appear that I have attempted an eclectic 'surview' of 
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the notion of a form of life and selected discriminately to suit my 
case. What I am seeking to say about revelation as an experiential 
encounter between believer and God, epitomized in the encounter 
between 
the Apostles and Jesus of Nazareth (and in the transformation from 
presentation of the proclaimer to that of the One proclaimed), 
depends 
upon making good sense of the concept of a form of life. For my 
thesis is bound so closely to Wittgenstein's view of the primacy of 
fundamental propositions (which I shall expound at some length in the 
following chapter), that it is incumbent upon me to show how this view 
provides logical support for my idea that, in the Christ-event, a 
knowledge claim about encounter with God may be made. This requires 
that I show that the Christian communal activity and practice, 
emanating from the Apostolic kerygma, does indeed take on the 
character of a form of life, with its implicit fundamental propo- 
sition concerning God in Christ and associated theological doctrines. 
I wish to say that not only is it, in the light of the fore-going 
discussion, permissable to use the phrase 'form of life' to denote 
the language, community and activities rooted in the central beliefs 
of Christianity, but that it may be called a paradigm for what 
Wittgenstein intended by the phrase. To justify this assertion, I 
propose to state a number of reasons and support them by reference 
to points in my argument which look, either back to what I have 
already said about the kerygma, or forwards to further discussion 
of the significance of Wittgenstein's slogan: "The explanation of 
the meaning 4f a propositio7 is the meaning. " Firstly the Christian 
active community is composed of all those who have elected to believe 
in hod as understood through faith in Christ. There is thus, at the 
level of belief, a homogeneity which enables the community to be 
marked off as an exclusive entity. It is a specific entity, 
a clearly delineated group of like-minded adherents to a religious 
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belief. Secondly, the language Came which is played as a consequence 
of such belief is unique insofar as talk of Christ and his attributes 
is irreducible to talk of other prophets or thinkers. To play this 
language game is to learn to use specific language wherein the 
proclamation of the kerygma and the behaviourial implications of it 
constitute the criteria for participation in a form of life. Thirdly, 
what Wittgenstein says about all ones questions and answers being 
rooted in fundamental propositions, which lie at the bottom of a 
language game, is indicated here. For the constitutive concept of 
Theism - belief in god - finds its home here. It makes sense to ask 
questions about God within this context. Fourthly, the form of life 
implicit within the Christian language game or presupposed by it can 
be shown to determine all that can and cannot be said about meaning 
and reference. Logical criteria (and 'rules') are established 
through the medium of the communication between believers, on the 
basis of their understanding of the primitive kerygma. So an 
autonomous grammar exists which reflects the depth grammar of the 
game. Fifthly, the constative aspect which such proclamation produces, 
is mirrored in the commissive formulae, whereby a way of life is 
pronounced. Ethical and spiritual demands are made upon the denizens 
of the Christological interpretation of God's revelation to man. 
And so, sixthly, 'belief in' may be said to yield the possibility of 
now knowledge, knowledge about (od and of (tod. Each of these six 
elements, it seems to me, have some bearing upon the view that 
religious belief (as evinced in the community of believers), and 
particularly Christian belief, may be considered a form of life. 
For I have attempted to argue that in the kerygma, the proclamation 
of the primitive church, and in its commissive implications for 
believers, the foundation for Christian beliefs reside. And that 
foundatiotii. is that to which the description 'form of life' might be 
- 50 - 
applied insofar as it was upon such that people based their worship 
and attitudes to life. It helped to shape a new dimension of belief 
and practice. So, I cannot see why Wittgenstein's use of the term 
cannot suitably be nzed to describe the nexus of belief and language 
of the Christian community. If I am right, my efforts to anchor 
epistemological questions in those fundamental propositions relative 
to belief in and and knowledge claims of God in the kerygma will be 
supported. In the use to which Christian words were put by the 
Apostles, and have subsequently been used by generations of 
believers, one may discern the meanings of those propositions which 
form the substance of Christian belief. I think, therefore, that 
the concept of a community of believers, kerygmatically inspired 
and informed, qualifies for Wittgenstein's connotation 'Form of Life', 
and because of its conformity to what he said about fundamental 
propositions, autonomous grammar, criteria and rules, may be said to 
be paradigmatic of what a 'form of life' is. I hold that the 
keryematic language game and the Christian community in which it is 
rooted comprise a 'form of life', wherein the meaning of propositions 
concerning encounter with God find logical grounding. Since funda- 
mental propositions inherent in the Christian b1'lief in God are 
implicit within this 'form of life', I accept that at this level a 
'given' element obtains. I do not think, however, that this militates 
against my overall view that the idea of lack of grounds is 
preferable to an endless searching for 'privileged' facts to 
corroborate (epistemological) assertions of belief. 
I am in partial agreement with the prevalent views of each of 
the four philosophers discussed. With Hunter, I see a form of life 
to have some organic meaning: my understanding of the Apostolic 
community as one which grows as it 'feeds' upon its Christinn. (or 
kerygmatic) beliefs shows this. With Sherry, I take the point that 
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Wittgenstein put emphasis upon the context or &-surrounds' of a form 
of life, and would stress the all important contextual (and thus 
unique) aspects of the primitive believing community. With Finch, 1 
would acknowledge the concept of meaningful action as being determinant 
of a form of life: so much of what I say of the 'autonomous' grammar 
of the kerygmatic language game inheres in an understanding of what 
the writers intended in their proclamation and doctrines. Finally, 
with V'udson, I identify firmly in finding in certain fundamental 
propositions (the concept of god, and the proclamation of the Christ- 
event) a logical basis for the Christian form of life. With him, I 
have found reason to subscribe to the view that an identifiable, 
analysable, unique. form of life can be singled out by paying heed to 
the requirements of rational debate and to the intelligibility of 
what it makes sense to say. I believe that, understood as a specific 
form of life, the Christian language game and its associated logical 
criteria of autonomous gra^miar forms of representation and funda- 
mental propositions, provide just such an entity. Thus, while some of 
the ideas forwarded by Hunter, Sherry and Finch find support in my 
construction of an experiential view of the concept of revelation, I 
an influenced by Kudson's interpretation of Wittgenstein most 
decisively. ! fiq case depends upon my being able to show that 
rationality resides ultimately in that form of life which explains 
what is meant by an experience of God. Thus, I conclude, that the 
view of the meaning of the phrase form of life which I espouse is 
that which construes it to be a determinant of meaning itself. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN Iv{PERIEt1TIAL VIEW OF REVELATION - TIE ROLE OF 
FUNIAf1E11TAL PROPOSITIONS IN PROVIDING ECPLANATION 
To seek to understand what is meant by an experience of God, it 
is necessary to determine what characterises that experience. This, 
I think, may be done by paying careful attention to what counts as 
an explanation of it. I am taking the view that for the concept of 
experience to make sense within the limitations imposed by those 
fundamental propositions inherent in the Christian Theistic language 
game, the autonomous grammar of that game should be analysed. For 
what it makes sense to say in respect of man being said to know God 
must, given the acceptance of those fundamental propositions, depend 
upon an ability to understand the meaning attaching to the system of 
representation exhibited in the language game. I believe that we 
shall discover that, insofar as we look for explanation within the 
boundaries which the autonomous grammar establishes, the explanation 
of the meaning can then be shown to be the relevant meaning. Thus to 
say that a believer, through assent to constative propositions and 
by commitment to the One about whom those propositions speak, has an 
experience of God is to say something about the meaning which finds 
its explanation through understanding of the 'depth grammar' of the 
Igame1. 
aWittgersteinss belief that fundamental propositions are implicit 
within our acting, in a sense enables us to say that our empirical 
"knowing" of God stands or falls in relation to the coherence of the 
concept of "God" as a constituent of the theistic language Came. Our 
acting, as believers, includes the prayers, hymns, sermons, charitable 
works etc. which accompany worship and practice. It is within the 
framework of this devotional life, that the theist might speak of 
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knowing God. Yet his speaking in this manner rests upon a prior and 
underlying understanding that "God" is written into the very substance 
of which the theistic area of discourse is composed. Viewed in this 
way, it would not make sense to say that the believer discovers God 
or discerns Aim as one would come across or experience some physical 
phenomenon for the first time. That there is an empirical manifes- 
tation of Theistic belief, Sunday church attendance and all the 
paraphernalia of Christian activity demonstrates. If onels involve- 
ment in these things substantiate a claim to one's knowing and being 
known by God, the nature of that claim is open for all to investigate. 
To the accusation that all that the sceptical observer can perceive 
after painstaking enquiry, are certain rituals and morally attuned 
actions on behalf of the believer, it must be replied that 111 such 
overt acts of behaviour presuppose that which lies beyond empirical 
showing. What lies beyond such activity, yet is implicit within it, 
are those fundamental propositions which enable Theists to perform 
and to say all which appertains to the language-game which they play. 
With the concept of "God", given content, as Hudson suggests, 
by the recognition of Christ as the One who shows us God's nature 
and will for us, as the fundamental constituent of the theistic 
language-fie, Christian language has illocutionary and perlocutionary 
force for the believer. That is to say, it is in response to an 
ontological choice regarding one's understanding of life and of the 
world, that one decides to indulge in that area of discourse which 
characterises Christian Theism. It is thus through 'belief in' God 
that one, logically and psychologically, becomes involved. Taking 
this step co =its one, inevitably and necessarily, to the acceptance 
of specific principles and views which accompany the concept of 
Christian dedication. Thin, then, is the commissive aspect of 
'belief in'. It would be as ludicrous for a scientist to doubt the 
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uniformity of nature or the existence of physical objects; as for the 
believer to deny that "God" (and in the Christian sense, Christ) 
constitutes what it is which underlies all that he says, as a 
believer. Thus we can see that empirical evidence for Christian 
belief, whatever it may be thought to be, cannot of itself provide 
empirical verification or falsification of the fact of "God". On 
the other hand, if there were no 'acting' of the sort which has come 
to be associated with Christian belief, there could not be any ground 
for speaking intelligibly of "God". Since primitive man sought to 
interact with the forces of nature, manes belief in physical 
phenomena has informed all his scientific endeavours. A host of 
words and phrases indicate the primacy of such a belief. Daily life 
functions on the acceptance of its truth. So the Christian language 
game mirrors "a form of life" which, while being influenced by 
changing ideas over the passage of time, originated with the 
Apostles and continues to inspire the words and phrases heard in the 
churches and in Christian discourse. To attempt to deny the existence 
of God, or alternatively to offer empirical evidence for such 
existence, would be to put that area of discourse into limbo. 
How, then, may Wittgenstein's insistence that fundamental 
propositions provide *the rock-bottom of my convictions', 'the 
foundation of all my beliefs' and the 'fundamental principles of 
human enquiry' help us to determine the epistemological issue 
concerning the juxtaposition of knowledge and belief? Do they, 
perhaps, suggest a kind of cast iron certainty which, residing at 
the base of all that believers say, help to dispel doubt and, in some 
way, authenticate belief? We may recall that 
bPrice 
seeks to give to 
Christian belief an empirical testing on the invitation to the sceptic 
to "tasto and see" that the "Lord is good" etc. In so doing, he 
advocates an hypothetical approach to religious truth, dependent upon 
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the laws of verification and falsification, at least insofar as such 
laws can be said to apply to a person's having experiences which e 
said to be attendant upon Price's empirical procedure for affirming 
the reality of God for oneself. Wittgenstein steadfastly opposed 
all such efforts to interpret religious belief in such a manner. 
Instead, he insisted on the essential logical difference of theistic 
and empirical modes of speaking. They are different language games, 
and only conceptual confusion can result from any attempt to bridge 
the gulf between them. 
I give below some examples from Wittgenstein's "Lectures on 
Religious Belief" to elucidate this point. They are all quoted from 
Hudson's c"Wittgenstein and Religious Belief". 
"We don't talk about hypothesis, or about high probability. 
Nor about knowing. In a religious discourse we use such expressions 
as "I believe that so and so will happen", and use them differently 
to the way in which we use them in science. " 
"Suppose somebody made this guidance for this life: believing in 
the Last Judgment. Whenever he does anything, this is before his 
mind ... It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary 
grounds for belief, but 
Brather by regulating for all his life. " 
(LRB pp 53 - 4, Hudson p. 169) 
And quite unequivocally, in response to O'Rara's statement that 
religion is a question of science, Wittgenstein remarked, "I would 
definitely call O'Hara unreasonable. I would say, if this is 
religious belief, then it's all superstition. " (LRB pp 57 - 59, 
Hudson p. 61)e. 
Hudson interprets Wittgenstein to mean by "reasonable" scientific, 
and reminds us that Wittgenstein was aware of the problem of the 
rationality of religious belief. Wittgenstein stressed the fact 
that the difference between the believer and unbeliever is that 
they 
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have different pictures. For the believer these pictures provide an 
explanation for and an interpretation of his experiences. Thus his 
belief in the Last Judgment "might play the role of constantly 
admonishing" him (LRB p 56; Hudson p 172). Wittgenstein adds: "Here 
an enormous difference would be between those people for whom the 
picture is constantly in the fore-ground and others who just didn't 
use it at all. " Similarly, he says "Suppose that someone believed in 
the Last Judgment, and I don't, does that mean that I believe the 
opposite to him, just that there won't be such a thing? 
fI 
would 
says 'snot at all, or not always'. " (LRB p 53; Hudson p 168) 
Let us take this matter further by commenting on gHudson's 
attempt to relate his definition of religious belief as being 
constituted by the concept of god (i. e. the god of any religion what- 
soever) to Wittgenstein's concept of fundamental propositions being 
h"anchored in all my questions and answers, so anchored that I 
cannot touch them". Hudson suggests that the concept of god con- 
stitutes religious belief in a four-fold way. He compares the con- 
stitutive function of such a concept with that of two other areas 
of discourse where what is said is determined by appropriate consti- 
tutive concepts. These are the discourses of physical science and 
morality, whose language focuses upon and pre-supposes the existence 
of physical objects and the fact of moral obligations respectively. 
There could be no speaking of scientific language or of moral 
language were these constitutive concepts not accepted as the 
foundational beliefs, upon which everything which is said, rest. 
Similarly religious belief may be said to be constituted by a concept 
which is just as basic for any intelligible speech about religion to 
be employed: namely, the concept of god, The four senses by which 
this concept constitutes religious belief are as follows. "First, 
everything said within religious belief is said with reference to 
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God. Secondly, the existence of god is something which cannot be 
doubted within religious belief. Thirdly, definitions of the concept 
of god are logically related to what can, or cannot, be said within 
religious belief. Fourthly, the concept of god is logically 
irreducible. " 
In a recent paper, 
JHudson 
reiterates, develops or introduces 
further arguments to support his view that there is a close tie 
between the claim that the concept of god constitutes religious 
belief and Wittgenstein's understanding of fundamental propositions 
as the rock-bottom of all our convictions. He reminds us that 
Wittgenstein refuted'the argument that religious beliefs or "opinions" 
are hypotheses, which further evidence could one day validate. 
Hudson explores the possibility of religion being conceived to 
transcend a limit, recalling Wittgenstein's use of the concept of 
"the mystical" as that which lies "outside the world" since, being 
conceived as that which has absolute value, it cannot, logically, 
be just one more thing. Hence "the mystical" transcends the limits 
of language by "showing itself". All this accords with Wittgensteinls 
later view that religious belief consists in holding a picture 
forever before one such that one sees the world as a whole. (Here 
Hudson draws upon Wittgenstein's remark that the world of the happy 
man "waxes and wanes as a whole"). Since, however, Wittgenstein 
introduced the notion of two godheads, the world and the independent 
"I" whereby, nataphysically speaking, the self expressed by "I" or 
"will" can alter the limits of the world (in effect by making one- 
self independent of the world by renouncing any influence on 
happenings), Hudson believes that, at this point, Wittgenstein has 
left religion behind. He therefore turns to, and clearly approves, 
the second conception of religion found in Wittgenstein's writings,, 
namely that it constitutes, rather than transcends, ra limit to our 
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thinking. It is at this point that Hudson draws upon Wittgenstein's 
exposition of the significance of fundamental propositions from "On 
Certainty". 
The important point which he makes by drawing this comparison is 
that it is in the non-hypothetical aspect of fundamental propositions 
that the significance for religious belief is to be discerned. For 
just as fundamental propositions constitute a limit as to what can or 
cannot be said within any language game, so certain religious beliefs 
constitute a limit as to what counts as an explanation and what 
characterizes experience. And basic to all such beliefs is belief 
in god. 
-Hudson thinks that the concept of god is, in Wittgenstein's 
terminology, 'the tacit presupposition' of religious belief. Further, 
in respect of fundamental propositions, Hudson 
1comments, "*. at we 
must say instead (i. e. rather than as with an empirical proposition 
where truth may be shown) is that assent to a fundamental proposition 
gives our experience in some respect or other the character it has. " 
our very experiences reflect our assent to such propositions which 
give to those experiences the character they possess. 
THE SIGNIFICA? CE OF FUNDAU NTAL PROPOSITIONS IN EXPLICATING 
THE MEANING IMPLICIT 1"#'ITHIN LANGUAGE GAMES 
mWittgenstein asks, "Why do I not satisfy myself that I have 
two feet when I want to get up from a chair? " and replies "There is 
no why. I simply don't. This is how I act. " Later he alludes to a 
telephone conversation in which his friend in New York describes the 
kind of buds on a tree and Wittgenstein determines with conviction, 
from this information, what sort of tree it is. lie then comments, 
"An I also convinced that the earth exists? The existence of the 
earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting- 
point of belief for me. " Similarly, to the suggestion that a table 
Gp 
before someone either vanishes or alters its shape and colour when 
no one is observing it, and then when someone looks at it again 
changes back to its old condition, Wittgenstein responds, "But who 
is going to suppose such a thing! " He comments, "Here we see that 
the idea of 'agreement with reality' does not have any clear 
application. So 'The reasonable man does not have certain doubts'. 
my experience of the world of nature has the character it has 
because it is conditioned by my "not doubting" certain propositions 
(Hudson's paraphrase of Wittgenstein at 150). 
niiudson 
applies this 
thinking about fundamental propositions to the area of religious 
discourse. He makes a comparison with the experience we have of 
feeling remorse or of being aware of a sense of responsibility. The 
underlying belief which enables us to interpret our feelings in 
moral categories is the fundamental proposition, "There is such a 
thing as moral obligation". Hudoan comments, ". .. it is only 
people who already believe that there is such a thing as moral 
obligation who can feel moral responsibility or remorse. " In a 
similar way, he points out that religious beliefs "characterize 
our experience. " Belief in god, as a constituent of what is 
entailed in the commitment of oneself to the theistic language 
came, permits the believer to interpret his experiences in the light 
of this belief. Thus Wittgenstein can ask rhetorically, 'k'hy 
shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in 
a Last Judgment? ' (LRB p 58). 
°The 'form of life' here is clearly 
conceived to be all the 'acting' which lies at the root of the 
theistic language-game. Hudson draws our attention to Wittgenstein's 
observation in "Philosophical Investigations" (25) "Commanding, 
questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our 
natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. " He relates 
this observation to Wittgenstein's analysis of non-doubting behaviour, 
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without which our facility for doubting could not function (O. C. 354). 
pIn what he calls a 'very badly expressed and probably badly thought' 
statement, Wittgenstein speaks of the certainty, which in comfortable 
and not still struggling, as not something 'akin to hastiness or 
superficiality, but as a form of life'. "But this means that I want 
to conceive it as something 
j. e. the certainty enshrined in a 
fundamental propositio7 that lies beyond being justified or 
unjustified; as it were, as something animal. " So belief in a Last 
Judgment, viewed in the light of being a fundamental proposition 
within theism, both counts as an explanatirn (if it were deemed to 
nerve as an explanation, 
gHudson points out, it would be hypothetical 
and thus empirical) and characterizes one's experiences. It draws 
a limit to thinking for a theist. Thus a believer might explain an 
illness in terms of punishment which an unbeliever would not do. 
Wittgenstein speaks of the use of different pictures by the two 
groups of people. A believer's experience of anxiety or the terror 
which Wittgenstein refers to as "part of the substance of the belief" 
in a Last Judgment, adverts also to the limit which religious beliefs 
constitute. There is no question of belief in a Last Judgment being 
viewed as an empirical hypothesis. This is brought out clearly in 
Wittgenstein's comparison of the different attitudes of two people 
expressed as follows. "Suppose someone were a believer and said, 
'I believe in a Last Judgment' and I said 4.111 I'm not so sure. 
Possibly. ' You would say there was an enormous gulf between use 
If he said 'There is a German aeroplane overhead, ' and I said 
'Possibly. I'm not sure, ' you'd say we were fairly near! " (p 53 LRB) 
rThe fact that a believer uses his belief in a Last Judgment as both 
an explanation for events in his life and as an interpretation of 
feelings and attitudes which he experiences, bears witness to the 
limiting and constitutive nature of the belief itself. Behind such a 
_62_ 
concert (i. e. of a Last Judgment) lies that of belief in god. For the 
notion of a final judging of humanity (however that is understood by 
the believer), can make no sense whatsoever in the absence of some 
conceptualisation of divine agency, through whom such judking is 
thought to be effected. Hence we notice again the primacy of belief 
in god as constitutive of theistic belief. It is a fundamental 
proposition of such belief and, as such, informs and explicates each 
and every aspect of that belief. 
The example of belief in a Last Judgment is helpful in drawing 
attention to a distinction which Wittgenstein made as to the 
immutability or otherwise of fundamental propositions. 
aHudson 
reiterates, towards the end of his paper previously alluded to, his 
point that Wittgenstein, some of the time at least, thought of 
religion as constituting a limit to thinking in the way that funda- 
mental propositions do. Hudson adds that the question as to whether 
religious belief can continue to be considered a rational system 
(which he himself holds to be the case) is a separate issue. Here 
we may take note of the significant differentiation which Wittgenstein 
recognised between forms of fundamental proposition. 
tWittgenstein 
speaks of the "river-bed of thoughts" as being capable of shift. 
"But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river- 
bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp 
division of the one from the other ... And the bank of that river 
consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an 
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in 
another gets washed away, or deposited. " At once Wittgenstein 
offers an example of an immutable proposition, illustrative of those 
which, in his analogy of the river, form the solid rock bed. "Such a 
proposition might be g. g. "I! y body has never disappeared and re- 
appeared again after an interval. " Any suggestion that this 
_6j_ 
proposition may not be in accordance with the facts meets the rebuff 
that such a suggestion would not fit into the rest of his convictions 
at all. This leads Wittgenstein to make the remark that such a 
proposition is an unshakeable conviction, "anchored in all my 
questions and answers". Assertions as to his possessing two hands, 
being the offspring of human parents and never having been a great 
distance from the surface of the earth are in similar vein. In 
citing these examples, Wittgenstein refuted Moore's claim to know- 
ledge where universally accepted truisms were concerned. 
Wittgenstein's recognition of other kinds of fundamental 
proposition, those not representative (an in the cane of those just 
listed) of the hard rock of the river bed, was made in the realisation 
that human heings have modified or given up ideas which, at one time, 
were believed to be fool-proof. These ideas would be expressed in 
propositions which represent the shifting area of the river bed. 
Scientific theory is marked by changes of this nature: flat earth to 
sphere, helio movement to natatory earth, steady state to 'big bang', 
predictability to indeterminancy etc. Axioms of scientific enquiry 
such as the fact of physical objects or the uniformity of nature 
are held fast: firmly held theories about the structure of the 
universe and of life give way to new theories in the wake of fresh 
empirical evidence. 
Vhen we consider, with Wittgenstein, belief in a Last Judgment 
as a belief which cannot be doubted within the theistic language- 
Came, since belief in the Judaeo-Christian God entails belief in 
judgment, we can see that, like the scientific theories referred to, 
it is capable of fresh definition. UHudson comments, "sophisticated 
believers can be found arguing /oweveE about such matters as what 
conclusion should, or should not, be drawn from the #last' in 'Last 
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Judgement'. Should we take this picture to imply simply that human 
history will reach some temporal denouement; or that the judgment of 
God on human beings takes place here and now but is final in the 
sense simply that it cannot be gainsaid? " Ile contrasts these alter- 
native interpretations of a specific feature of theistic belief with 
the iranutable, and thus definitive, proposition that the concept of 
God's judgment involves belief in the justice of God which cannot, 
logically, be intorpreted to mean any form of injustice. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WITTGEI4STEIN ON EXPLANATION, UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING 
We have been taught by Wittgenstein that the explanation of the 
meaning of a sentence or of a word is the meaning of it. A man's 
understanding of a particular explanation can be ý; naed by the way 
he reacts to it. His ability to apply correctly the word or 
sentence within its appropriate 1 . nguage-game 
is the measure of that 
understanding. He may, of course, apply it correctly without under- 
standing, in which case further examination of his claim to under- 
stand would be required. Knowing how to apply a word is the conse- 
quence of correct training. To be informed of the techniques for 
using a word is to be informed of the area of discourse where it 
normally finds its home. C6tensive definition, use of samples or 
verbal explanation may have been cmployed to demonstrate how the 
word may be used. Variations of usage will have been observed as 
the growth of skill in recognising different situations in which it 
might occur has taken place. Where we have tended to seek objective 
reference to establish the meaning of a word, Wittgenstein has 
persuaded us to look, instead, and see how that word is used. He 
has weaned us from the Augustinian picture of language where meaning 
was thought to reside in an external reference. With such a change 
of direction, we have been encouraged to recognise the folly of 
thinking that the entertaining of a proposition, and the assertion 
thereof, are divisible into mental and verbal events. In supposing, 
surmising, wondering or believing that p we have used linguistic 
patterns of expression as much as in writing or speaking overt 
propositions or commands, wishes, questions etc. To formulate 
opinions and query ideas about a subject is to engage in a kind of 
linguistic activity, which only finds meaning within a specific 
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language-dame. All human efforts at communicating thoughts reflect 
the existence of verbal manifestations of a community, and the 
exchange of views and information within it. It might be thought 
that, since Wittgenstein relegated ostensive definition to a more 
lowly position, without in any way denying its role in our under- 
standing of propositions, and by way of compensation raised into 
eminence the -parts played by sampling and by comparing and con- 
trasting, the strangle-hold of empiricism has been relaxed somewhat. 
Wittgenstein's revolutionary change of emphasis was away from his 
picture theory of meaning which, like the empiricism of Frege and 
Russell, had been mesmerised by the Augustinian contention that 
words and sentences must, when properly understood, refer to objects 
in the world. His doctrine that 
reference is to be discovered within language, rather than via 
language to a supposed reality beyond it, had opened the way for a 
different way of conceiving of meaning. In this connection, it is 
interesting to notice Wittgenstein's concern for proper names, about 
which he had a good deal to say. What he so strongly resisted was 
his earlier attempt to adopt the slogan: 'unum nomen, unum nominatum. ' 
Frege had departed from the rigidity of this principle, by teaching 
that only an expression together with its context has a sense. 
wittgenstein's focus upon context reflected this opinion, but his 
stress upon samples rather than simples, e. g. examples of colours, 
colour variations, textures, smoothnesses and hardnesses, liquidity 
and solidity etc, indicated that he, unlike Frege, had broken once 
and for all with the idea that, in the last analysis, there must be 
a particular object for which a word stands. This much and more is 
ventilated in his 'Philosophical Investigations'. 
Wittgenstein acknowledged that one mistake he made inlihis 
atomistic philosophy propounded in the 'Tractatus' was to project 
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grammar on to reality. By adhering to an Augustinian model of 
language, he generalised about proper names in relation to objects 
which were thought to be indicated by them. He created metaphysical 
necessities in so doing. In his later philosophy, he pointed out 
that ostensive definition is bound up with the use of objects as 
samples. In pointing to a red object and saying 'This is "red"' 
(i. e. what is meant by the word "red"), one is employing,; the object 
as a sample of the colour red. Also by stating that an ostensive 
definition is a rule, not a statement of fact, he undermined the 
belief that such a definition connects language with reality. The 
important point for my purpose is to notice that, according to this 
new way of viewing ostensive definition - that is by connecting it 
with the use of samples and concentrating on its practical signifi- 
cance rather than on its assumed metaphysical propensities - it 
enables some symbols to be explained in terms of others. This can 
only be achieved by seeing that explanation is an explanation within 
language. Wittgenstein is at pains to stress that the ability to 
give an ostensive explanation of, say, tired' is dependent upon the 
ability to apply 'red'ccorrectly. However, it is to be observed 
that a correct explanation can be of more than one kind. By pointing 
to a shape which is circular and saying 'That is the shape of a 
circle' one is explaining the word as much as one would do by giving 
a mathematical description. Also, the fact that one cannot call to 
mind the necessary explanation may not indicate a person's inability 
to do so. He may recall it on being prompted or by being influenced 
by events which help him to recall what the explanation is. A degree 
of latitude, both in the determination of what counts as an expla- 
nation and in the conditions permissible for a person to be allowed 
to give an explanation, exists once we recognise that the meaning of 
a word or a phrase is to be discovered within language, with its corre- 
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lates of gestures and bodily articulations. Flexibility and approxi- 
mation, as in the command to 'stand roughly here', variety of 
usages, wherein one sentence-radical may be allied to a number of 
functional phrases (illustrated by the boxer stance picture) may 
suitably provide explanation. 
Employing a word correctly, within its appropriate context, is 
indeed necessary for both explanation and understanding. So, in 
seeking to explain to someone what a word, phrase or sentence means 
it is essential that the one doing this understands what he says, 
and his understanding will be shown in his ability to use the word, 
phrase or sentence correctly. Ile may use a gesture (wave of his 
arcs, facial expression etc), point to an object, using it ostensively 
and as a sample, or allude to comparative or contrasting examples to 
demonstrate that understanding. In doing any or all of these 
things, he will not be in any way implying that the object or 
objects referred to by his elucidatory procedures are merely 
incidental. There will be no indication or hint that the real 
samples are mental entities (e. g. the length of the standard metre, 
the colour of the patch on the chart, or the imare of this particular 
colour in the mind of the perceiver). 
It is the application of rules which enables a speaker to use 
words correctly. Wittgenstein moved away from the calculus model 
which Fege had used to apply the game of chess to language. In 
place of that, he showed that a word has a meaning only in the 
context of a sentence and a sentence only in the context of a 
language, just as a chess piece has significance only in the context 
of a move and a move only in the context of a game. Thus when I am 
showing my understanding of a word through ostensively applying it 
as a sample of a particular shade of colour, weight or length of an 
object, I am displaying how it is used within a contextual pattern. 
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It is this pattern which engrossed Wittgenstein. lie commented upon 
the richness and complexity of language. He speaks of language 
crowing end developing like a city which adds new streets and houses 
to its area. He said much about family resemblences which illus- 
trate the connections and likenesses, sometimes unobserved, between 
words and phrases having natural kinship. That ostensive definition 
alone will not provide a fixed definition of a word but rather one 
which differs from one setting to another, from one usage to another, 
will be apparent. The shade of 'red' indicated with regard to a 
piece of cloth or a house or car, discloses a sampling procedure, 
involving exclusion of other shades which in other circumstances 
would be ostensively suitable. That there are other correct 
usages of the word 'red' does not suggest in any way that my use of 
the word in a particular situation, as a sample of a shade of red, 
is not in itself a complete description. Wittgenstein teaches us 
that a language-game is complete in itself, insofar as it permits 
people to communicate correctly what they have to say. Further 
knowledge may extend its frontier, but that does not mean that it 
is not already complete as far as explanation and understanding of 
its constituents is concerned. What is essential for clarity of 
understanding is to have a 'surview' of the language used. It is 
in seeing the connections, analogies and disanalogies between words, 
both within a particular language-gare and, more widely, throughout 
the range of the language used that perplexity can be eased. 
From what I have written, being greatly guided by Laker and 
Hacker in their exhaustive analysis of part of the "Investigations", 
it will be clear that it is not always appropriate to seek for 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of an 
expression. "An inexact or incomplete X may suit our purposes 
perfectly in a given context. " Thus Wittgenstein gives an example 
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of an order being given to 'stand roughly here'. It will be a con- 
textual matter to illustrate the acceptable use of "He saw red and 
lashed out in fury". Obviously, the autonomous nature of grammar 
-precludes here any suggestion that 'red' can only be used by 
reference to some established reality. It is to be observed that 
it requires a grasp of the different way in which the word 'red' is 
being used jr. the above example, both by one familiar with its 
application and by a learner. To understand what is meant by the 
word 'on' one requires an understanding of the words used in any 
phrase in which it occurs - 'on the table' 'on the agenda' 'on 
Monday' etc. Understanding is provided by contextual paraphrastic 
explanation. The correct use of an expression and giving; the correct 
explanations of that use are the two criteria of someone being said 
to understand it. Indeed, Wittgenstein provides a variety of 
criteria of meaning which can be grasped when we realise that these 
can be explicated in terms of criteria of underktanding. He gives 
at least four criteria of explanation. Firstly, it must be of 
general application. Secondly, it must be public. The institution 
of words is lacking in a private explanation. Thirdly, explanation, 
unlike causes, comes to an end. The practice of explanation has 
limits (which may shift). Fourthly, there exists a public practice 
of applying the explained expressions, through appeal to rules. 
So, I return to the fundamental dictum that meaning is what is 
given by an explanation of meaning. And one's understanding of an 
expression can be gauged by the giving, in one way or another, of a 
correct explanation of it. 
TUE MEANING OF CHRISTIAN TALK OF GOD'S REVELATION TO PEN 
I have attempted to analyse meaning in relation to the view 
that a limit is imposed upon what can$ or cannot, be said in a 
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particular language-game by those fundamental propositions upon which 
the ý-zune rests. A number of important points emerge from this for 
my attempt to provide some kind of logical coherence for the concept 
of revelation. I shall deal with these by way of drawing together 
the Wittr°ensteinian strands I have discussed. 
To use a word correctly, in keeping with those rules which 
govern its normal usage, is to show that the speaker understands the 
meaning of that word, given the assurance that he is in a position 
to have acquired a grasp of that usage. Training in the use of the 
word will be evinced by his correct use of it. That use will provide 
evidence of understanding when its contextual location is clearly 
defined: that is its appropriate langzage Came or home. The limits 
imposed upon it will be determined by those fundamental propositions 
which form the presuppositions upon which it rests. Such propositions 
are not matters for empirical enquiry and do not depend for their 
validity upon contingent elements to which the particular word may, 
for its meaning to be explicated, relate. 
If we grant, then, that the word 'god' considered to be the 
constitutive concept of religious belief, and thus a fundamental 
proposition of that belief, cannot be open to empirical enquiry, 
because it does not contribute in any way to a hypothesis about a 
possible state of affairs, we can make a beginning towards an under- 
standing of Theistic talk. If we, further, accept the principle 
that the concept of god determines all that can be said within the 
Theistic language game, the path can be cleared for an attempt to 
give some kind of intelligibility to the idea that, in Christ, God 
has made himself known (revealed himself) to mankind. For it is 
Christ (and the 'Christ-event') which give to the concept of God 
its distinctive Christian characteristic. 
Armed with this fundamental proposition for discourse about 
- 72 - 
Christian belief, it will then be possible to use Wittgenstein's 
concept of meaning as use to elucidate epistemological problems 
concerning: man's knowledge of God. As I have said, the believer who 
speaks of his relationship with God will be able to provide an 
explanation of the ricaning of what he lays claim to by correctly 
using, words, phrases and sentences which refer to, and find their 
,; rounding in, the fundamental proposition concerning God which lies 
at the bottom of all which he has learned to say about his beliefs. 
It is important to notice, from what I have just written, that 
the charge that believers simply project their particular 'depth 
g, raInn ar f on to reality can be answered, when the 'form of life $, to -ý 
which the autonomous grammar of Christian Theism relates, is investi- 
gated. By this I mean that societal and individual way of life and 
explanatory langzage which characterises the Christian community: 
members of 'Christ's Body's the Church. In case I am misunderstood, 
I should make it clear that a yardstick by which to measure the 
Üenuiness of those professing to call themselves Christians should 
(given the original context in which Christianity is placed) be that 
of the Apostolic faith. Wo have seen how the kerygma, the primitive 
proclamation by the early church can be seen to be a linguistic 
foundation for both explaining and understanding what might be meant 
by $an experience of God'. Following Wittgenstein's philosophy of 
language and of meaning, it will be in the believers ability to say 
correctly what his belief consists in, that explanation and under- 
standing may be indicated. For he will be obeying those rules which 
are inherent in the tradition, and which criteria relative to that 
fundamental proposition concerning the concept of Cod, have helped 
to shape. 
The keeping of rules of the Igamet or adherence to them on the 
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part of the sincere believer will be a recognition by him of the 
understanding to which his belief adverts. By his response, in 
faith, to the kerygma, he belibves that he has encountered the God 
whose manifestation in Jesus comprised the historical event upon 
which that kerygma was subsequently proclaimed by the Apostles. I 
think it would be fair to say that they mere not guilty of making 
the mistake which Wittgenstein came to see was at the heart of so 
much misunderstanding, namely our tendency to project our grammar on 
to reality. Their method of representation rested upon their prior 
belief in God, for they were raised in the religious tradition of 
Israel. Insofar as they encountered Jesus of Nazareth, communed 
with him and drew inspiration from him, their eventual proclamation 
of knowing God through faithfin that Jesus might be seen as a logical 
progression within that belief. 
The language gare which Christians elect to play in our own day 
may be said to emanate from the Apostolic area of discourse. This in 
turn, an I have tried to emphasise, drew its strength from that 
constitutive concept of god which we have shown to be at the bottom 
of the gare. All the (acting' of the Apostles and of believers today 
can only make sense when understood in this way. Limits as to what 
can be said or cannot be said are imposed by that presupposition. 
Nothing which is said therefore, whether in the New Testament or in 
later Christian literature can, logically, be considered hypothetically 
aimed at establishing the existence of God. There is, it's interesting 
to note, however, a sense in which the Apostles offered samples of 
the sort of behaviour and the sort of moral and spiritual character- 
istics a follower of Christ might be encouraged to emulate. And they 
did compare and contrast Jesus with the Graeco-Roman deities and with 
the manifestations of the God of Israel, recorded in the Old Testament. 
Although, as I have previously indicated, the kind of empirical 
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testing Wittgenstein had in mind when he spoke of the need to provide 
sanpies rather than simples in order to provide ostensive explanation, 
within an appropriate context, (to discover what a particular word 
means) cannot apply-,,; by its very nature, to the spiritual dimension 
to which Christian Theism points, we may, I think, suitably utilise 
his methodology. For in seeking meaning and understanding, the 
Apostolic carefulness in making such distinctions relative to what 
they took to be the unique contribution made by Christ to human 
knowledge of God, must be of value. The reason for this is given a 
little further on. 
It is important, in this connection, to see how Wittgenstein's 
dictum that 'the explanation of the meaning is the meaning' of a 
given proposition, may be applied to those explanations proffered 
by the Apostles. Such explanations are to be found in the Gospels, 
the Acts and the Epistles. For example, the Pauline assertion that 
'God was in Christ reconciling; the world unto Himself', whilst clearly 
a theological interpretation of the early church, provides a ciSni- 
ficant explanation concerning its beliefs. We can discern the 
various features here of a specific area of discourse in operation. 
Thus we may notice the primacy of the fundamental proposition which 
sets a limit to what can be said. Their inherited 'belief in' God, 
enabled the Apostles to ground their 'hcrmeneutical' remarks about 
their experiences with Jesus of Nazareth in a theological could. 
Then, there is the autonomous grammar which emerged through their 
collective and individual enterprises in putting into spoken or 
written vocabulary a body of ideas. Such ideas emanated from 
another of Wittgenstein's categories, namely a 'form of life'. 
Indeed, such a 'form of life' was instrumental in inspiring and 
formulatin the languaCe game itself. So what was said of Christ 
as, for example, in the proposition of Paul given above, expressed 
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beliefs shared by communities of believers. 
Thus it is that we may reasonably speak of the proposition 
"God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself" as an 
explanatior of meaninF-. It provides one of many similar theolof-ical 
propositions whereby the meaning of the nascent Christian belief 
concerninr God's revelation to men in Christ may be said to be 
! riven explanation. Wittgenstein's dictum 'the explanation of the 
meaning- is the meaning' appears to be apposite in this instance. 
When the critic asks for the meaning of the general Theistic 
proposition that, in Christ, God has revealed Himself to humankind, 
he can be directed to such explanation as offered by the Apostolic 
writings. Thus reneral beliefs about God find explanation through 
an understanding of particular beliefs relative to the Christ event. 
Now, all this may seem to fit the Wittgensteinian model, What 
are we to reply, however, to the unbeliever who, having been given 
such an explanation, from within the limits presented by the funda- 
mental proposition regarding "god", seeks further understanding? 
Wittgenstein wishes us to discover in the explanation of the meaning 
of a word, phrase or sentence the reaninr which it bears, when 
correctly used. Such meaning entails understanding if both parties 
to the communicative process are capable and willing to grasp that 
meaning. A knowledge of the appropriate language and a learned aware- 
ness of when or when not a word or phrase is being correctly used, 
are pre-requisites for such communication to be effective. We may, 
it would seem have to face the problem of explanation of meaning 
being given, yet being not understood where Theistic discourse is 
concerned. 
Perhaps we should observe that the proposition from St Paul 
referred to above requires some initial elucidation before its 
meaning can be adduced. That was what I wished to imply in what I 
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said about its home being the lantguage Fame and the form of life of 
the early Christian community. It would seem, then, that the un- 
believer needs considerable education in the wider aspects of the 
keryrmatic proclamation to enable him to recognise that particular 
proposition as some kind of an explanation regarding the concept of 
revelation. For the proposition that God was effecting reconciliation 
between errin" man and pimself through the ministry of Christ to make 
sense, it micrht be supposed, the appropriate theology of atonement 
must be introduced. And, indeed, such a theology is provided by 
Paul and, more widely, by other Flew Testament writers. Surely, this 
indicates the contextual framework which exemplifies Wittgenstein's 
later teaching that reference is to be sought within a specific area 
of discourse. The proposition thus emerges as a paradigm of those 
beliefs which gain their meaning and reference within the context of 
the Apostolic proclamation. 
It would not, I think, be altogether outside the scope of 
Wittgenstein's definition of a sample whereby understanding in 
usage is displayed. I have noticed the vital distinction between 
empirical sampling which he discusses in his 'Philosophical 
Investigations' and elsewhere, and the sampling of ideas to which I 
have drawn attention. Yet the method holds, I believe, insofar as 
ideological concepts require a context to give them the significance 
which they seek to make known. My understanding of the determinism 
which the principle of dialectical materialism embraces, requires a 
similar language game and a similar form of life for Marxist ideology. 
In isolation it cannot intelligibly be understood. lily efforts 
later in my dissertation to draw parallels between sensibly aroused 
concepts and ideologically aroused ones will throw further light 
upon this matter. I shall endeavour to analyse the similarities 
and dissimilarities between sensory perception and our belief about 
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physical ob ects, and those which might be thought to hold between 
theistic beliefs, and an awareness of God to which they purport to 
point. "y concern at this stage has been to suggest that the 
Christian car show examples of what his beliefs about God entail. 
The proposition concerning God's reconciling work effected through 
Christ is rarticularly apt in adverting to a central doctrine of 
Christian Theism. For the purpose of seeking to elucidate the 
concept of revelation, understood in an experiential way, that 
proposition suitably links the divine and human elements of the 
assumed nexus. Here, then, is a 'showing' of the kind of pattern 
which an unbeliever can expect to find when, and if, he earnestly 
requests believers to demonstrate the meaning of those theological 
propositions which comprise the Christian language Came. A single 
proposition may not suffice (indeed cannot for the reason given 
above) to elucidate what Theists are saying in their talk of God's 
revelation to man. But, just as the colour red (to use one of 
'Wittgenstein's examples) may be indicated by reference to a variety 
of shades, whose degree of redness can only be shown thron'h the 
exhibition of different samples, so theological pronouncements 
require varied manifestation if they are to be explicated. Like- 
wise physical objects such as tables, chairs, windows and doors 
become identified, it would seem, through the sampling process, as 
a child is introduced to different examples of each item. The 
important conclusion to be drawn from an apparently disparate and 
tenuously connected parallel is that concerning linguistic 
proficiency. A child learns to use words correctly as a result of 
b&s having acquired an understandinF of ostensive identification. 
A believer learns to use correctly, within the norms imposed by 
the autonomous grammar of the kerygmatic form of life, those 
pronouncements about God and Christ which advert to a common usage: 
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that of the community of believers. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
aI have made use considerably of Hacker and Baker's commentary upon 
Philosophical Investigations Volume One, to analyse Wittgenstein's 
thinking on Explanation, Understanding and Meaning, throughout this 
chapter. HACKER, Peter M. S. and BAKER, A. P. Oxford, Blackwell, 1980 
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IiiT i. L1 ýIi3ILIiY FY-)P WHAT IS SAID 
A TJ"... ,y 
rya, : e. ntal r: ropositiorn thun perform the followin functionß. 
First, t' c., set limits to 1ani-uage and so to what can, or cannot, be 
said. : econdly, the:. determine what counts as an explanation and 
what cha ncterisea an experience within a particular lran, -uaf°e game. 
Thirdly, they establish loF; ical criteria for showier what are the 
entailments and contraries yielded by their inherent presup, positions. 
o". rthly, they enable us to conceptualise our experiences in such a 
way that zone kind of assurance can be gained as to our belief in a 
reality beyond subjective sensory perceptions. All of these have a 
bearing upon Theistic beliefs and upon the concert of : 'evelation. 
i: ere i would like to deal with the third function mentioned 
above. to Theism, it is instructive to notice those entail- 
ccnto which stem from the constituent concept of j, od which, as we 
have seen, may be said to act as a fundamental proposition. To do 
this will be to appraise ourselves of certain modal qualifiers which 
operate in relation to that fundamental proposition. I an proposing 
to continue to interpret this in a Christian Theistic manner. Thus 
the person of Christ, and what is said to be believed about his in 
the Ptcw Testament, are apposite factors in any int®lliCible notion 
of Cod which is deemed to be the bed rock of the language game* 
! Adally speaking, it is then necessarily, certainly or obligatorily 
the case that whatever rod is, He is actuated by love, justice and 
goodness. This assertion does not defend upon a hypothesis concer- 
ning Cod. It ¬ sserts for ical necessity. Given the fundamental 
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nrorosition of Christinn Theist concerrin^- crod, to opeak rat all 
about ? evel. ntion, is to use entaiir^ents yielded by that concept. 
Contrari1:, it is loS7ically nececs ry, that the negation of these 
attributes referred to abovo, such as hatred, injustice and evil 
are excluded, recocsarily, certainly and oblif-etorily from these 
dcscrinti. ors of °od which Christian Theism uses. 
T shall now cay° conethir. 7 more about this iazue of nodal 
qualifiers in relation to the constituent concept of )-god, under- 
stood to be a fundamental proposition for Theism. 
T; HC'a :t; ýP 3: P AL F" CPO3ITIGNS AND TPiE MI MI G!; A! "", F I ESTABLISH 
II iýI_ 1' 1 TAILi iýi'ýnT:  fiC': i iT'i32SZ: 3ia 
To draw to a conclusion ny discussion of the cis'nificance of 
fundamental propositions for theistic belief, it will be helpful to 
considor 
a 
wti'hitota views as to the nature of modality, as a complement 
to what can be said about necessity. "In short, modal concepts do 
not signify particular iters either in the world or in our minds, 
but the relation of one item to others in a situation, " White 
proclaims. He points out that modals, like evaluative concepts, 
have to be studied in relation to their context (a good Wittgcn- 
steinian requirementi) to ascertain their referential focus. White 
draws our attention to, what he considers to be, a number of 
fallacies as to the use of modal forma (e. g. necessity, certainty, 
possibility etc). To elucidate these fallacies, he contrasts the 
traditional antithesis of 'do dicto' and 'de re' interpretations of 
modal qualification. The former relates to the qualification by 
modale of what is said about comothin, while the latter relates to 
the sornethinr* which it is said about. White further contrasts the 
adverbial and ioperconul form of modality with that which appears 
to 
give a more personal reference. Fe finds hero some affiliation with 
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te nncier. t differentiation between the application of modal cuali- 
t'icntion to the whole or to the part of conethinr. The thrust of 
: io it u nent lies in his wish to stress the objective focus of 
rods ity. ;? once he refutes tho view that r. ýodalo are 'do dicto' 
up.. ]ic;, t. *. orz ay "knee nr*uod. when we say that comethir. is 
-. onsibly, necessarily or certainly so we do not of ly en, ro in 
illocutior. Less still do we express thot; ,, 
hta about what we take 
to be the c=ase, founded upon 'inpreesionat conjured up by our 
minds. "Bite especially draws our attention to the need to notice 
cnrefullyy what rrecinoly is beinC qualified by a particular modal. 
b 
Thun their relative nature can be shown by his example of the most 
rabid nimyniat in the Ft culty. That he is a; ýainnt Vomen'8 Libo 
expresses a necc=ary truth. It is in relation to his being a 
miro: 7yniat that he can be said to be opposed to 'Women's Lib'. The 
fact that he happens to be professor of Classics as well does not 
permit us to ray that 'The Pofen: or of Classics is against 
Women's Lib. ' expresses a necessary truth. similarly, "'it in because 
the planets number nine and not sorely because they have some 
number that the nunnýber of the planets is necessarily renter than 
seven ... though "The number of the planets is greater than coven" 
unlike "Nine is ; renter than seven" does not express that philos- 
ophers call a necessary truth. " The specific reference to which a 
nececcart" truth relates in clear. It can only bo construed as being 
that which is relative to a logical entailment; for it is by dint of 
possessing certain qualities or exxpressing definite ideas that X 
can be said to be necessarily (or obligatorily) Y. 
white further refutes the do,,, -, m, that what is qualified by 
modals such cz necessarily, probably, certainly is not the propo- 
sition to which they relate in itself but the truth or otherwise of 
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it. t'e stronses the difference between what is stated or expressed by 
u nroro: itior and the attcm t to construe what is thus exrressed an n 
Fropnsitinr. 7'o my that X is necessarily (or possibly, certa$nly 
etc) Y Is not to say that it is the proposition trat X Is necensarily 
Y. This would he like sayinr that it, 
the prononition 'the =*earbox is possibly (necessarily, certainly) 
faulty' it is meant that the 4Jcarbox is possible (necessary or certain). 
The relativity of the qualifying modals in clear. White iss here 
concerned to chow that the nualifying words are not a verbal locution 
but a refererce to what is beine qualified. It is in relation to 
the actions and happening thensolves that riodals have their 
c 
sienificarce not in the propositions about them. Likewise, White 
rejects nurse's subjective analysis of necessity as "existing in the 
Sind, not in objects. " In a modern version of this theory, modals 
auch as fruzt' and louirht' apply not to can event but to our thinking 
of that event. Thus to quote %hitera ox=, ple, in auch an expression 
an 'Smith t (or ought to) hanf, his hat there' (used in an 
indicative-. roverninp way), the medals Im; t" or 'ou; *ht f relate to 
our thirkinr that he must (ought) to hnn<* his hat. In rejectinc 
this interpretation of the rza o of nodaic, ? thite a rain seeks to 
refufa the 'do dicto+ position in favour of the 'do re' one. 
With White's help, it can be coon that what in said of God by 
way of 1or? ical entailment from the premise stated cwt, nece zari1y 
follow in reepoct of C. od - as an objective inL. This need not 
conflict with ritt en: tein's view that reference in to be discovered 
in the use to which wordy are put * In fact it coheres with his view 
about the role of Tnda=ental proposit6nno in determining what can, 
or cannot, be said. We are following that dictum in noticir. more 
carefully how critical qua]. ffyir. words are uoed by theiotn. If Wo 
take White's realistic aruient about the reference of iiodals, we 
^. - ý, ,. 
roecli the hn-vr corclu, inn that the z rticulnr innI-ua of Tlieicm 'him 
an its en ential object - God ? Timcelf. For God at an object is pre- 
curnosed jr the fundamental proposition upon which Thoicri rests. By 
objectiviBIr Him an the one in whom Theicto profess to believe, not 
only is -! -, unwmrranted cubiectivicm avoided, but we are able to keep 
in line w 4th, traditional T? holotic underatandinr. . At the cane time, 
:, ritt -cnateir. criteria for e akin; intelligibly within a particular 
lansi<ape-imame are adhered to, while permitting a specific point of 
reference to be racertainod ; n'rolnticn to the subject and, indeed, 
cubatance of that area of diccourne. What I hope T have succeeded 
in doing- has been to identify what it is within theistic language 
which can be teen to justify its claim to knowied -e by revelation. 
we are attempting to gnawer this question, among others: what 
precisely is it which Theists take to be that knowled-, e which 
revelation is believed to convey to then? By utiliain. - recent 
dihcusaion of Witt7enatein'e doctrine of fundarental propositions 
and the a, -Alleu of the concept of Cod co conatitutin ; relir; iouo 
belief, pursued by Hudson, I have tried to answer that pucation. 
with the help of W'hitera analysis of modal qualifiers, I have been 
able to elicit those characteristics of Cod which 71-eiots take to 
be implicit in their reconition of that theistic fundamental 
proposition. 
Thera could be no Christian lang=,, -, e r; cmo apart from the fact 
of Christ and the proclamation of Christ to the ccn of his Coner- 
ration und beyond. Tn that cezco there curt, as cztter of logical 
necessity be conceived to be an empirical bridro which enables the 
Christian talk of God to bear significance. For the ideas which 
were iratantiated by the early theoloýy, while having a realism by 
dint of their articulated projection by the community, could not 
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have orir-irnted uprt fror, t"oir experiences. Such experiences are 
conceived to ? be capable of revival by each 7cneratiori of believers 
insofar an they discover a dimension to their lives, throe, -t- faith 
which rives substance to their reli!, iouc coziitment. 
In considorinr; that necessityt which the theistic concept of god 
su7ro3ts, it is of interest to ask whether it makes, seine to may 
that Cod needs to act in certair ways or stands i: i reed of certain 
thins. `mite points out the difference between the retrospective 
and prospective use, of tho corcopt of necessity. ?; e inferno us 
that 'need' cannot be used in the indicative way, but also that in 
its subjunctive usa^-e it can only express the idea of being' necessary 
for ccnothinc: that is, it is prospective, not retrospective in its 
usa -o, !i fitte renarko, "Thus, a necessary result or consequence is 
one which ban to be, but not necessarily one that is needed; whereas 
a necessary rearm is one which both has to be and is needed" and he 
c . -cnlifies thin by the following comparison. ""To say 'if a raz is 
touched by a spark it must explode* is different fron 'If a C-as is to 
explode, it must be touched by a spark. " Only the latter si rifiec 
a need. One can coo the causal factor here, for the ininediate 
cause of a gas cxrlodin; - will be the application to it of aa rk. 
pence, bei nr in connunication with the spark, it must explode. The 
word "ast" an an expression of need is brought out clearly in 
White #a further example "Everyone -o ing abroad needs to have - and, 
therefore of course, aunt have -a passport. " Again, he stresses the 
prospective necessity which need points to -a need to or for Como- 
thing, B contrast it in possible for $must $ to express something 
which iss not needed. Hence the regulation that every citizen must 
have an identity card, 




w". nt ore wants can express desire and there need he no conetrrint 
,.; -o- ore. ? owever, to need comathinr7 requires an exnlnnstior a's to 
wad ýt i. Needed and a constraint upon one. ia nu; ° osted: n ysieal, 
legal, coral, °, h,, -cholo ~ic, 0. or whatever. Arg end-state is always 
to a state of need. However, one can reed sonothin ; 
which ore does, not lack. 17o ^a that I need all the noncy ? have at 
'recent is, such a case. Hence, although often to need conething is 
to lack it, it is not necessarily the care. T think that it can be 
aaen that to speak of ! ', od havirr wichefl and intentions in initiating 
revelation, is different frort attributing auch lack to hin. 
Thus, in speakin; - of that necessity which ettachca to our talk 
of -rod, where the concept of . mod is conceived to be constitutive of 
reli°riouzs belief, we -mean those entailmonts which such necessity 
imposes upon what is said. 1 211 atjon it determines what cannot 
be said. It must, therefore, 1o icolly be true t? a. t, given the 
stipulation inherent in Theism about God, it is intelligible to 
speak of his willing those actions of creation, revelation and 
redemption which he purposes for his creatures. By contrast, üe 
car-not ray that he is the cause of any action which in contrary to 
there attr. bates of love, justice and holiness which are said to 
characterise his Person. The concept of personality referred to 
here, implies a capacity to advance his intentions for man in. a 
ranner appropriate to human personal response. Tt is sensible then 
to suppose that God needs human utisulua in order to extend his 
revelation to ran, as a gas needs a spark to explode, to use White's 
exa. le. And just as the converse, that a , aß must explode if 
touched by a spark, indicates nececsity but not need, so in 
noticing the logical ontailnents which Theistic belief in Clod yield, 
it can be shown how necessity rather than need is implied. It rat 
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be so, therefore, that in speaking of God'a acts, it is the case that 
necessarily (obligatorily or certainly - the sort of variants White 
offers) he does X rather than Y. There is no question of empirical 
choice or a scale of preferences being open here. It is not a 
question of what God can or cannot do, viewed from the position of 
what omnipotence is deemed to represent in an empirical sphere. 
Rather it is a question of logical necessity as to what it makes 
sense to say of God, where the fundamental proposition, that belief 
which is "swallowed" along with all the other beliefs which wo learn 
when we imbibe the theistic language-Came, stands firm in such a 
context. That such necessity is proximaie rather than ultimate is 
itself a logical necessity. For if we accept the view of Wittgenstein 
that the difference between believers and unbelievers is that they 
each use different pictures, the theistic picture can but be 
proximate. It represents an 'ontological choice' as Hudson puts it. 
Yet this does not nullify the use of the analogy of the hard rock 
of a river bed or of the notion of the concept of Cod being 'anchored 
in all my questions and answers, co anchored that I cannot touch 
Zi-gO, to remind ourselves of two of Wittgenstein's illustrations of 
fundamental propositions. 
C RELIGIOUS BELIEF - LTSIrG A PICTURE 
4' 
Wittgenstein speaks of religious belief an using; a picture, or 
pictures. Hudson remarks that the pictures concerned are, x, of course, 
mental ones. A condition for saying that God is known wot4d then be 
the subjective capacity to learn, according to W: T. ttgenstein, certain 
'connections' which enable the believer to talk about his faith. 
Knowing how to use the pictures either psychologi,: ally or logically, 
or both, would be a requisite for being accounted e~--believer. 
Wittgenstein refers to the psychological effects of holding a 
- 87 - 
picture of the last Judgement in the foreground of one's conscious- 
ness: it would help to regulate all of one's life. Logically, to 
use such a picture would be to learn the technique of applying the 
connections relevant to religious discourse. Wittgenstein asks 
what conclusions are to be drawn from the picture of the Eye of God. 
In ordinary language, we associate eyebrows with eyes and it becomes 
apparent that the believer, in speaking of the Eye of God watching 
him, does not intend such a physical connection to apply in this 
instance. Provided, however, that the metaphor can be sustained in 
respect of the concept of God being said to see what cannot be aeon 
by man, or to guide the believer in the right pathway ('I will guide 
thee with mine eye'), the usage of the figure of God's eye is 
intelligible. yo the technique of learning the appropriate connec- 
tions for the use of the phrase the 'Ere of Gcd' is a necessary 
condition for its application within Christian discourse. While it 
is permiacable to draw the conclusion that God 'sees' further than 
man and is thus capable of loading him rightly, it is not permissible 
to ask questions about the colour of God's eyebrows. Such a concept 
is not compatible with the particular usage being employed by the 
religious picture suggested. Witteerstein's use of the concept of a 
picture to indicate what religious belief is thus tallies with his 
concept of a language game. To use the picture correctly, the 
believer must recognise the due entallments and incompatibles 
yielded by the particular concepts implicit in his belief. It comes 
down to his use of lange e: what it makes sense to say or not to say 
in respect of theistic belief. The question which emerges here is: 
does the concept of a picture as expreseive of religious belief 
constitute come kind of assertion of knowledge? ! Say we use 
Wittgenstein's notion to enable us to say that God can be known by a 




"For a blunder, that is too big. " The religious la iguar e Fame is not 
that of science. True, but may we say that Wittý^; enztein's idea of a 
religious picture is a necessary condition, if not a sufficient 
condition, for saying that real (as distinct from ? ewman'c 'notional') 
belief accompanies ors at least, paves the way for knowledgo of Qod'6 
For what could knowledge of God mean apart from a knowledge of how 
to hold together those elernonts in theistic belief thinking of God 
as loving, righteous et7 which are constitutive of its very nature? 
If this seems to be too narrow a stipulation as to what night be said 
to constitute knowledge of God, at least it must be granted that it 
forms a pre-requisite for such knowledge. To be sure, Wittgenstein's 
insistence that a believer cannot contradict an unbeliever, and vice 
versa, removes the concept of religious belief as a picture from the 
area of truth conditional propositions. So we are not expected to 
provide empirical data to substantiate what we are intending to 
include in the picture - or perhaps, more correctly, what we find 
to comprise the picture which is constituted by religious belief. 
The picture may be understood, however, to indicate (as Wittgenstein 
obviously thought) what could or could not be said. It shows the 
limits which the theistic languago-fie imposes as to what is 
permissible. Above all, it enables the believer to have a cornpre- 
he'nsive interpretation of his world -a world which waxen and wanes 
as a whole. Intelligibility is perceived in the coherence of 
thought which the picture provides. 
What wo are implying here in respect of the concept of 
revelation, in that any claim to knowledge of God has necczzarilg 
found expreasion in language. The Bible in said to be the vehicle 
of divine truth to men. In its pages, numerous writers have in 
various ways convoyed that revelation through put, tive historical 
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events, laws, pr lc, poetry, symbolic languago, parables etc. 
Literary genre is all important in the matter of revelatior. To 
grasp something of the intentions of its expositors, to reflect 
upon their use of metaphor and irre and to ponder the lessons to be 
learned from the historical facts alluded to, is to enter into the 
heart of what revelation is. 41ittgonstein'e view that religious 
belief may be seen as a picture can help in enabling us to speak 
intelligibly of revelation. The crux-would seem to reside here. 
For it is the care which we take in analysing the language used in 
the theistic language-game which determines how we shall see the 
picture presented to us. It seems to be confirmed by Wittgenstein's 
remark about the fact that the unbeliever cannot contradict the 
believer "You can say they are contradicting one another. It is 
Greek to me. " Wittgenstein acknowledreo the essential facts of 
Christian Theistic belief, for example the death and resurrection 
of Jesus. fie is right to tell us that they are come of the 
connections which enable the believer to use the picture in a way 
consonant with the belief which he purports to hold. This of course 
does not mean that we are not to take seriously the task of 
examining the hard data comprising the historical framework of the 
Judaco-Christian tradition. Unbeliever and believer are confronted 
with putative historical facts which are an indispensable core of 
all that goes to make up theistic belief, in a way in which eastern 
religious are not co indebted to definite historical ciqents. One 
could envisage a languego game being played by Buddhists or 
Vedantitt in which the necessity to include specific historical 
facts would not be considered to be essential to its nature. They 
too, might be said to hold a picture before thus as to what it is 
they believe and, although rxedit&tion and 2ysticiara are e¬zential 
features of their religious practice, they cannot be said to be 
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wedded to historical facto in the way that Jews and Christiane (and 
to come extent funlims) are. 'ittgenotcin would no doubt have 
assented to this observation, since he informs us that the religious 
language Came must not, by its very nature, be confused with others 
which depend upon empirical criteria for their legitimacy: that, 
presumably, therefore, it does not (or is not conceived to be part 
of what it makes cerise to ray) constitute anything within that 
language game to seek to intrude such an epistemological quest. 
"Itts Greek to me" etc. I want therefore, to utilise Wittgenstein's 
idea of a picture as a vital contribution to all also boing dia- 
. tamed. It may well be that his underst&rdirig of the mystical as 
that which cannot be spoken of but only shown (TRACTATUZ) helps to 
throw light upon his meaning or understanding of religious belief. 
Language sets limits to what can be said. The mystical is outside 
those limits. 
For it is clear that Wittgenotein'a doctrine of religious 
belief being understood as a picture meota the criteria for any X 
being hold to be a belief. 
fPrice's 
discussion of the attitudinal 
nature of belief confirms thin. Price alco prefers a disponitional 
to an occurence understanding of believing X. Ho shows further that 
belief in X as distinct fron belief that X exists, is weak or strong 
belief in proportion to the conviction one has about it, and the 
vitality with which it is entertained. He thinks that P, ewtan's 
idea of real as distinct from notional belief in especially cieni- 
ficant for religious belief. All of this seems to endorse the 
assertion I have oado in respect of Wittgenstein's understanding of 
religious belief. Hudson itemises three things ifhich bcin a 
theistic believer meanc, following Wittgenstein's model. lie nays 
that in usinj certain pictures the believer recei"ren explanation 
through significance being given to overything in his life; he 
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commits himself to what those pictures reveal; and he responds affect- 
ively to their implications, with pity, terror, awe, etc. A sincere 
theistic believer then is one for whom there is psychological and 
logical value in those pictures, which he has learned to use by dint 
of his being, a believer. 
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CYA- Pmi 2 EIGHT D 
IXPERIE? = OF GOD: IOW "BELIEF III"" DL'R? -9INF MTEPJ ING 
WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY AV AUTONOMOUS GRA -W 
So far I have used Wittgenstein's philosophy concerning the 
placement of the meaning of a proposition within the context of a 
specific language game, in alliance with his view that fundamental 
propositions count as an explanation of that meaning. I have further 
noticed that in explaining what is meant by reference to fundamental 
proposition, it is necessary to discern the depth grammar which 
emanates from them. Entailments and contraries are seen to be 
logical products of the ideas implicit within those basic assumptions 
which lie at the bottom of the 'gesso'. Since experience is charac- 
terised by those logical eloments, it follows that what can or 
cannot be said of human activity is dependent upon acceptance of the 
'rules' appropriate to the particular area of discourse relevant to 
the subject concerned. I believe that, in seeking to establish 
priority for the concept of god an constitutive of religious belief 
and, in intending to show how the kerygma provides the ground for 
intelligible talk of God making Himself known to cw. n, I can utilise 
these principles of üittgenateints philosophy suitably. For the 
concept of 'belief in' provides a human responsive attitude 
entirely appropriate to the requirements of the proclamation about 
Jesus which the kerygma announces. It in apposite in indicating 
how men night assent to the notion that, in Christ, they have 
encountered God. Explanation of what is meant b; r a knowledge claim 
to this effect, and an understanding as to how e2periences consequent 
upon such alleged encounter might be charaeteriseI, are each riven 
irradiation in this way. Understanding must precedo knowledge and 
- 
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explanation precedes them both. I saunt be told or discover what is 
the case, and how it can be shorn to be the case, if I am to be 
satisfied that I am in possession of something which might pass for 
knowledCe. Thus by learning und by acquisition of appropriate rules 
to enable me to use words I have learned correctly, I should be in a 
position to provide an explanation of the meaning of those 
propositions which assert what I purport to 'believe in$. 
The system of representation shown in the area of discourse (or 
by the autonomous gm m=) which focuses upon the C1LPIST;; ? JT indi- 
cates HOW reality is conceived to be. 
!y purpose then has been to try to establish that belief in God, 
and in Christ, hass conntativc and co iianive o1cxn nta. The constative 
propositional having empirical significance, find their meaning 
within the area of discourse in which the proclamation of the korygma 
will, be shown to be determinative. And integral to all that is there- 
by proclaimed in the constitutive concept of God$ which functions as 
the primary or pivotal fundarental proposition of the Christian 
Theistic language Ca=o. Given that 'belief in' is the appropriate 
response to the kerygma, the notion of encounter with, and thus 
knowledge of God, is logically determined by the fundamental 
proposition to which one thereby accents. Belief that God exists and 
belief that He hau made himself known to roan in the person of Christ 
are necessarily implicit in the decision to believe in Christ, where 
such 'belief in' indicates trust and obedience to him. Entry into 
the form of life which finds its expression in the koryma and 
associated language Came is achieved through belief in Cod and in 
Christ. 'Belief in' thus is shown to be the key to understanding 
and understanding enables the believer to explain the meaning of 
those propositions which assert divine self disclocure and human 
encounter with the divine through response to Christ. Christ is 
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deemed to be alive in the sehe that one's belief in Him opens up the 
possibility of spiritual awareness of His presence, and prompts 
obedience to His commands. In this way, both explanation and 
experience are seen to be determined by the criteria which have 
shaped the autonomous 'depth grammar' of the Christian language Bane. 
That language, although expressive of the unique subject matter which 
it describes, is also in true Wittgen. 3teinian manner (by which I mean 
that it coots his stipulation that language within a language grime 
must not, to", be deemed to be intelligible, be without 'connections' 
with normal usage) capable of being understood from beyond its 
bounds. : o, although 'belief in' in seep, to be an integral element 
in the whole issue of rasing sense of putative claims by Theists to 
encounter with a revealing deity, it does not entail a lose of hold 
on what night be considered to be the cafe world of "real" experi- 
ences. What we presuppose about the world oust determine, to some 
extent, the sort of experiences we have. The belief which we enter- 
tain about what we conceive to be real: our system of representation 
(hero determined by "belief in' Christ etc) chows us what that 
'reality' may be taken to be. The concept of 'belief in' where the 
object of such belief is One who no longer physically exists, and 
about whom much theological and literary speculation continues to 
flourish, has been shown to be a necessary condition for justifying 
the attempt to explicate that meaning which is said to be resident in 
the keryema. Its contact with 'reality' is then a matter of seeing 
where such belief leads one in being able to conceptualise experi- 
ences which, by their nature, suggest 'something moral than those 
dependent solely upon arousal by sense data. One might speak of 
ideologically aroused concepts rather than senssib:. y aroused ones. 
I hope that what I have said above will help to provide a 
coherent and intelligible basis for speaking of the Christian view 
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that, in the person of Christ and in the proclamation by which the 
Rpostles themselves, made known the One who had himself proclaimed 
the 'good news', an ultimate ground for speaking of God's revelation 
to human beings has been established. The question ras to whether 
God exists or not is of course left unanswered and nothing I have 
said has* I hope, suggested that by simply playing o*lOnguaca :e or 
entering into a form of life, the question can be shelved. It 
remains at the very heart of any efforts I might make to forward 
the view that an experiential interpretation of a Golf-revealing 
God can be shown to be intelligible. fat what, it may be asked, of 
other world religious views? Although I an concerned specifically 
with Christian Theism, it may not be inappropriate to try to notice 
briefly how the concept of revelation relates to them. 
V. Firstly, it should be observed that my two presuppositions for 
the experiential view of revelation which I have adopted, namely 
the existence of god and the idea that God makes Himself known to 
mankind through some moans of communicatior, fit other religious 
beliefs, especially those of the. monotheistic faiths of Islam and 
Judaism and, to come extent, Sikhism and Parsecism. There maybe 
some ambiguity in seeking to apply these presuppositions to 
Buddhist, Shinto, Confucianism, Jainism and Taoism, where stress is 
laid upon moral attributes rather than upon revelation. Hinduism 
with its monistic view of the unity of Cod and man in a particular 
schema of things, may also lack something of the clearly defined 
concept of communication between a calf-discloning deity and nankind. 
Secondly, attempts at comparison between the concept of revelation 
through the kerygma and other concepts (for exam le the address by 
Allah to harmed at Medina in c. 610 A. D. ) inevitably raise theo- 
logical issues concerning the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. 
Q 
In this respect, Nielson's assumption that an anthropolc icsl 
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concept of prod belongs to Gracco-pornan and ancient E tian, Assy rn 
and Babylonian ideas rather than to core modern formulations, in 
interesting, lie attempts in his book entitled "Scepticism" to arCue 
for the incoherence of the concept of god, where such a concept is 
strictly non-anthropological and confined to a purely spiritual, 
other-dimensional creator. i7ielcon'a assumption, in the light of 
what I have said of the primacy of the kerygma an the focal point of 
the Christian view of God's revelation to man, could lead me into a 
discussion on the use of analogy in seeking to speak intolliribly of 
Cod by comparison with significant figures auch "father" 'king' 
t±kepherd' etc which the Bible supplies. I do not think that this 
in the moment for ouch a discussion. Yet my distinguishing feature 
which has been noticed to sot Christi¬rn belief off from other world 
religious beliefs does raise this issue. For the leery a cakes 
proclamation, about Jesus of P. azaroth which could be interpreted 
as an attempt to anthropomorphize the concept of god. Whether this 
is no or not, it is the case that both Islam and Judaism accuse 
Christianity of blasphemin against the One who is deemed to be 
the Wholly Other by speaking of Christ as the on of God and 
teaching that Re "thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but 
emptied Fiincelf and took upon Himself the form of a Servant. "b 
Thirdly I want to say an a consequence from these theological 
dicputee, that since my whole cane in built upon the premise that 
the form of life of the Christian community in dependent upon some 
kind of acceptance of God-in-Christ, or the Christ-event, acceptance 
of the kerygma is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for 
knowledge of god. It is a nccen ary condition because, nz we have 
coon, logical ultisacy for Christian talk of revelation is resident 
in the form of life and the fundamental propositi=a which support 
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it, of which the keryg to in one. It in a sufficient condition 
becauso response to the kery , given the premises concerning 'od'n 
celf-dicclonure though the Chrint-event, enabler belief in god to 
be clothed with the Carmentn of experiential encounter with God. 
Thua, whatever disputes may abound between adherents of different 
faiths concerning the primacy of one particular faith over another, 
Christian Theism in necessarily, an a matter of logical necessity, 
grounded in the keryCma. And at the heart of the proclamation 
which comprises that kerygma is the belief that putative historical 
events in the first century A. D. eatablinhca the right for 
Christiana to speak of experiential enconnnter with their Creator. 
Belief in, than, may be said to be the appropriate form of 
belief entailed by the kery aatic proclamation. Such belief in 
focusses upon constative and corraissivo elements within the kerygma, 
without which the essential features of the Christian faith could 
not subsist. That is to say* in order to enter into and to experi- 
ence what it is the kerygma proclaims, a believer dually responds by 
affirming indicatives and imperativice. lie accepts belief that 
certain revelatory propositions are true, but also commits himself 
to belief in the One about whom those propositions make specific 
theistic claicss. Such belief in nits nicely into the framework of 
a form of life, for it indicates what is required of some one Who 
wishes to put himself in a position where he might understand the 
meaning of those claim, By believing in Christ, he adopts a 
positive stance towards the message of the kerygma and acknowledges 
its conetative and comnicsive implications for hire. The form of 
life, embodying a continuing manifestation of what Christians con- 
ceive encounter with God to mean, provides both en explanstion of 
the constative propositions presented by the keryma and the basis 
for those experiences which commitment to its demands produce. For 
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experience within the form of life which emanates from the kerygma is 
determined by those fundamental propositions resident or implicit 
within it. That is to say, any putative experience about which a 
believer may speak can be spoken about solely in terms of those con- 
stative and corimissive propositions which his belief in the kerygmatic 
proclamation call forth. Belief in is constituted by constative and 
commissive elements which the New Testament present and prescribe 
respectively. 
CHAPTER EIGHT D 
a NIELSON, Kai: Scepticism (new Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) 
ed. Hudson, London, MacMillan, 1973 
b Philippians 21-11 
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CWtPT 'R VINE 
A THE CO! C}TT OF IPPTEITIONALITY IN RELATION TO COD BEING 
SAID TO ACT IN THE WORLD 
In the T1CTATUZ. Wittgenstein attempted to show how facts are 
pictured in language to indicate what can and cannot be said. His 
concern was prim rily with the picturing of facto spoken of in the 
indicative mood. Later he came to see that we also picture states 
of affairs emanating from p; ychological states like wishing, intending, 
etc. The optative mood (or subjunctive mood) and the imperative 
mood, as well as the indicative mood, were now included in 
Wittgenstein's interests. First person psychological states would 
thus be seen to be picturinfs of certain mental events. Insofor as 
they can be put in linguistic format, language can represent 
pictorially commands and wiche,, previously considered to be 
excluded from such methodology. Our attempts to talk intelligibly 
of God wishing to fulfil certain purposes for humanity, or intending 
to carry out certain actions in the world on its behalf, say be aided 
here. Take for example the remark, "I wish to continue to write 
this thesis" or "I intend to continue writing this thesis", tho 
psychological states of wishing and intending, when expressed in a 
suitable context as in these examples, 'chow what can be said as 
effectively as descriptive indicative propositions may do. For, 
given that there in something being wished for or intended, its 
placing within a context which enables such psychological language 
to be used appropriatoly, presents us with a state of affairs as 
surely founded as where the indicative mood is used. Thus my saying; 
that I wish to complete this thesis may be undors. ood is an 
expression of a state of affairs, pictured in the stating of the 
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wish. And thin will be true even though cry saying that 1 now 
writing these words may be considered to present a more inciolvo 
picture as to what is the case. 
The biblical representation of God being said not only to per- 
form certain actions in the world, but to have wishes and intentions 
about what he purposes for rxankind, will depend severally upon the 
spheres of discourse in which they occur, beins shown to ponneca, 
or not to porceco, logical coherence. I shall apply Vittgenntein'a 
views on expectation to the concept of Cod having wichen and 
intentions. His later thinking on the way in which co , ands and 
wishes express a state of affairs is here most apt. "The expectation 
coces somewhere between a statement about a current state of affairs, 
and a co=and for the futuro, l"Yonny observes in respect of 
Wittgenstein's thinking in the "Philonophiacho Ber erkungen". In 
thin work Wittgenstein said 'The essential thing in intontionzlity, 
and in intention itself its the picture, tho picture cif what in 
intended. ' This bringing to the fore of the concept of a picture 
an the focus for the articulation of psychological states, helps 
immensely to clarify what in being adduced by theicto in their talk 
of divine intentionality. What God intended for Israel, we are told 
by Old Testament writers, is clearly related to the keeping of his 
coranda. His ultimate expectation for Israel is seen to be the 
realisation of articulated intentions, tempered and shaped by the 
degree to which his co m=nds were eventually obeyed. What God in 
said to do through overt action on Israel's behalf is shown to be 
one in ideological understanding with expression of his wishes, 
intention;, co eds and expectations. An a Judeco-Christian 
theistic languagýe-gano, what is said about God wi : hin it has a 
coherence which embrace. -, the language of intention' and expectation 
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as surely an that of description and report. In the 'rhilonophical 
Investigations', Vitteenntein says that it is in languaCo that an 
expectation and its fulfilment make contact, He came to see that it 
is in the articulation of psychological states such as wishes, 
intentions and expectations that their logical status can be shown. 
His reference to 'logical space' enabled him to show the connection 
between different points descriptive of a particular psychological 
concept, like expectation. It seems to ne that this linguistic 
analysis is invaluable in helping us to understand the Biblical 
teaching about Coda intentions and their expected fulfilnents. I 
shall try to apply what Wittgenstein aayn about the oovenont of a 
pointer which shows the object of expectations to this theistic 
idea of how thing stand. For they may be seen to stand in relation 
to one another an they are given expression in propositions which 
picture. psychological states. 
iittgenatein cane to see that the pictorial element of a 
proposition is separable from its indicative element: 'A proposition 
shown how things stand if it in true, And it pay: tImt they do no 
stand. I I onny remarks "Coo eight equally say 'A cos land shows how 
thingn stand if it is obeyed. And it nays that they should Co 
stand. $e Both an indicative proposition and a co=and, we tight Bay, 
contain a description of affairs. " The forner describes how thingn 
are; the latter how things should be. In the light of this obser- 
vation, we may analyse the concepts of God beint said to wish for 
und to intend certain things for mankind. It will be helpful to 
utilize Wittgenntein'c theory of expectation. This involved the 
first person employment of psychological concepts: sometimes he says 
that these utterances express a riven emotion; at other tines he 
cuggosts that they are part of a kind of behaviour, For examples 
- 102 - 
when expecting a friend who is late in arriving, I may express my 
expectation by pacing a room, looking out of a window etc. I cxpreas 
my expectation through cy behaviour. On the other hand, it may be 
hold that my saying 11 am expecting my friend' is part of, rather 
than a report on, my expectation. Allied to this diotinction, and 
supporting all Wittgonstein'u thinking on the subject, is the belief 
that there can bo no gulf between an expectation and the report of 
auch. Tie replied to Russell's view that recognition of an external 
relation is necessary to conceive of the fulfilment of an expectation, 
by affirming that "there are only two things involved in a thought's 
being true, namely, the thought and the fact. " Zo expectation raust 
be internally related to what is expected. Its differentiation from 
a memory picture lies in its meaning. `n asking how a picture is 
meant, %iittgenatoin ruled out that this could be something to be 
settled in the future (for example by a feeling of satisfaction when 
the picture event occurrcd). 
ý 
'The intention d: presaea itself already 
in the way in which I now co re the picture with reality. ' 
hThin 
of 
course presents problems, not least being that of trying to compare 
an expectation picture with reality, when that reality in in the 
future. IIcre 'ittgnstoinle cpoeeh-ruler metaphor in appropriate* 
e are asked to visua. lino a ruler being placed, am it were, against 
the present point and also to point forward in the direction of 
expectation. He establishes hic notions of intentionality and 
expectation in relation to, what he terms, 'logical space'. - Wo are 
in a familiar area of Wittgenstein's later thinking. it is not in 
the caucHal relational nexus that clarification in to be sought., 
instead of trying to go behind the phenomena presented to ups, we 
place the phenomena in a broader setting. In othor worde, we t 
explore the logic of the language-Came of intendire, and expectin r (oz' 
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other psycholoiical states). 
To elucidate this point, we should note that psychological 
states such am wishing, expecting, intending, hoping (looking ahead) 
or remembering, reflecting, recalling (in respect of the past) are 
not objects like horses, trees or building;. Wittgenstein rejected 
both behaviourist and internalising attempts to point to something 
which in the object of each of these psychological or mental events. 
Instead he showed how they each must be understood within the context 
of an appropriate linguistic setting. Since we are concerned with 
states which look to the future (wishing , intending, oxpoctin, etc), 
I shall concern myself further with these "mentalt concepts. If wo 
ask in what intending, for example, consists we may come to coo that 
the answer is elusive. We have said that it is mistaken to attempt 
to identify the state of intending as some sort of entity which can 
be observed, like a dog might be observed. It is helpful to nee that 
our use of the verb 'intending' will be diffuse. It will not be 
possible to give it a Imeanin 9 which establishes it univocally in all 
circumstances. For it is those very circumstances, in all their many 
possibilities, which givos`: to the concept of intending, its context- 
related significance. For example, I intend to continue writing this 
dissertation. t; y friend's intention in to bccozo a Christian 
counsellor. I intend to meet my friend to discuss our mutual interests. 
So one could continue. I think I have made it clear that to use the 
verb $to intend' in any of its tenceo is to express a psychological 
disposition, variant in usage, and dependent upon circumstantial 
words to indicate Each specific meaning. The meaning does not inhere 
in an assumed behavioural characteristic of the one expressing an 
intention or in some imarinary mental, inner imago culled "intending" 
or "havin, ^ and intention to do X", but in our udderstar ding the 
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words of the sentence(s) in which it is placed. The lol ica1 p onitior 
of the verb $to intend' is to be Grasped by duo appraisal of the 
"1--ram ar'". The context establishes the way in which the word is 
being used. For we are mistaken if we im Vino that there is something 
intangible and hidden in addition to the situation which enables us 
to speak intelligibly of intending to do X. When I assert that I 
intend to continue writing this thesis, my intention is encapsulated 
within the phenomenon itself. That I have such an intention is a 
fact, but not a fact such that a piece of overt behaviour or 
supposed internal event in my mind could be discovered to identify 
this intention. The sense of the assertion resides in its reference 
to something which is. the case, namely that I intend to continue 
writing. A reader may understand what I mean when I say that I have 
such an intention, provided that he is able to understand the words 
of the centence in which it is placed. Sometimes, a sentence will 
not be sufficient to supply all that to required to clarify how the 
verb 'to intends is being used. For example, the intention behind 
the signing of the (now abortive) SALT agreement was to help to 
ensure world peace. It requires further information to elucidate 
what is coant. We would need to know that the agreement referred to 
the restriction upon nuclear arms in the U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. jointly. 
Given the prior fact that a "cold war" has existed between these two 
'super power s# for many years, the significance of the treaty is 
laid bare. It makes sense to use a psychological word like 
'intention' in respect of the overriding purpose in the minds of the 
American and Soviet leaders. So the context of the political 
situation appertaining to relations between Eft and West, co='= ist 
And capitalist states, has to be made clear in order that what is 
meant by the word 'intention' in this instance may be pede 
If it is accepted that verbs which express paycholorical ctatec 
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acquire cenninp in the context of the particular cottinFr, in which 
they me used, clearly the concepts of expectation Ord intentiornlity 
within theistic discourse must find their logical status there. The 
key theistic word "God" and its conclativo concept of "belief in 
Clod" provide the grounds for ideas of divine intentionality. Bithin 
that context, speaking of Cod having expectations and intentions 
sakes rood sense. We are cayinc- nothing, about evidence for the 
existence of God hero or supplyin criteria for belief in hic. These 
my indeed be considered to be the nine qua non of religious 
credibility. Analogy with coral discourse will show that the quest 
for credibility, or at least intelligibility, is far from easy. 
Since rooro averred that the word "good" in indefinable, moral 
philosophers have debated the thorny problem as to the possibility 
of deriving "ought" propositions fron "in" propositions. That iss 
they have wondered whether it im logically pczcible to deduce Moral 
values fron descriptions of states of affairs e. g. John ought to 
visit his aunt, bocauco she is Ill. 'Me doccriptivinte have argued 
in favour of thin, prescriptivists and enotiviota against it, CO C 
tines the language of cctence nppeare to sit loosely upon the reality 
it purports to describe: in its talk of m oleculest atoms and 
particles it pontulatea an invisible (to the naked eye) world of 
activity within a; arently solid, stable objects. Credibility May 
be said to be stretched an far as the layman in concerned, Eo MAY 
find it hard to believe in the existence of molecules, ntomr. a etc, 
just as the phencä enoliut may question the reality of abstract 
values. Cut we are not raking tests for credibility, we are 
concerned with the intelligibility of what is said. For na 
wittgenstein pleads, "philosophy should try neither to identify nor 
to explain the phenomena of mind ... It should describe language 
,.. It should bring to rind how we actually use the mental terns 
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t4 xt confuse uz philccofhically. " 
1 
3o while the notions of wiohing, expecting and interdinr may be 
applied differently, there cozy be said to be such a thing, as a 
normal response in the key that people understand each of then. The 
differences are the result of differences in their contexts. 1'e do 
not therefore find it difficult to grasp the principle of God 
wishing for, expecting and intending certain events in the human 
arena. Once we accept the theistic belief that he is a god who no 
nature in to love and who acts justly we can conceive of hic wanting 
the beat for his creatures. relief in such a Cod is a prior condition 
to acceding to the idea of God boing said to take an initiative in 
the world. It in not a necessary condition, however. An unbeliever 
can recognise the intelligibility of speaking of a God such an is 
postulated in Christian Theisa. Likewise he can appreciate the 
concepts of intentionality in respect of such a God who is said to 
act in the world. F; e may not choose to play the theistic langua e- 
s, ame; he can, however, be helped to coo that there in a rate to be 
played in which rational people nay join. Thus to the sceptic who 
rtdicules the idea of God having wishes and intentional the theist 
can suggest that it is the placing of these concepts within their 
true boundaries that coherence may be given to them. The sceptic's 
niotako may be to try to confine them within too narrow imitations. 
By turning his attention towards the way in which these concepts 
are used he will coo that it is this which shows their function. 
For wo have made it clear the fact that to ray that A intends to do 
B is to show how that state: rent of psychological fact stands in 
relation to those circumstances which are the oc,: aaion of it being 
said. If A intends to got up early to Co fiohinF', his intention can 
only be spoken of intelligibly when we relate it to such events as 
an alarm clock ringing, hustle and bustle in dressing and break- 
fasting, motoring to the river etc. That his intention my not be 
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realised (he may be ill when the day dawns), doca not charge the fact 
that talkin, about intention to fish only makes tonne within a 
'fichi ;' context. It in one thing to examine the "gr ar" 
peculiar to the 2an,, uaGe of wishing, intention and expectation; it is 
another to ask what are the criteria which permit tin to 'inc e this 
lan e firstly, in a general way and secondly, in respect of Cod., ' 
The importance of ascertaining these criteria is to be seen in the 
remark by Wittgenstein that criteria vern what is said. Thus to 
say that A has an expectation of B makes sense within an appropriate 
linguistic framework expressive of a 'form of life'. That is to say 
there is a logical anchorage for opcakinn of expectation, or 
intention, or wishing, within the boundary of the language of hope. 
Human looking ahead and lonzing for certain specific events which 
are yet to be presents us with the empirical environment in which 
such lange fits appositely. One criterion, therefore, for 
establishing the tgrar. mar' for the use of the languni e of expectation, 
intention or wishing is that of human utility. Wittgenotoin +: 
c*. ested that criteria are arbitrary: they emanate from human need. 
They are not 'given' in the sense that necessary and sufficient 
conditions are in an empirical truth-conditional situation. They 
rather enable us to speak intelligibly of how there psychological 
dispositions may be expressed. A criterion shows how and when 
language appertaining to the future may be used. It cannot be justi- 
fied since it recta on human tradition and expediency, not being 
impelled by overt conditions. Common u: e dictates the verbal 
correctnes, or otherwise of word-, like expectatian, na in the case 
of countleGS other words of varying linguistic contoxts. Thus their 
validity dopcnds upon tho 'fora of life" which they reflect and seek 
to exprecs. Clearly, a further criterion for clear and coherent ape<ak- 
ing about expectation lot alia' is that public and not private 
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lu°.;: ý o be used. For it is a truism that there curt be public 
critera for p, so that if the criteria are correct p will be correct. 
Yet, further, criteria are rough and icmrecieo: it in regular use 
which enables than to provide standards for accepted opeech, 
Witrin Biblical Theic^, wo are presented with the 1arzrurre of 
hone. P; oltmann Prr] Pannenberg have written eloquently of the 
'theolo *y of hcee 
: The criteria for c irZ th ßl n^; ut'g e may be 
said to be those standards which Israel, the early church and the 
conteoporary church have accepted. she 'sitz i lebent concernir, 
Jesus' life and that of the first Christians provide the lolicnl 
grounding for theistic la-4 e of hope t? nd expectation* It rakes 
sense to say that believers conceive of Cod having expectations for 
his people. The criteria for auch l. rn ;e are arbitrary certairi:?, 
arisin. C out of the need. of the believing community. They mist 
nece rily, therefore, be public$ open to all to d=ine. A form 
of life' is to be found in the community of the Judneo-Christian 
tradition which provider, the logical setting for words of expec- 
tation. That tradition shown that the criterion of regular use 
has indeed helped to weave into its fabric the notion of Cod 
intending to achieve still itore for rann than hitherto experienced. 
Those tendencies and dispositions of God's character, previously 
discussed, are the psychological features whose expression in the 
historical events of the tradition is a pointer to the realization 
of future expectation. Certainly it is in the laniugo of the Bible 
that we read of God's cxpectationa. The eotaphor of laying a 
coccuro against propositions expressing expectation which occupy the 
rºa=o 1o ica1 space cakco good sefle of that lrn tge. The #object 
of expectation' roirht be mid to be that coal which the Bible 
srritcra repeatedly refer to in their ecchntologmicuul tiritingß. "Mus 
God's wichc3 and intentions are related to cosmic or cupra-r mdano 
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evo, >ty so that wo do not find divine mental states being substituted 
, or putative happenings in which can may participate. It is true 
that the mind of God is sometimes spoken of and its essentially 
hidden nature implied* God's thoughts are said to be unlike those 
of an. The logical space demanded by the need to speak intelligibly' 
about God having wishes and intentions which he is able, to some 
extent, to implement provides suitable grounding for auch intelli- 
gibility. W'ittgenntoin'u pointer metaphor to suggest the marking 
of positions relative to present expectation and subsequent fulfil- 
cent of that expectation similarly helps us to map the logical 
boundary of our languago-ono about God as initiator of events. 
So, although we are constrained to speak by analogy with human 
experience of Godta cents]. and overt activity, we have drawn 
attention to the need to recognise the 'logical apace$ appropriate to 
the specific area of speech relative to Cod's revelation to clan. 
Thus the doityta wishes for can anticipate the objects that fulfil 
then. What counts an fulfilment will be the implementation of the 
events or actions intended by God. We are not here concerned with 
the c irica2 matter of historical evidence for putative actions of 
the deity; rather our concern is the question of the logical coherence 
of speaking about God's initiative in revelation. Wittgenstein has 
persuaded we that it is in our use of language hhat we can determine 
such logical coherence or lack of it,. In his analysis of the grans r 
of a particular proposition he demonstrated how words are used in the 
context of a particular inn; uaCe-gwo, Abandoning his picture theory 
of ceanirg, he substituted a functional interpretation of the cýc&rin 
of propocitiono: their contextual sphere was bold to detercino their 
significance. 13earini; this in mind in connection with his corntder- 
able dincuscion of philosophy of mind (psychology) we may recall his 
refutation of behaviouris. Wittgenstein appeared at timen 
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to auGg-oct a behzwiouriat view when he disputed the j. }oaaf-bility of 
our ksowled. Z^o of rental states. For example he inferno us that to 
oa 'I en in pain' entiroly doncribe: my condition, baking the 
accertion 11 blow I an in paint inaccurate. This is becauco there 
is no dental state which may be known, since fcelir.. pain in ito own 
verification. Wittgenstein, said that he wa not a bchaviouriot 
insofar as he thought that our experiences acquire aiCnificance 
beyond their physical nature throush their expression in lan,, o. 
Thus it is by careful analysis of granrar that the rcaninC of 
propositions and behind them the t±üo understanding of what is the 
case may be discovered* 
in analysing what it scans to say that God has taken an 
initiative through revelation, wo may cay, then, that the desires 
and wishes which we take to be behind specific events in the world 
are to be contesp2Ated linguistically. Witt , cnztein'c use of 
the 
notion of logical apace enables us to view theistic verbs of 
intentionality (wishing, expecting;, purposing etc) as being, connec- 
ted with events which arc thought to have fulfilled the aspirations 
expressed by those verbs. The language of the Bible presents us 
with e . ples of Yahweh being represented cs promising to act on 
Israel's behalf, lie informed ? Ices that he would go before the 
people from Egypt and lead them to the promised land; he assured 
David that his army would dcfcat the Fhiliatinca; to cpoko through 
Jeremiah to comfort the exiled nation that they would one day return 
to their homeland* ßr11 are predictions of facts. We are here 
concerned with the languaro by which these prom. ces and events are 
reported. In hu5; n affairs, if A predicts to B that he will do X, 
in the fulfilment of they deed he is said to 'keel) hic wordº. "NO 
reports are conceivable. Cno would refer to R ºa mores spoke. -, at T1. 
j. 'ittgcnvtcin'c point About mental events not being states of affairs, 
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a1thouj; h analysable through the wordz in which they are described 
(and thuz dcronstrablo os states of affairs by boing articulated) may 
hcli; uz to ggrazp what such a report 
is ca, ying. It is showing; us what 
A does at T1; ho says (or writes) that he intonda (hopsa, wishes) to 
do X at co--e future tire* The report of A's doing X at T2 will rho 
repro, ent a specific action performed by A. Thee each report 
describes a state of affairs in the world. The link between the 
reports 'tlittgenetein calls points, as it wore, censured a1on; -, a 'line' 
which occupico the race 'logical space'. For it is in langunre that 
an expectation and ite1fulfilzment cake contact. So the Biblical 
roportin, of Yahweh's intentions (and alto, to a degree, wishes and 
desires: I say, to a degree, because thoco extireno idealistic hope: 
for mankind rather than realisations of the divine will in spite of 
hur-an intrarroigonce), and the report of their fu]xi'ilcent in events, 
exhibit linguistic consistency. Within the theistic lang=go-gone 
it is coherent to speak of God intending and inpiccentiný; acta of 
will through which he is said to reveal hits , elf to roan. Thay" Zre 
recorded as states of affairs. That it cakes sonne to open of tho; o 
theological propositions which lie behind the notion of revelatory 
initiative, I believe, bes been demonstrated. "The sense of a 
proposition presupposed only the grammatically correct use of certain 
words. " 
L'Elsewhere, Witteenatoin stated that it was only through a 
verbal exrreroion, indicating an it were the ciovccont of a pointer 
ohowing tho object of expectation, could an expectation be oxpreü +od. 
r 
This refers to his concept of logical space which permits hic to 
relate propositions purporting to convoy a paych, logical state to 
an appropriate cystes. The language of the Bible provides just such 
a nyate5, in giving u theological propositions which report the 
realization of alle, ed psychological states of this divine sind in 
specific acts in the world. We are treated to verbal exprczsions 
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of God's wishes and intentions which occupy the logical space pre- 
supposed by theism. In also presenting us with reports of events 
which are said to result from divine r , ercy, 
the Bible verbally shows 
the direct-ý. or_ those wiches and intentions point. "'heisa is a unity 
of j ropoai. i ions about a God who reveals hirccelf throuyjh cre'tion, 
acta of salvation and redemption, incarnation and final juci'. °escnt. 
That these events reflect the rind of God is mode plain. There is 
no hiatus between psychological states and states of a's irs. 
Divine activity is reported as beint a record of what is the case. 
Although man is the object of God's intentions, it is made clear 
that human o easy in incapable of achieving, the goals indicated by 
verbal expre: siors of expectation. F: enco the necenaity of divine 
initiative in conveying, to man an understanding of his intentions. 
Those intentions are expressed within the kind of lancuai-, o which 
consorts well with Wittgenzteir, 'o concept of 'weltancc-4uWfg+- - 
a world-view which Iwaxes and wanes as a whole' a the theist 
responds to it in faith and cosaitscnt. 
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I would define the taking of an initiative as the taking of a 
new step oririnating within the self which, although determined by 
the character of the individual taking the step, bears the genuine 
marks of creativity. It will be coon an the result of a decision to 
perform that particular action. This would seem to rule out things 
done by habit. FLy driving a car after due experience may not be 
deemed to imply initiative; although my deciding to get up and drive 
the car might suggest a sort of initiative. A candidate sitting an 
examination may be said to be taking an initiative in applying pen 
to paper and proceeding to answer the questions suitably. This 
would lugest that to take an initiative is to make an effort to do 
something in a constructive way. Mould 4tying my shoe-lace qualify 
as an exaample, or would it be core true to say that, having learned 
to tie shoe laces years aggo, the action is performed in a mechanical 
why, while my mind is ended with other matters? A pupil who makes 
little effort in school might be said to lack initiative: he doesn't 
try to improve his academic work. If ho hands in to the teacher an 
exercise carelessly written and only partially completed, can he be 
said to have taken or shown initiative in his work? Faking a casual 
effort would not seen to qualify the schoolboy's shoddy work for the 
verdict of taking an initiative. Ile lacks the determination to 
achieve and so his effort is poor. It would seem that merely to 
take some sort of action simnliciter in insufficient to earn such a 
description. Three features apparently need to be present for an 
action taken to be called taking an initiative. Firstly, there must 
be specific motivation or purpose to kindle sufficient enthusiasm to 
make an effort to do something. Secondly, the ability to perform 
the deed must be present in the one who seeks to take auch action. 
6 
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irompted by past praise from his parents, a youngster might volunteer 
to tic his shoe laces, thus performing a feat which indicated an 
advance upon previously displayed skills. This would correctly be 
described no taking an initiative it a way which an older , person's 
tying shoe tacoo would not be doomed to be. If the youngster t 
hardicappec', no that he e unable to tie them, he could not be said 
to be talon, an initiative, however much the desire to do no might 
exist. Implicit within the phrase 'taking an initiative' is the 
idea that something will be effected by the implemontation of the 
decision to do what is conceived in the mind. Hero one in not com- 
mitted to a vier which isolates 'mind' from body or is necessarily 
dualistic. The wish to do X. however much it carrier with it strong 
desire to perform the deed, cannot be said to be taking an initiative 
until come specific action in taker,, which enables the wish to be 
realised (in one way or another). 'no wish is father to the deed", 
but thoughts without deed,, remain dormant or moribund. 
I have, then, suggested that to take an initiative is to srry 
out core action such that the perpetrator of the action may be said 
to implcecnt a decision emanating; from within the seif. To nay that 
it in self-determined is not to deny that there will be prior 
conditions and antecedent causes, without which the action could not 
take place. For example, the one who performs such an action must 
be physically and psychologically able to do no. A handicapped 
dwarf would be incapable of pole-vaulting a six-foot hurdle, for 
e==pls. A man's being obis to ilccent an intention will depend 
upon prior conditions which cry incorporate environmental as well as 
genetic factors which have combined to rake him the sort of person 
he is. Thirdly, there =, t be appropriate circumstances prevailing 
to allow the action to be taken. An athletic exponent of pole- 
vaultint would be prevented from Jumping in the absence of the 
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appropriate equipment. Ala have thus extended the notion of initiative 
to include wishes, intentions and other Golf-determining elements, 
occnyioned h; r character which has been formed from prcvio decisions 
and action;;. Ability h been shown to roan havint the canability in 
the sense cf posnennin,: the rece. narü: phynical and pn eholo; ~, icel 
powers to affect what one 1= n mind,, In addition, the npnropriate 
opportunity and facilities to ensure that thoco pcworn can be used to 
fulfil the 
. 
riven intention rust be prevent for an intention to be 
realised. Thus a distinction between Motives and intention, is 
implicit in what in understood by initiative. 
In ctntinv that God ban taken the initiative in revealin, himself 
to men, therefore, theinto postulate a desire on his part to do no 
and the ability to implement thin desire. 'For God no loved the 
world (hin attitude to,. nrdo men) that he Cave hin only son (he 
ef$4cted hic intention for man) that whoever believes on him ... 
should have everl, a, tinn life (the purpoco of hin activity). ' Lot us 
note the application of what Pa been said of the nature of taking 
an initiative in relation to theistic claims abott revelation. The 
idea of God's love for the world indicates that he hon conpollin; 
desire to aid his crrinc and otruät, lir creatures. The motivation 
for distinctive action in to be discovered in Gods nature. Such in 
lot; icnlly distinct from an intention to act. It is a constant theme 
of the Bible that ho w aas constrained by hin 'evorlanting love$ to 
intervene on man '3 behalf. The inability of can to initiate a 
loving relationship with him finds expreo, ion in the words 'not that 
we loved God but that he first loved us', and in 'Cod showed his love 
tots rdo us in that, while wo were yet cirnerc, Christ died for us'. 
The i pror ion in riven that, beint, what he in, he can do no other 
than canife; t his loving disposition for the benefit of mankind. 1VOm 
within his own self he has the encontiul quality of co =aionatia love 
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which prompts him unremittiaig. yto extend euch to man. That is not 
to cay that this love may not be spurned by the free decision of men, 
in which case we are informed in scripture that God cam;,; withdraw his 
c-ood efforts to=rd than, for the time boinL. Since Us wish is to 
extend his love towards con, it carrot be said to be self- 
contradic-tory that '. -: o should so withdraw himself, in some way, for the duration* 
For this could be said to be reflective of his love in Its, : fundamental 
motivation, rcmoly to move son to ru, pond in love, not indifference 
or rejection, towards him. Wo need here to note a distinction between 
motives and intentions. It must also be noticed that rod', love is 
said to be balanced with his holinew and righteousness and that 
whatever he does in loving action can only be done if it is in 
kcepini with his holy and just desires. If we take the point that his 
wish to create free, responsive boings must be cat within an overall 
intention to reveal l elf to them wo may suppose that hin loving 
intentions for sen reflect wishes which were only partly capable of 
creative fulfilnen. t. Here the hinan crcL1ogy hold. For to wich for 
X cut be, Given limitations izpoved by other people 'c actions and 
circ tancc3, a weaker mental event than to intend to do Y where 
intention in 6apleionted by fire resolve to do it. And the nature 
of one's wichco and intentioro will reflect the natura of the seif 
of tho one in whoce 'ird they oriGin te. Character mxt help to 
shape such, co that wishes of a wholc; o kind, althowj. incapable 
of coplotc or partial fulfilcicnt, would r. 2ra, t certainly instruct 
the sort of intcntiono which are capable of some ieplc is tation. A 
can ster who wishes to achieve success an a man of effluence, ray 
have to cattle for loon as lie cocks to follow t1 roww; h intentions to 
procure wealth in illegal ways. Baulked in rcalinin what he wishes 
for, he nonetheless dicplayo his character in that derreo of molf- 
detcraincd behaviour which he is able to porforao So the wholly 
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good and righteous God of Christian theism may be grieved by his 
inability to create, or fashion through human response the kind of 
men he yearned for. In determining to intervene practically in the 
human arena, he evinced his wish to chance this situation. In so far 
as theism conceives of God as the osnipotent creator and sustainer of 
the universe, it holds that he possesses the ability to effect such 
intervention. 
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CHAi-TER Tk N 
TH 77 ; ICAT. ýmct?. r MIR Al. EPT Tr'. 'OILY OF PT-MA 'I(M"x 
THE THEISTIC T ANGDA, GE-^AA E 
1 The 3 roble: a of Doubt in rto1ation to C1aioin, to know that r 
To ca' thtt T know thmt such-acrd-euch is the case i rdicatea that 
I nrt unier- the verb 'to knows within the nccei ted boundaries of e 
r.. articulnr 1nrr 7e-rare. In so far as I lay claim to cce Item of 
c! r-Aricnl knowledge, I exroeo myself to the nossihility of bein. r 
falsified by events. Should I wich to rake ein affirrAti. on of 
certainty by sreakir. of beiz' sure of whet 7 ! bim to know, 7 have 
to concede that sore one else may doubt It. Of amoordb clam, to 
know with certainty a number of whet, to hfm, ceeted to be ure. cailr- 
able none , itions, Witt rü. tein commented "You don't know anything. " 
bAn F1izcbeth Trinkire Wolraet rointa out "If ooneorc says, 'This is 
cbcolutel;; certain - certain beyond doubt or the ponsibtlity of 
doubt, ' he is expreccjn º hic belief. He does rot describe a state of 
affairs .. ." and a few lines before thin she declares, "There is no 
defence atcinct the possibility of doubt. That doubt Is nlways 
raasible reR-erdinr what we know, or claim to know, in s 1orical 
truth. " 
Deccarteo wreatt-^d with the difficulty of whether he could know 
t: nythinr* for cure csnd found that doubt r. 1nR*ued his efforts. Moore 
attempted to cut through the cordo which seemed to bind ph11otophers 
in their west for indubitable facts, by can appeal to con on-aerse 
exrerienccn of )a owinc that n. W'ittrenatein asks whether it makes 
sense to doubt furdar, entna. propoaitiora (e. r. that the earth existed 
a 1or4 time before I ras born). In say'ing' that cýbore claimed that 
he knew it wan a hand which he perceived (his own hand), Wittgenstein 
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renirded him of the public nature of ouch sknowled? `et. It wa not a 
privile- ed fact known Zi 1y by 'bore. In that cenco, t'>oore 1o claim 
to know an i ediate object of perceptions would seem not to require 
the verb 'to know' to indicate its acaured stance. : doubt hero 
would appear to be i pprorziato. 
dWolgazt 
rci irda us, howcvCr, of 
the logical noceanity of doubt in relation to clairrn to know or 
LL3crtionz of belief. Mc criticizes the view that knowledge chould 
be viawod an come port of inventory whereby it is inpiied that there 
are n nunter of things which might be know.. 0Prichard'a wich to 
ectablich the uns ailability of mathonatical proof in Cartesian, 
and he wichen to cxtcrd the c :e privilege to direct obzervaticra. 
f owovor, there is a vast difference between an a priori otetecent 
which owes its truth to logical necoanity, like that concerning the 
angles of a triangle, and an empirical proposition concerning cone 
experience one in having or has 1, ad, which owes its truth to cuit- 
able verification in the external world. So 'richurd'a linking of 
direct obcer'vctionn, for ex=plo that one coca a brown patch in one's 
visual field, cannot be taken to be necessarily a valid parallel. 
(Ayer 
cakes an i ortant rc' rk about this: "In demanding for capiri- 
cal statements the safeguard of logical necocaity, these philosophers 
(e. g. Leibnitz) have failed to ace that they would thereby rob then 
of their tactual content. " Ayer, while apreeit that ote o beire 
cure cannot lend support to the belief that what one is sure about 
cn t be true, acknowledges that one can alaic the right to be sure 
for empirical propoaitiona. The extent to which such a claim may be 
justified will depend upon the degree to which a secure basic for 
the clays can be offered. Re , ivee an examples that the atotonont 
in calf-evident, or that its truth in directly warranted by our 
experience, or that it in validly derivable from nor-o other state- 
centa, or net of ctatcncnta, of which we have the right to be surd* Re 
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hlatcr 
rya that a ran who makes a claim to be aura in respect of a 
piece of putative knowledge gust show that be has taken every rettaon. 
able atop towards raking aura if his claim im to be accepted by 
othere. ý , If- his claims is to know how . to do X his doing it will catab- 
liah come credibility for that claim, cnpecially if he repeats the 
feat acveral theca. Rio claim to know that p will gain approval if 
he-aucceec33 in showing that it rests upon duo authority, for exa. -plo 
knowledge of an, historical fact. This draws attention to 
iRyle's 
, 
definition of krovin something an a rucceca verb, while his cl i- 
fication of believing something is that it is a motive word. Urre 
one would . have to nuccoed in showing the strength of one's claim to 
know that p or how to do X, while in believing one in nutting one's 
zi hta rather lower and indicating an inclination in one direction 
ratter, th n awther. Alttouch JA, ycr clearly favcur3 a scientific 
vicw ot.. 2ow we can perceivw the world of physical objectut lie cannot 
altoaoti cr got hoyond the position of conceiving of hin i odieto 
Gau oryýcxperiencca sui bairn, the awearernen, a of some Hort of nenne- 
data phenaecna. Ho npcukrs of seeing a , coding-cigarette cane before 
his, for ern. -ple. to doss no in support of the idea of the incorrigi- 
bility, of ix ®dtnte nazi: Q perception, While allowin, for verbal. ain- 
ropnnentatibn. 
If we rcco uizo the juxtaposition of knowing, believiri and 
doubting, au swell as a hont of perceptive crti cognitive varba 
exNrozuive of how wo aacortaiu at it in wo ate experiencing At any 
given tire. (eatertaininz a propositions azaanting to its confirming 
it, reco ing an abject of perron, identifying, clazzifyinc, 
compariz ,;, understanding, clarifying, teeing, etc) r wo shall to able 
toý rracp a logics: l truth which can only aid theiistic efforts to upock 
of revelation to ºkräwlodroº. It is true that to cay I know that p 
eiu eats-an infallible state while to any that I believe that p dots 
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not, yet it remains also truo that I may race a mistake in my rasertion 
of kz. owing u particular fact. how often have we spoken confidently of 
knowing sorothing, only to find later that we were mistaken'. ' 
Týi»'ol t 
has shown that we may onlyr refer claims to knowing to huL. ar, a euta, 
who cay be mistaken, rc human ngcntn, in any of auch clairc. Mc 
cx; rccn our beliof that cuch d-euch is the caco in the rccoGnition 
that we cai be mistaken. If cce tics would seem to follow from 
this, it is not by the disccvory of co .o 'privileged fact' which in 
beyond doubt that we shall overcome such. 
3. 
alcol Clark speaks 
favourably of the lattcucre of questionin rather than affirning to 
conquer ccapticic. i: o doom so in support of a 1st-person agent 
approach to ! snowing rather than a 3rd person spectator approach. The 
vZont cxperionccs perplexity before the situations hei confronts. 
Unlike the scientist, who adopts the viewpoint of an observer f he 
refrains from stating A or not-A, Instead of viewing an object in 
torte of its being ozio thing or another (and hence en, k. `olgnst denies, 
the pc cibility of being one of a number of ite= of knowlcdgc) $ he 
acknowledern Lia role as agent in questioning what be perceives, 
aChisho. 3. '-S Three Condition Theory is pertinent here. It states that 
before a an can be said to know such-and-such, he must firstly, be 
cure; secondly, he must be able to produce evidence justifying his 
assurance; and thirdly # what he is ogre of must be true. C 1) 
accepts r t2) in sure that ;' is true (3) iýý . öttrue). 
%, olgeet criticises this theory in respect of clai to know 
comothinj. Cho differentiates claiming to know a t, nj; from identi- 
fying sowething. Since we exjrecn our beliefa in raking euch a cloth 
rather than identifying one thing or another, thoro crinrot be 
rccosrary and sufficient coztditior. 3 for knowing, OB Chisholm affirms* 
For we do not £utcuwo what wo say wo know under a specific cl o 
concept. Ur refutation of C1 iohojw'a formula turns upon the logical 
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irr, -. "aibiiiti of determinin 'objectively' what in fact are our 
i liefa about uo : othing. "For whether ccaeoro doon Ä to equate 
evidence', whether he des 'accept h9y and whether hin tue - ail 
the no reflect our boliefoi' oto atator,. 
"Aaron 
acknowlcd, co the value 
of the Three Condition Theory in ctrc sing the centrality in 'knowiz\' 
of being cure. lie a rcea with i'o1,; aat, however, that boir: cure 
can of be identified with Zoiowiz . 
File 
alto points out that while 
Chiaholc'o theory cay appear to be cuitable for irctancce of 'knowing 
that' it is inappropriate for nany instances of $1-mowing how'* c. G. 
"lie know:; how to grow dahlias" or "1: e knows i Inch" i. c* how to 
speak and understand French. `Ayer cugr cste that it in the appli- 
cation of the word $know' rather than its ccaninG which marks off 
ccepticirm from claims to being cure of what in known. ''hat the 
sceptic contends in that cur narkingn are too hied; that the groundc 
on which wo are noruclly ready to concede the right to be aura are 
worth lone than wo think; . .. or not worth anything at all. ' In 
spite of this Ayer bolicvea that criteria can be established for 
knowing that conothiug in the case (like Aaron he accepts that 
'knowing how' i to be connidered separately), lie ayca s of not 
only being cure of what one rays one known, but having the 'right to 
be sure', Such a right haa to be carted in various wwayc, he informs 
us. however, any definition of knowledge raunt rem=in elusive jt: at 
tti. a definition of Good aunt bo elucive. For the atand a. rdo we 
establish to satisfy our atto: ptc to be sure of what we know nay be 
conparcd with standards of goodneoc which help to ah ape our snags of 
the word "good". nowledge, to coma extent, m , -%, y thus be said to be 
valuo-laden, to be looked at in relation to its particular inn uego- 
This reference to ctnrderdo which may fluctuate im; lic$ a flexible 
approach to the subject. t ilcolm Clark's insistence on a QucntiofcinS 
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rather than an affirming attitude before the phcx o ora of one 'a 
experienco, see= to have a othilar boaring. r he rAyc, perplexity$ 
confusion and doubt result fron such quostionir , from which we may 
cock sosse cort of deliverance* stating or affirming comctbirg may 
avoid such perplexity, but at tho came time makes for a more static 
attitude to 6=win,. father than seeking 'privilocd' facts which 
ray be forwarded to settle the issue, wo admit of the ponnibility of 
Toro light beine thrown upon the situation. We may remain open to 
the availability of new irziGhtc or inforuztion which present a 
challenge to that 'knowlodCo' which previously we irdner we 
po:. seused. she point Wade earlier of gore's clam to know somee? _ FA 
facts for certain han been disminsed by Wittgcn atoin on the ground 
that f; oore cinu: ed the verb to know in this inatanco. The public 
nature of the situation where Neore hold up hire hand to affirm 
certain perceptual knowledge, precludes the success of what Moore 
wicked to achieve. Re wished to uno that 'uncnnilablo' fact n. an 
indisputable banjo for genuine knowledge clnir.. t=cithor in I: ore'e 
attempt to lint specific itoon, no incorrigible evidences of what is 
known for cure, ratiufnctory, ko]gant raminds us. For it implies 
that there is a class of think which one might know and that it in 
ible, in principle, to exhaust t ho total of knowable bona. Buch 
a view . runa counter to the kind of open and enquiring approach to the 
problem of knowledSe which I have diccuc; ed. And it tan bean 
observed trat to claim to know conetbing is, logically, to admit of 
the pozzibility of doubt. Would it be appropriate, in the licht of 
the above dicauoaion, to adopt *"ýM, 'illicna l view, that non- 
tropocitiona1, $ineffable' piccca of knovled;, e (the io-called "given" 
elet cnt) are im, adz it ablot 11=t It with bins regard all kzowlod&o 
to 4* lropoaitiozal, related to c®nceptct and rj4t. t9.. aQt idtruthI? 
12k,. 
The clationßhir of inowirr to Bo1ievin - ern --r r 
Malcolm rronort3 us with e coquenco of prop3mitiorr concernin; 
the rrohrM1it a of a. rows containin. r a flow of water,, To useS this 
g; , -gale to try to illuntrate the difference between knowledge and 
belief. "o points out th. at the roeeo ion of relerrnnt evidence by 
the clairtnt is n neceecary condition for knc . n'. nit,. 
IT know that 
it (the river in the core) won't be dry' and the reason given IT caw 
a lot of um-ter flowinr there this morninr*t carries with it a sufficient 
reason for euch a claim. If on going to the Torre in the afternoon 
we found It to be dry, we should ray that you believed there would to 
water, even though you declared that you knew at the tir©. Malcolm 
refutes Prichard in the latterfn contention that it in by reflection 
that we cannot ©tatako belief for l eowledTo. Reflection alone, in 
the case of the probability of there boix water in the corm, could 
not elicit a certainty, however euch the speaker felt cure nt the 
time of cp fing-. It lcolo diatinruiehea strong and scat: ccncee of 
kncvinr- an a cor. Eequence. UPricbard dra'wo a £irL d stinction between 
cur ability to know t! t we are knowinc* comethirr and our knovi rC on 
other occaniono that we are only bel. ievi. nr; comethinr, vK lyn 
dice rcen cn both cotrnta, lie points out that child- en may t now 
thin-o without }mowing that they do, and a teacher may have to draw 
their attention to it. pomlyn also concidera the possibility of 
uncoraciouo belies to toll aaainat Prichard's assertion.. On the 
other hand, Prichard'e cautionary advice iz that in th1nIdn tie know 
X va may be tacinr much for ¬-rantcds that 1t he t reca with Cook 
Wilson in rejecting the notion trat thinking without question *that 
the thine in front of me is a table, or that todcy 10 mac' y" or 
that co and so came to see va la: t weeks to the came nß bcinr certain. 
The 'tckinr for (ranted' habit undoubtedly accounts for cnintIsco 
- 
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in our claim to know what is or ware the cane. To return to t; alcolm'm 
cxaaplc of the cor o hcirr found to be dry after one had =do a confi- 
dent azncrtion to the contrr , wo notice the inportarco 
he pIACOO 
upon oupportin facts;. Te prediction that, should one go to the 
largo in this afternoon, one would find water in it ran ends upon the 
experience of having seen water there that very ccrniz;. On fin iinj; 
the gorge to be dry, however, it becocco nocco ºxy to alter a know- 
lodge clam rotroopoctively to an assertion of belief. ? shim hypo- 
thatical example f helps to centre both knowledge, clams and belief 
azzertioria upon the need to corroborate, where one cant the claim 
being endo. To believe that the gorge would be flowing with water, 
oven to the extent of having a strong conviction that this would be 
no, awaits evidence an to weather the belief iss juatificd or not. 
Ac xA. R. o iilito ctatccz 'r.. . it is a characteristic of all chairs 
(to knowin7 that they may be validated or invalidated; it in a 
characteristic of all pretonciona to knowledge that they cay to 
exposed as fraudulent. " He Coen on to refute Y, aücolnso uo of sknows 
when given a lsstrong' co, nnotation, since 3; alcolo insists that euch 
unaco (e. g. in the cane of the proposition 2+2a 4+ or that there 
in on ink-pot in front of no) precludes any admission of caking a 
mistake. Intoreotingly, Whits in co enti on the different views 
held by ialcolc und Prichardq finda a cocoon factor (at Icant in 
respect of 3; a1colc say revised version of hin own view); it in that in 
caking a claim to know X one can, by reflecting on one's condition 
and without recourco to anythir eine such ca the facts of the c +Ol 
discover whether in fact ouch a claim is being ende. ere can 
know by introc. oction whether one in kind a claim to know that p 
or only Lolievin it-to be the case. Thin of course tolls; us nothing 
of the truth or falaity of the putative knowledge for which the claim 
is being cede; it coroly e, rabica the person caking it to distinguish 
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Cowin, claic3 from belief ortiorw. I oro i hito c 'orres Prichard's 
view concerning the part introopoction r my play in dotcrr inin 
whctker wo believe or know that p. 
Yäoozlcy takte phi. lo ophorn like E . color to tac1c for the eiatn: a 
they cake in a ao ix that a can cannot know aocothin unless he is 
ctre of it. This idea of Sbciag auro' and 'having the right to be 
aural finder atrong echoes in Ayer', - view, -. woozley uses the 
eý. precoion lfcols cure' in respect of knowledge elaica and exposes 
the fallacy of euch feeling; being accredited with groundn for 
certainty. Loozloy'c distinction between the justifiability and the 
truth (or validity) of a claim to knowing that p in crucial. As 
White co. «:. entas thin distinction points to two different ways of 
judging canconc'a claim to know. For one could be ju: tificd in 
caking a claim which is false. The con of the fifteenth century were 
justified in asserting that the earth in flat$ Given the limited 
aciontific knowledge they pocaccaed. So wo ca, y ray of coccone'a 
claim to Ehov that s in the circurstancen in which they made its 
it 
rcnconable. Tbc; the claim can be cubcoquently shown to be 
invalids though renconable. On the other hand, we ciight rebuke 
aomoonca for 5kir u claim which we deem to be unreanonabl. o, inplyine 
that they had the opportunity to correct their claim to enable it to 
be a true one. As White coca on to show, the criterion of good 
evidence in really relevant to the ace ; ant of the rer conablernc C 
of a claim to knowledge rather than to its validity. All of which 
brigs ua again to 11 atcolm'a example of the gorge, and the distinction 
which he draws between a claim at Ti that one knows it to be flowing 
with water. The ground for thin claim is that one has witncosed 
water running there shortly or Cole time before the claim was z do. 
r. owcver, auhocquently at T2 it is discovered that the core in dry 




to the effect that one believed (ctron, cly no doubt) that it would 
flow with water at T2. It was roaconable to say that one know there 
wan water in the -orpo at T (indeed, at the time of cpe iris the 
ponnibility in that that was the cane). On boinc found to have 
predicted falcoly in respect of what one expected to find, the belief 
that thin would be no was found to be invalid. 
It is clear that it in the reanoraablenern of the claim-nakinz, 
not the claim itself which is, in this instance, important. The 
relevant question to ask the claimant would be "Bow do you know? " 
rather than Mimt do you know 'ill The reply to that question entitles 
the claicant to the respect of hin illocutionor* ibr he states that 
he caw water in the Gorse that rornin . lore atzet notice that his 
ability to give grounds for his reply may be taken an indication 
of a disposition so to mower. Thus there is a cloy of events such 
that, whenever any comber of that cl is experienced the person 
concerned uses this to proclaim a prediction for the near future. 
Given the occurenco of B at t1 he is disposed regularly to predict 
that at t`$ 1S (similar event) will occur. All such predictions 
depend upon inference. They all run the risk of cccti 11ro'n 
criticie about inductive rcczoning. since the claim to knowled ,c 
in made in respect of an indirect situation, rotor- will play an 
important part in cnablin;; the claimant to state his proposition, 
t; aoory however could be appealed to in order to support a claim to 
direct not inferential knowlcdi; e. It i3 cienificant that 
zPrico 
recoÜnircn an affiliation between 'knowing that' and rbclievin 
that', A ittinnr of difference of do roo rather than of I-and. "T ere 
are acne sorts of kno4led ;c wt: ich can be defined, seit : suitable 
precautions, in torca of beliefs" ho informs us. tie opeako of the 
porzecnor of kncwled, Ze, an distinct from one who merely believao, 
its one w3zo hr3 rare evidence and atror., ^cr reasons for the ft1opooitio1 
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as to what iss claimed to be the carp. In his talk of degreeo of 
knowing (including belief) he cec to reflect Malcola strong and 
weak fort of knowing. Since Price's linking; 'knowing' with 
#believing$ refers to inferential knowledge, the parallel in 
heiEhtaned, for Ualcole l6 tweak knowing, nI have shown, relates 
to situatior. z(as in the ca.: o of the proposition about there being 
water in the gorge) where the speaker is not directly able to verify 
the proposition. Renes, na wo have seen, he has to give res nonce for 
his assertion, in such a earn, and these inevitably entail come 
reliance upon cciory, an well an prediction as to what one expects to 
be the case should one seek to verify or faloify the proposition in 
question. t`alcola's strong form of knowing cirrorn the kind of know- 
lodge about which Price affirri there cannot be any reduction to 
belief term wbataoever. This is iediate or direct knowledge, 
where to modify one's claim to know that p would be impossible. 
Cit is raining" "There is something brown in any preaent mi: szz . field" 
'#I have a headache" etc; ) as one legitimately may do when uttering a 
beliefs "I believe it in raining" said in a position where one is 
unable to know for sure whether thin in no or not. The question 
"jIow do you know? " in throe inntarcen does not-make sense* an it 
does in respect of the 'wankt forms of knowing or inferential know- 
ledgo. Price includes having a memory of onels headache as being an 
example of direct knowledge: something which one cannot doubt: reasons 
are unnecocaary in speaking of it; it is sufficient to ray that one 
has a memory of having a headache. 
Althou, -h belief is alwa'c fallible, however ti=ly one believes 
or however stror. onto evidence for oneis belief may he, it re=ins 
true that knowled, e cannot be given Cast-iron guarantees. Philosophers 
largely 
are oZreed that thero to no road fron belief to knowlcdro. Prichard 
rcxrks that no icprovecont in a belief and no incrcano in one's 
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feeli. r= of conviction will convert it into knowled;. r3. It"tsa different 
in kind as are dcairinr and feeling or red and blue. Yet different 
dc; -rees of knowing, are admitted. Cook Wilson defines the verb 
strictly to roan the having of come entity or some fact directly 
present to ore's conacioucreca. Price rennrk n that a core lax verso 
of knowin: ' is the believing of some proposition which in reasonably 
certain, and Malcolm distinguishes his "stronrl and tweak' senses of 
knowing& white criticises this latter distinction, on the grounds 
that it in a logical characteristic of all Claire to knowing that they 
say be validated or Invalidated. Yet White agrees that t lcolrn is 
right if we move from ono'c not allowing a claim to be invalidated to 
one's not being able to see how it could be. That is why we assert 
01 know' co strongly in auch instarces: 2+2= 4+ the ink bottle is 
before co, etc. White concerts here on Fcore's appeal to common-sense. 
that it is not that statements of conncn-sonne are true or known to 
be true, but that it is core reasonable to claim they are true than 
the opposite. Prichard believes that where we should say we are 
certain, we should be prepared to say we know. of the proposition 
that the zquaro of three cunt be an odd number, be asks that if we do 
not ray wo know this to be no, wo gust wonder what in fact we know 
at all. Yet with all this, the possibility of one's being mistaken 
in respect of claim to know may not appear to be so different from 
the accepted fallibility which attaches to statements of belief. 
4'oozley criticises ? tlcolm's assertion that 1being confident is 
a ncccaoary condition for knowing' pointing out that rorr 11y a ein 
would not rake a claim to know un1co h3 waz sure., re could know 
without being cure but would not be juctificd in rakirgr the claim. 
It is on this issue of claiming to know an distinct from knowing that 
t. loozley laya bare a vital courco of confusion. Doan claicin! to kr: o1' 
amount to no more than corer belief? Price renindu s that therm in a 
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state of sind which wo are tempted to call belief whore we are not 
aware of the po. ^, zibility that wo may be mistaken. Re calla this 
acceptance or taking for granted. Cook Wilson terms it beiri under 
the iaprescion that= Prichard speaks of thinking without queotion. 
Cook Wilson tolls us that having an opinion, although dependent upon 
thinking, is not knowin , any more than pondering, wondoring or 
inquiring are. On the other hand perception and the epprehenniou of 
a feeling are ezomplon of knowing (or channels of knowing). to it 
is ponaiblo to rake a clam to know whcrel on closer inspection, 
casts claim (bowing) in a matter of opinion or more belief. Price, 
however, reminds to that for belief proper (es distinct from the 
ample entertaining of a proposition without pozitive ancent to it 
being, given) $ come knowledge must be present. 
A belief rents upon cons knowledge and upon probability. Price 
cites an cs ple of our hearing a noise in the cupboard which we 
believe to be the cincir. cat. We entertain the proposition that 
the cat is in the cupboard, and in loins further than this and 
accenting to it wo express our belief in the probability that that 
in where we cha11 find it. Ilowevor, for this assent to qualify an a 
belief, it in noceozary that wo acknowledse the possibility that we 
ray be aictcken, for the noise fron the cupboard may be Cade by a 
rat or a ans l boy. We recoCuicso that in believing the proposition 
p, there are alternative propositional q and r, which might obtain. 
M evidence which would confira the truth of p is incoapleto, until 
the cupboard door in opened and the cat discovered inside. Yet, in 
a=cnting to p an wall an entertaining its likelihood, we I; ive 
credence to a set of facts which, in our vier, rakes ,p core 
likely 
than rs viz, we have heard a 'rainow', we have previously on other 
occasions found the cat in the cupboard, we noticed the cat in the 




proper as reasoned went to an entertained proposition. A certain 
degree of confidence, how much or how little Ual indicate our 
emotional rcsporna to the cazo in point, is shown. We deliberately 
choose to assent to p, aware that q and r have claics upon us, but 
give priority to pe what needs to be stressed, in our use of Price's 
analysis of belief, in the difference which he here draws between 
firm belief and zero acceptance, taking for granted, being under the 
inpression that, or thinking without question. Considered thought in 
given to the proposition in what price calla belief proper. If one 
knew that p, theses would be no roes left to believe that p, or if 
one knew how to perform p there would be no need to speculate or 
express a predilection for this method rather than that an to how 
to do p. 
Although thought ray be required before we are able to state 
what we know, as when we arcwcr correctly a queetion taddreaoed to use 
thickine in neither a cece: nary nor a sufficient condition for 
knowing. Cook Wilson c; cakn of knowing that which is directly 
presented to our cercen or apprehended at once. Fowover unconscious 
core residual beliefs ray bot in that we have no Cc=ion to examine 
then now, any rolovcnt belief cannot be other than that about which 
duo thought in applied. But not all uncxanirod assumptions should 
to taken to to bow. Wo do not need to be asking ourselves 
constantly whether we have evidence for a belief or even to be aware 
of our having it. Trice explains that our acceptance of Smith's 
trustworthiners nay be the result of long encounter with hire and 
experience of having seen his relating to other people. If the 
subject crorol we would affirn Smith's trustworthiuccn, but wo do 
not need to produce an inventory of Saith#a deeds or to recall any 
specific einlas to on , blo us to make that affiraation. fries 




o poouro to relevant situations increaaeo. Insofar as Prico accepts 
Cook Wilson to strict use of knowing to direct oxperienco t his 
conclusion as to the reinforcement of our less (vocal or) articulate 
beliefs by repetitive favourable circucotancen, does not seem to me 
to fall short of his "lox's hence of knowing, rawly the believing of 
cone proposition which in reasonably certain. Thin is inferential 
knowlod o of course. It consorts also with Woos. ley s remark that 
although to coy ll think I know that# see= odd, althouih not 11 think 
I know shat (where, when, why)', we should perhaps remit ourcelvea 
to ray it core often in adainoion. of the fact that we have leas 
than certainty for some of our pro, ooitionn. Lo does not think 
that adding the verb 'thin ' diminishes a claim to know since 
k owir. e- in not like wondering, pondering s reflecting etc, a pclcholo- 
Eical word, leant of all is its claim ba. od upon a mental state or a 
condition; it refers to w1mt wo do to attain an end. One carry 
wrongly think one knows and not know that one kcnown, Prichard 
rejects the former of thene possibilities, arguing; that claiming to 
be certain when one thinks one tniow in actually being; 'under an 
inprccaicn that', I=-owled hero being simulated. To be certain is 
not to know; no inductive , encralication can count an knowledgek. 
Cougar is sweet etc); it wo r we are certain we should be prepared 
to say we knob. Frick and cites the exo. nplo of saying wo know that a 
mine is loud. 
j The A p1icution of the Discuapion to Theie3tic Polief 
Froz the various vicws concerning the relation of belief to 
kncwleduo which have been discucaed, it can be seen that cy initial 
ccacrtion (at the beginning of this chapter), that any knowledge 
claim whatever requires a context to enable its nerit or de»erit to 
be c. c cdo has been illustrated,, dun a knowledge claim =1 be 
r 
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said to be cirestantial., relative to a given situation. I think 
that it will be possible to find a deZreo of agreement in thece viewer, 
while acknowledging definite points of diem eiont. A major point of 
difference relates to the qucation as to whether neceaaary and 
dufficient conditions for a claims by S to know that p can be estab- 
lished* Another relates to the question as to whether belief 'that' 
can# in so=* way, load to a clath to know (that I, where appropriate 
corroborative circucntcncco obtain, or seem to exist, here is some 
difference of opinion, also, in respect of one's intuitions or 
introspection about what one knows one believes or believes one 
knows. Thus the issue of being sure, or havinr a conviction that 
such and such is the mace, poses a problem in relation to attempts to 
establish grounds for knowing that p. 
The follovirg points will indicate the conclusions I have reached 
and which will guide tie in say offorta to discover how far, if at all, 
revelation in an; 'cxpcricntial nonoe, cry be said to qualify for come 
kind of knowing, by man and by God, Firnt, I want to accept 
tfittgoratoin'n contextual basis for seeking the canning of knowledge 
claims the cediua Ur undcrctending is the language C. -Mat whore the 
verb Ito knovl ucquirea the craning it has an determined by the 
conditions (ultinstoly the form of life # and the ne sociated autono- 
couo or depth gre nr of the gano) inherent in the linguistic criteria 
therLtn indicated. This need not entail the seeking of a 'given' 
elocont or 'privileged' fact. Secondly# following fron the first 
point t it in aiatckcn, I believe, to view (knowledge l an consisting 
in a naher of facto which cou. ld* in principle, be accumulated like 
an inventory and which, again in principle, t have a finite limit 
in terca of rathc : otical foxaul. ao. I have shown, by contrast, 
oy=pathy with the ooVo open approach of W'olgant and Clark, both of 
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t. =hoa cspouco a questioning sind first rorron interpretation of krcw- 
1cdCa clair. hence, Ica favouring a view which accke to avoid the 
two components theory; that ing the view which conceives of knowledco 
¬s coiprisirg a given clernont erd human reflection upon euch« 
Thirdly, the subjective copcct of enc'n clai to l tcv that p 
eight eecc, therefore, to advert to a state of mind or a particular 
ph no of cornciounncao. Without absurdly wiohir to y that cy 
awarencca of cry assertions of belief or my clinic to knowing, could 
function in a state of unconacicuoneez, I think that I want to say 
no ethin;; other than that such mortis: a or claims- are simply 
coreonta upon oy pcycbology. I want to uco Ayers concept of 
'having the riCht to be sure $ an a criterion for a , Genuine knowledge 
clam, t: hcre trat right is scan to be relative to one's being in a 
position to cake such a claim: one hrn to earn the right to cake it. 
rcro, I boliove that Wittgcnctein0a diccuonion about knowing in 
"Cn Certainty's in relevant to oy view. Ile shows to that, in the 
light of those fundacontal propositions which lie at the bottom of a 
particular lnrgvave rams, it doe:; not ice conao to doubt thoco 
things which hold fast there. To use Aycr'n phrase, my 'having the 
right to be mire' will than depend upon mp having appraised myself 
of those deterair nta of the kind of knowicdCa which a particular 
aroaof dircourco exhibito. This should not be confused with the 
cocking of e piricai Crounda by looking for a ICitrcn+ clerent to 
try to provide an indubitable basis for a knowladCe cloth. 
Fourthly, it will be seen, then, that my claic s to know Will, be 
ireluctabllr hound up with te 1e rnine , of a liznjua e Vameq and the 
cbility to dc crßtrtto that I rnvc sractercd the rules which enable 
ro to use corroctly the worda, phrrtco and nenteucce appropriate to a 
particular subject. White's point about the distinction between 
vilidatinr, and justityina a propositions where a krowlcdce claim is 
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r do, will link up with this Tattor of lcarnirit. To know that p in a 
Liven instance requires that I am in a position to otnte a rraticfecctcry 
claim to know, and such a claim presupposes a grasp of linguistic 
patterns of recognising and identifying correctly how p is to be 
dczcribod« 
Fifthly, it does not follow from what has been said of the need 
to root the word 'know$ in a particular context, to ascertain what 
sort of a claim is being Cade by its uze, that there in only a 
shifting sort of usago for the verb. Cn the contrary, the philono, born 
referred to have been at one in reeking to dc^ucnctrato that elaining 
to know that p in of a different order to assorting a t1 lief that p* 
r', nowir , in whatever context it exists rni bt be said to possess a 
homogenous quality in that it in t to use Kyle Or. phrase, a 113=0Ss 
ward". It in where I as able to chow that I have cause to Justify 
a claim to know trat p, in whatever context the claim night be dada, 
that I can rightfully make such a claim. To , 
justify here pointy to 
my being in a satisfactory position to support ny claim with 
publicly acceptable grounds for the claim. ya- lcolu'a use of 'strong' 
versions of +j row would appear to meat AA. yer'o criterion for having 
the right to be aura, although *tlyn refutes the attempt to argue 
from a subjective conviction of being sure to n. cuccessfl assertion 
of knowing. bolgant'a view that in caging that I know that pI do 
but assert a belief about it, would seen to tally with this view. 
%t my saying that I know, whore I might in other circumstances 
speak of belief would, as ralcolmla tweak' version of knowing 
reminds us, at least provides a subjective acaurrance to the sort of 
success FFyle wished to differentiate from states like wondering, 
entertaining, pondering or thinking, where somethir abort of 
arrival coon to be indicated. 
sixthly, I am able to postulate, therefore, that it is in the 
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connection between the cubjestla firmt parson (and necenrarily 
questioninf; ) approach to personal knowlodro, and the lincuictic 
franewark in which his apocific usn o of that verb is uned, that 
headway for cj subject can be cede. For, given that I shalt concern 
Mcelf with ideologically aroused concepts, rather than conaibly 
aroused concepts, I may be appearing to settle for Cook Wilson's 
position whereby I conclude that 01 think I knows in respect of the 
beliefs about a rvvcalin deity$ who is said to be cooking communion 
with ca through come kind of experience or seat of experiences. It 
eicht also appear that I shall not perhaps be able to cccrply with 
Prichard's request that where one should speak of certainty, one 
should speak of k : owled, e, for that certainty will rot apparently be 
open to me in the area of religious discussion. Yet it is-,, prccisoly 
through being in a position whereby the believer can spews of knowin 
Cod by hits rccponec to the Christ-event, that 'certainty' In apposite. 
however, ceventhlyt I would want to think that I shall avoid the 
charge of rarely 'taking for granted' or lbeing under the impression 
that', ar thinking without question' or 'sorely having an opinion', 
when I utte pt to find coke kind of intelligible use of the verb to 
know within Theistic talk about God's ruve]ation (and hence the 
alleged caking known of Hic seif to teen). I shall inevitably run than 
risk of falling foul of t oowley' stricture upon t'. kolas that being 
confident should not be forwarded an a necessary condition for 
txv%fteo b oozley, it will be oca31dd, points out that a can would 
not rake a claim to know unless he was saure; where he cakes a claim 
to know without being cure, he is not justified in co doing. 
Malcola's $weak* version of knowing would fit the latter observation 
for the claim cad* as to wester being in the gorge did not merit the 
kind of acaurance that this was so which the knowledge claim suggeated" 
(A puzzle bore is that, the claimant appeared to be justified at the 
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time of bin accortiona: yet wo murt recall that justification for 
and validation of a knowledie claim tay not coincide. ) I shall rely 
core specifically upon Aycr'c formulation of having the right to be 
sure and argue that, with appropriate proviaon in view of the ideo- 
logical nature of the natter on hand (where Ayer is concerned with 
perception and cer tiona (or nenne data) in relation to cinirz to 
knowing), Christiana may ctnko a claim to experiential knowled, 7e of 
God when, and only when$ they arc able to show that they are able to 
evince undcrotandix of what it is they mean by such clai . Such 
underatanding will bo dc onatratcd, an I have attempted to nrjua, by 
their ability to explain the noanin; of their assertions about 
encounter with God. Co it is a conceptual innue, principally. And I 
have sou ht to catablich that the koryEma provides the necessary and 
nuirficicnt condition for for nilatin, -, a scheme for the encounter- 
reaponac principle to acquire logical cign. ificance (irnof, r an i an 
speaking c; ccifically of Christian revelation), That cigniftcance 
can only be neon when the h pothetical natura of questions about God 
in rejected, and the privacy of the form of life, understood an 
those conur-al exporioncca whore the concept of a God, which has been 
given waning through Christ, is considered to be coratitutive of 
belief. 
Co, I reach the position of affiroini the need to study a 
lar. . Co ccze to ascertain whothor a specific know1e a claim is 
intelligible. Eoir. ablo to justify a claie will depend upon crio'a 
beirr in a pcaition to know whatcver It may be to which a claim to 
being laid. The ucanraptio: z which inform tho particular area of 
cpcal: irv in qucntion will help to chow what sort of Imawledge is 
beinj considered. If it in a claim to know that ps the csubjcct's 
position hero will be critical. Ho doao but expreaa (or, perhaps, 
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imply) a belief in the cerise that he indicates this is how things 
etand, as far as he is concerned. In being able to use correctly a 
lan4--uage which has a public authentication, he moves away fron 
subjective atateconts. The difference between ionediato canoe 
perception and his description of such should be noted here. i; e does 
not, however, rcceursrily remove the questions which accompany an 
open, enquiring approach to the issue at stake. In reapoct of 
Theistic discourse, this nuot be so and a third person, spectator 
description of what p is taken to be may seem to be less to the 
fore. It will not be entirely excluded, in view of the historical 
propositions, without which the Apostolic proclamation (the kerygma) 
could not operate. As part of the process whereby that which in 
thought to be known requires sentient beings, and beings capable of 
intellectual enquiry, who interact with what is thought to be the 
cane, the believer in God, must bear come responsibility for the 
elaboration of new ideas pertinent to his beliefs. In that respect, 
however, he does not differ from a can who cakes a claim to know 
that p in respect of sensory perception. For in the epistenology 
of belief and knowledge, to speak of any knowledge whatever demands 
some kind of relationship between the knower and the known. And, 
whatever nay be said of the logical relationship of knowledge to 
belief s and of both to doubt, it oust be remembered that any know- 
led, -, e claim, atrone or weak, direct or inferential, in subject to 
the possibility of being mistaken. It is because this is a logical 
necessity that I have looked to Wittgenstein's anchorage of 
empirical propositions in those fundamental propositions which fers 
the "rock bed of the river". In doing co, wo are encouraged to move 
from the multitude of views and arguments about knowledge and belief 
to a consideration of logical criteria for determining what it cokes 
sense to say. Such criteria should not be taken to be oubotitutes for 
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'n' given facts which are held to be sacrosanct. Rather, they are 
the criteria which emanate from empirical events of the nature of the 
form of life and which determine the linguistic rules for speaking 
coherently of revelation. 
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CHAPTER ELEVE? 
xr: O'WL E1T E BY DM CRI TT Ict, 
Mhat sense would it make to speak of the knowledge conveyed by 
divine revelation to be knowledge by description? For it in a facet 
of traditional Christian theistic belief that its propositions 
concerning the content of that revelation are held to be truths, 
capable of being grasped by the faithful. Philosophically, we have 
to enquire whether these propositions meet the requirements for 
truth-conditional rules. In other words, we ask whether they purport 
to describe a 'reality', testable by experience in sore way or 
another. In it necessary to speak, however, of validation of 
propositions here? At once, we recognize a problem, previously 
alluded to, namely the recorded nature of the propositions in 
question. For they do not purport to be, apart from claims to 
certain present awarenosses of the individual, about events in the 
world now. They take us into a realm of cosmic happenings stretching; 
to pest aeons (the creation of the world and of man) and to apocific 
historical events set in Palestine and adjacent lands from the 
seventeenth century B. C. to the first century A. D. Yet the propo- 
sitions relating to these recorded events form the foundation for 
Judaeo-Christian belief. Without them, no coherent basis for such 
belief would exist. In part, we are faced, then, with the kind of 
problems which besot philosophers of history. In this respect, we 
may recognise that the aGardiner-Stempel attempt to subsume historical 
propositions under greneral labº , will be less satisfactory for an 
analysis of Biblical historical propositional than the 
bDray-nroadbeck 
thesis which lays stress on the uniqueness of specific events. 
Clearly, the a priori claim of theism concerning the activity of 
God in the world, icplies soxathing other than the sort of evcuto 
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which mir-ht be empirically rub. -, =cd under a 'covcrin& In at mamdatumo 
more are thoco, of course, who would wich to view rccoxdcd history, 
"in toto", an belonging to God's overruling provider: co: 
c1-cnncnberg 
for instance when he opcJw of the Christ event being the focal 
point of all history. ILgairst this vice, one night think of trat hold 
by dcullr.. ann, and others, which conceives of biblical history ca beinE 
specifically 'calvation-hi3tcry' a God is hold to have shaped the 
events of larnel'a history and those of the early church in n uzy 
which is cif-nificantly different from secular hintory, per Co. %'e 
are concerned, however, to tee what coy bo said to support the idea 
that we ore precented with knowlcdgo-b=-description in those 
revelatory acta which are believed to lie behind the profocitiona 
forwarded as doctrines of truth by theicta. To describe X in to try 
to describe what is taken to be the case. Our concoptunli tion of 
nor-no experiences provide us with grounds for thirkir that soma 
connonnun amongst°a population in poc3iblo. Subjective differences, 
however, show that a number of variablen cloud the icnuo. Even if 
the problem of visual, acoustic, tactile cannery experiences boing; 
subject to a ccrciderable ranCo of difference be overcome, we wo der 
whether A coca a 'red' object in precisely the cane way cc ß. 
realism would have u5 accept tr. at, given certain conditions (e. g. 
the three conditional theory of Chisholm) a degree of cortairty 
about our observation of the world may be obtained. tcacivo 
definition in hold to be igportont in enabling an intelligible 
naming procc^ to take place, co that a multitude of objects say be 
rocs uiced anal cormunication about then achieved. In Baker's Phrase, 
thoso cay be referred to en 'consibly arounod concepts'. 
If I cap that I believe that Cod created the world, redeemed 
r.. nlcind and will be our judco, ca I dc; cribir,,, events which can be 




of verbal definition. I ray not have coon or heard Yoruba tribcc on 
of VVigoria performing a ritual dance. I have no rcaaon to doubt that 
such dances occur. It is sufficient that I read about or unten to a 
description of what taken place at auch an event. In it sufficient 
for me to read the propositions Given in the Bible and in the Creeds 
to enable me to accept, in a bone fide wayl the truth of the Frolo- 
citioncs asserted? I must take it that historical propocitiono relate 
to events attested by witneaces and are bone fide reports. Zinc* 
there in no gray that I can verity them in any ostensive manner, my 
I attach to them some degree of certainty by verbal communication? 
There are thoaa apologists who would point out that the authority of 
God in informing us in hin Word of what he has done in more trust- 
worthy than the most careful reporting of a Yoruba dance might be. 
As a sacker says, "Scripture in termed infallible and inerrant to 
express the conviction that all its teaching is the utterance of Cod 
who cannot lin. " The argument is apparently circular. I must accept 
what in proclaimed because it has the authority of God who cannot 
lie, and my understanding; that this in the word of God tend thus ban 
äivin© authority) is becauze I am told so by scriptural writera« 
However whether one takes a conservative or liberal view of scripture, 
Christian Theism azzertc certain beliefs. They take the fork of 
decoriptions through verbal toroulatioi. 
To aptak of lnovledr, o by description in regard to historical 
propositions which purport to provide information about God'a 
activities in the world at lack validating criteria, of a certain 
kind, clearly. That an event occurred which bore the ball nark of 
divine agency may or may not be the Casey putative miracles would 
fill one, bill. They would have to be taken on trust today. It is 
plain, therefore, that it in not in any attempt to validate that 
which, by its nature, cannot be validated that the idea of knowly 0 
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by description eight nerve a purpose in seeking to understand the 
concept of revelation. But it would ice good sense to ask the 
questions are the doacriptions offered by Christiane in support of 
their belief in God's activities in the world, justified or not? 
That in a different matter, and one to which I shall address raynelf. 
In order to try to discover whether one may speak intelligibly about 
knowledge by description in the field of Theism,, I shall commence by 
relating thin to the concept of kuowlcdje by acquaintance. 
It is not easy to avoid introducing 
Elb 
apro dictum that know- 
ledge by description ins in the last analysis$ reducible to knowledge 
by acquaintance. We recall ' Ayer's later attempts to define his 
verification principle, no that he spoke now of a statement being 
indirectly verifiable it it satisfied certain conditions. He ac knitted 
that his earlier attempt to restrict verifiable statements to either 
analytic or denonatrable empirical propositions had failed. May we 
say that there in something open to rational enquiry in the 
propositions forwarded by theists, which provides us with some such 
verifiable criterion? hi3oore held, arainot Ruzsel1, that knowledge 
by acquaintance gras subject to one's being deluded or mistaken in a 
way which knowledge by description, purporting to give information of 
certain truths, was not. AU here turns on the question as to whether 
accurate description of X is possible, apart from prior acquaintance 
with the constituents which cake up X. Analytically, a true descrip- 
tion of X provides a description of truth* but how may this be 
ascertained? Who are the parties or party to the description? For 
it eight be said of any individual who purports to proclaim that he 
known that Ps that he is but expressing his belief in respect of P. 
So Wittgonntein countered Moore la claim to know that what he held 
before him was a band, by averring that tore simply adverted to coo*- 
11+5 
thins which van not open to doubt. Wo iay not diaputo that biblical 
writers and church fathers oxprecced a belief when thoy proclained, 
with the inniCht of faith, that God had revealed himself in thin way 
or that. 
Hay we apply 
iRu 
sell'ei dictum for an analysis of knowledge by 
dcocription to Christian proIocitionn? For example, is it sensible 
to analyze propositions about Jesus in some cart of way an follows: 
There was one, and only one, x much that that x was he who died at 
the hands of Pontius Pilate (wan found to have vacated the tomb in 
the garden of Joseph of Arioathea etc). Russell cuMested that it 
was in the naming of the constituent elements in a proposition that 
its component parts night be examined and tested. Dray's suggestion 
in respect of historical propositions is that the details on to 
probable intention, motivation etct and all the relevant enpoata of 
the character of the one claimed to have performed a specific action, 
would have to be taken into account. For Russell wants us to reduce 
descriptive propositions to basic atonic facts » 'thin white', 'that 
narrt etct 
bray 
wishes to analyse a putative historical event as a 
unique bappeninJ in the light of all the known facts in respect of 
those responsible for its perpetration. Given theistic presuppositions 
about Code accrcy in the world, and an behalf of ran, it would cee; * 
to be intelligible to apply theca twin criteria to propocitiona about 
Jesus. If it be Granted that it was God's intention to effect a 
comic redemption for narJcind in and throuth the person of Jesus of 
? «azareth, such motivation would be adequate explanation for the 
events recorded in propositional fora in the Christion tradition. 
Thus 'Christ died for our sines and rohe again an the third day' voice 
the realisation of expectations proclaimed by prophotn and fulfilled 
in historical events. It will be aeon that I have changed putative 
historical events into theoloZ; ical propositions. ihia would zoom to 
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be a cohort-circuitin of the cncapculatod notivationn implicit in the 
descriptions given. In raping that Jesus of ? aznroth died at the 
handa of the Rom in c, AD. 339 theicta requires that wo rcco iee 
God'a intention in this event* 
kSo Peter proclaioa it in his 
Pentecost speech. Fact and interpretation are interwoven in such a 
proposition. Russell would want us to adhere to putative fact or 
eepirical proposition. In dealing with putative historical propo- 
oitiora, we are in a disciplinary area which carries its own 
sanctions. Each historical proposition of note iss pregnant with 
what it bears upon in human understanding. Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon or Queen Anne died for czaople. Each event had very signi- 
ficant consequences for Roman and English history respectively* 
Isolation of an event from context is historically impossible. 
1Wittgonctetnta 
co, ent "If someone says he known something, it 
cr.: 3t be comcthiz that, by tncral consent, he is in a position to 
know" nit here be related to his emphaain upon what he says of the 
significance of language ewmea. Of historical propositions he lea 
it plain that these require an appropriate language Coco to provide 
an intelligible basis for whet they have to say. However, it Is not 
a cmtter of Living grounds to establish auch propositions. °We do 
not $see' the truth of historical knovledZe co auch an participate 
in it by our 'acting' which lies at the bottom of the laniuage 
gnoo. So here is the idea of coc; jitcent to beliefs which rest upon 
Theistic fundamental propositions. And Wittgenstein points out that 
Grounds cannot be given here but more can be learned to elucidate a 
particular piece of historical information. As he to often reminds 
uoq it to in the picture which we have before uo$ that cone under- 
standing may be achieved of what we are seeking to communicate. 
From these obmervations we coy oaks to what extent would it cake 
.. 1t+7 .. 
cerae to cpock of a Christian being in a position to be able to 
speak of the truth of the various propositions which cake up his 
rclieioua belief? An a member of a group engaged in a language came 
which reflects a form of life ho may be said to be a participant, 
along with those who also believe, in using a specific prepositional 
form. An essential element in this are propocitiors which describe 
certain theistic beliefs like: 'God created the world', 'Christ died 
for our sins'. These constitute the overall picture. By using the 
language they do to express their beliefs about God and the world, 
they may have a truth-bearing function given the prior beliefs they 
hold about God. 
Wittgenstein asks of a proposition about which it query is raised 
by someone, whether it in reasonable to doubt what is expressed in 
auch a propcsition. P. e Points out that it would be rather senseless 
to question the existence of the world before one's birth or a 
hundred or no years before that. Doubt fails to be significant in 
this instance. h' at of theistic propositions which purport toi 
describe divine actions? It is not only by thoco outside the 
theistic lansuage-moo but by many inside (that iss, those who, by 
faith of no=* sort, are prepared to play that Case) that doubts are 
voiced concerning ouch propositions. If we consider the putative 
historical facts auch as the birth of Jesus in Falcetine, his death 
at Calvary etc, it is reasonable to say that we know them by having 
learned thorn, in a way similar to our learning facts about, ccy, 
Napoleon. Wo have cocio to believe that they are true. Wittgenstein 
reminds us that acceptance of historical facts has been learned: 
they are what Co to make up a particular languages gase. Fe acknow- 
ledges that in order to verify specific facto we gust rotor to 
established authorities. That in entailed in the playing of a 
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lanP, uar, e-cane involving historical propositions. In the use to 
which those facts are put, in their expression in appropriate 
lanzY-uage, their meaning is to be nought. Context is important. A 
putative historical fact does not stand in isolation, but relates to 
a wider whole of historical perspective. An historian is Judged to 
be competent to analyze and to coamunicate what it is in a particular 
historical situation which needs emphasis, or in what way it relates 
to that period in which it occurred. He plays the language Came and 
by his choice and use of suitable words, enables his audience or 
readers to beccoe involved in the scene depicted. Together they act 
out, verbally, a reconstruction of events presumed to have taken 
glace, perhaps many years before their own lives. The putative 
tru'. h of historical propositions thus enunciated rests upon the 
authority upon which they lie, whether that authority be documentary 
or contemporary historian, and upon their being coherently described 
within the confines of the langdune game. 
If it be accepted, then, that our understanding of what we mean 
by 'knowing' in relative to the particular language-gase being played, 
we can go on to consider the question of the intelligibility of the 
concept of cen knowing God and its corrplesent, Cod revealing himself 
to san. Here we encounter a fundamental tenet of thoiss: man's 
natural ignorance of God necessitates calf-disclosure to men by God. 
Christianity holde that man is incapable, unaided, to reach a know- 
led;, e of his Creator. n'"Who by searching can find him? " Yet heisa 
bidden to cake that search in the assurance that God himself in 
willing to impart understanding to the believer. "seek the Lord 
while he may be found. " "Seek and you shall find. " God in portrayed 
as being driven by his very natura, of which love is said to be the 
guiding principle, to reveal himself to men. "2'0 man has ever aeon 
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Cod; the only begotten Son ... has lade his known. " "God, who in 
former tices =do hirzelf known through the prophets has, in these 
latter days, made himself kro4n through his Son. " Sol Scripture 
teaches that can has spiritual desire to know God but in undblc to 
discover him; God's love for his creature # cant is such that W is 
impelled to make himself known. To be aura, the separateness of 
God and man in compounded by the reality of can's sinfulness, which 
militates against human response to the overtures of God. The 
picture painted in the I3ible in of God frequently hiding himself 
from can as a result of the latter's rejection of Gad'a loving and 
righteous demands. Kowevery God's love is said to be steadfast and 
unconquerable, breaking through the opaqueness of can's selfishness. 
'For a little while, in oy wrath, I hid self from you, yet with 
everlasting love have I redeemed you' 1Cod showed his love towards 
use in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for uses 
Similarly, can is bidden to step out in faith to secure those gifts 
of graces forgiveness and freedom offered by his riker. $Draw near 
to God and he will draw near to you' Pit we confess our Gins he is 
faithful and just to forgive our sins' Moir justified by faiths wo 
have pcsce with God ... through Christ. ' In both Old and Nov 
Testaments the idea of covenant-relationship between Israel (or 
Church) and God is a consistent theme. It is a these which modern 
biblical scholarship endorses, amidst all the uncertainty in regard 
to authorship, cources and historical authenticity. For if the 
Bible in the modern world can be said to convey any unequivocal 
sernago, it rast surely be that it records a people's experience of 
faith in Cne who had Progressively revealed himself and his intentions 
to thus. 0Fi. Euberta #I-Moue formula denoting personal relationship 
enabling hulas to worship, speak and write akut One whom they 
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conceived was at work in their experiences, and was going ahead of 
them in the implementation of his purposes, encapsulates the central 
principle of revelation: To be known and to know. 'I know my sheep 
by name and they hear my voice'. The propositions which are 
associated with the Biblical literature depend upon descriptions of 
putative events, whereby claims about God are voiced. As a body of 
doctrinal statements, they have a perlocutionary function in seeking 
to persuade readers that those events enabled Jews, and later 
Christians, to experience the presence of God in their lives. So 
they have an explanatory, as well as a descriptive, purpose. They 
indicate how in various human circumstances God was made manifest to 
those of faith. Although they appear to require acceptance by 
readers of a 'given' element in revelation, and to that extent must, 
logically, entail the making; known by giving - by initiating actions 
- on the part of God, it need not be assumed from this that they 
support a foundational concept of knowledge. Such a consideration 
might be the point at which my attempt to use Russell's argument 
about knowledge by description falls down. 
Russell was wedded to a 'unurn nornen, urnum nominatuwt' view of 
knowledge and reality: he has been mirrored by many philosophers 
including PC. I. Lewis, who made a sharp distinction between the 
data of experience and the mental events by which we perceive that 
data. My emphasis, however, has been upon Wittgenstein's contextual 
setting for the understanding of knowledge claims: this I have 
consistently allied to his theory of language games as being relative 
to differences in respect of the meaning of propositions. 
The Scriptural allusions to which I have referred might find 
some kind of epistemological significance if they are accorded a 
propositional status. By this I mean that, in keeping with the 
$open' view of belief and knowledge to which I have lent support, 
- 151 - 
Biblical attempts to talk of cents encounter with God should be 
considered to be subject to conditions of propositional criteria, 
and not troated as non-inferential, ineffable pieces of knowlcd e: 
the "given". Nor should this be soon cc a contradiction of my wish 
to treat revelation as experiential. 
For to be said to have an experience of X need not presuppose 
the absence of concepts or formulations of what one night take X to 
bet by which I oean that it cannot (surely) be dcoxod to be a 
nececnary condition for one's knowing by experience that one should 
know such non-inferentinllt although often it sny be a sufficient 
condition. I am here thinking of ? '. Williams' argument in his book 
'Groundless %elief' in which he refutes the two components view of a 
$gi"ven' element and a recbptivo one, in the form of a human mind 
which cogitates about, or reflects upon, a 'given' comethin, which 
is directly perceived. I as also recalling what is said about the 
problems of attempting to make sense of the concept of a pure sense 
datum, isolated from prior conceptual understanding. To say of the 
can of the Bible that they exxporionced the ineffable or the numinous, 
does not require that they lacked concepts by which the coherence of 
what they subsequently chid of their alleged encounters with the 
divine war established. Williams arguer, for a 'no foundations' view 
of knowledge, by which he aeokn to refute both the sceptic and the 
person who says that there must be an infinite rocroas of justifying 
anzertions, unless knowledge can be shown to rent on a certain foun- 
dation. Thus he cuggcots that 'groundless belieft, whereby wo trust 
our aensca and rely upon the hard won knowledge of empirical science, 
whore it in clearly apposite to do co, is preferable to a view of 
belief which is obsessed by a quest for certainty. To come extent 
he disagrees with Vittgonstoin, not so much in respect of the 
latter's contextual approach to asserting claims to knowledge, but 
r 
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in respect of his criteriological conditions for making a claim. 
There k'illiass takes to be a retreat to " rounds and to the 'given'. 
I vm not able to agree wholly with Williams, therefore, at thin 
juncture, but I think that what he has to say about an opon approach 
to belief and knowledce, which does not rest upon come ultimate 
ground, coheres with what I have already argued. And, bore, I believe 
that I have found come guidance to help me recognico, in the 
descriptions riven in Biblical and Theistic propccitions, a concep- 
tually inspired language wherein cents experiences are given cignifi- 
carnce in relation to the specific theistic claim made for them, To 
be propositional, and thus sensibly aroused by concepts, would 
certainly cohere with what I have written of the help provided by 
W'it"tgenutein'c ideas about fundamental propositions. These are held 
to be beyond hypothetical enquiry: they do not lend themselves to a 
truth-falsehood analysis. They cannot be said to be 'given' in the 
sense that non-inferential data are held, by phenomenologist: and 
exponents of sense data views about knowledge, to be given. However, 
I have referred to Llittgenstoin'a insistence that the fern=irr of a 
lan, ^tzage game presupposes rules which rest upon criteria which, 
however arbitrary, would appear to have a 'given' aspect. Williams 
criticises such appeal to criteria as being in danger of fuelling 
the infinite regress problem, 
rIn abandoning the theory of knowledge by acquaintance, R well 
Appealed to 'bncic' propositions which he defined ao those which are 
caused as ircdiatoly an possible by perceptive experiences* Ayer 
took up this approach in his enphanio upon a propoeition'3 function 
in not only meine a situation (o. g. a report of a aen. ae-datum) but 
in deacribin that situation. Both Russell and Ayer eor+e to Doc trat 
the attempt to find an incorrigible and infallible locu3 for direct 
knowing by acquaintance with the contents of a come datum was 
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suspect. aJtill, both hold to the view that a speaker cannot be 
rroved wrong in cases where he rejects correction. Ayer want further 
in granting an eye witness a pricacy, if not a clams to infallibility, 
in a sense dater state ont. Ire recognised that a mintza: 0 right be 
core than a purely verbal one, a distinction which flussell initially 
had not made (preferring to speaks of 'ill-chosen' words whereby a 
man's description of a sense datum does not match its actual charac- 
ter). I shall not discuss here distinctions between verbal and 
factual errors in respect of knowledge by acquaintance. I as con- 
cerned to chow that Russell and Ayer (and, as Poara indicates, 
Austin also) were alive to the danger of seeking ultinacy in sense 
data statements which failed to take into account the need for under- 
standing, and hence explanation. It would seen, than, that a 
descriptive element should be recognised in any report of a knowledge 
elms, in which the clai ant speaks of acquaintance with a specific 
object of knowledgc. The bearing of this upon oy experiential view 
of revelation in that, whatever encounter with God may be taken to 
scan (whether a nusinoun, direct experience, or so-. o kind of ©ncoun- 
ter through apprehension of a cognitive awareness through worship, 
Bible reading etc), its propositional form will necessitate a 
descriptive clerent" 11y etteopt to utilise the kery u will be seen 
to tally with this demand. 
I conclude then, that R ell#n analysis of knowledge by 
description atcd its possibility of reduction to knowledge by acquain- 
tsnco cannot be auatciaed if it eopouzcc nou-inferential knowledge ao 
itz fund= ontal tenet, I can, however, acnent to fiut301104 view that 
description of a state of affaira resolves itcelt into the conatitu- 
cnte of kneuledce with which I an acquainted, if auch be taken to mean 
that I bring to Qy experiences corcepta which enable me both to be 
soured of a $reality$ beyond the self, and an avarcncce, through 
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perceptive faculties, which creates a knowing situation, I believe, 
therefore, that the propositions of the Bible, which I spent some 
time in discussing, can be taken to be roads towards the understan- 
ding of the assertion of the writers, that encounters with God were 
thereby experienced. 
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C3i Rä IJELVE 
KtG'a2r+E3 A. ^, A FORM OF A'C11TE E? E? T 
To what extent, wo niy ank, can the concept of Cod cockir. to 
win o ronporn e from hunana, who are believed to be free a; -onto 
capable of choosing to respond to Riß overtures towards then, be 
aooociated with the concept of knowing, where such a concept itself, 
to use the definition Given by I lo and others, rocoo arily implies 
achievement, woo through effort? If to know, in contrast with belief, 
entails havinC succeeded in diccovoring, in come way or another, that 
to the cave (where knowing that p in being considered), may we postu- 
late a proposition to the effect that in the victory Gained by A in 
persuadin B to do what A wichen, whore such an act to doomed to be 
beneficial to both parties (perhaps initially unforeseen by B), there 
is woo kind of affinity with that success which cooing to know that 
p brim, -a? There are several problems here, I think. Firstly, we nay 
wonder how a believer is supposed to know that God has indeed 'won' a 
responco through the boliever's action in caking a cooitcont to God. 
If knowing that God hue revealed himself to mankind is to be said to 
rest upon such a contingency (i. e, that a believer, C in responding 
to the Cocjel, has enabled Cod to #win$ his response) the question 
appears to be be=od. It cannot perhaps be dioputed that C tarnen =do 
a decision to accept Christian beliefs. It could to argued that he 
has learned both how and what is required to substantiate his pro- 
fession of faith. Can it, however, be taken to th the case, from 
this, that C in able to discern that the God in when he has trusted 
has likewise experienced certain events, of which that of succeeding 
in winning C'a response to fundanantul? I think not. Yet I would 
not want to dismiss too freely the conceptual possibilities which 




from the first objection, in the problem of the psychological ctato 
which convcrcion or cor. it. -ont to Cod invol. vcc. tatcvcr C may now 
be said to know, which ho did not previously know, appears to be 
capable of being reduced to subjective feelings e. g. of certainty,, 
wonder, joy, etc which cannot be taken to be evidence, in the olvcn, 
of an equivalent or sisilar cxpcrionco on the part of Cod,. Later, I 
shall attempt to analyse pai-sentences in relation to clams to 
experiences of Cod encounters the difficulty that, boing private, 
they can always be cstecsod to be merely psychological atAtec. Care 
must be taken here, however, ca was pointed out, to recognise the 
logical possibility of C laying claim to a numinous or ineffable 
experience which, though personal, could in principle be experienced, 
in a somewhat similar manner by D and E. True, claiming to have a 
pain or to foal tircd, whore the speaker is sincere and knows the 
soeninm of the words, is accorded factual status, having Os it deco 
a 'public' conceivability confirmed by well-nigh universal experience. 
Thirdly, wo have to face the problem of how the now knowledge, Gained 
by an act of coz itciont, enables C to stake a clam to knowing Dome-- 
thing be did not already know. Aristotle's'- efforts in trying to 
envisage learning, as a form of recapitulation of what wan known 
already precludes the possibility of scientific diocovery Popper's 
"third world of ideas" provides us with a conceptual schone for an 
inclusion of so=othing other than sensory facts as auch, in his 
deductive-hypothotico analysis of knowledge. Clearly, to be "won' 
by God in the sense that C has freely responded to proeptin o of 
love and goodness, alleged to flow from his baker, would be to be in 
a different standing than hitherto. Certainly one must suppose that 
now self-knowledge would result from such a chased awareness (of 
the situation). If it can be argued that it in here that cost 
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Pro p 3a likely to be . do in =king nenne of the coxccpt of God 
wirxinz a ro or o from =no 'it y be replied that we ore now trappod 
in a verbal deists. But in it coroly verbal? h. an not adoption of 
t'itt nntein to t err of lanCm-a o r, =en appeared to land cc there, 
in any cane? fart of Hula has been to extricate r»jgolf from 
any such char, o$ at least rufficicntl r to roocuc from core verb th , 
the concept of revelation. True, I laid atme s on the Idea of wino 
that the rooto of reference are to be found in laz u a. Yet I 
atte ptod at ooze lea th to ohow how one piece of 3 C%= a, that 
oýwized in the koryCnatic proc tioxz, could only rzake zone when 
vie d it t context of putative hatoricu1 and conto ; roxy 
bo a zitio *I Bobtod to Popper for z1owi vs that idcwi 
c, be aeon bavir , in corm ix tacci, more than rzc o1 verbal 
purport, providtx that ono idhcres to Popper'a criterion of ceeing 
ld , not only being i tontiated, but as the procurcors of now 
und rstr di .I -think it zzýy be helpful to ex ira the concept of 
A nni ;a rcopo o fron fl to elucidate thcictic belief on this 
natter. In zo din, º"c my to able to decide whether this concept 
can be anal0 LCA11y cuatainad, an a radtci for rclt ious irowlodr o. 
Lot o orvc to tollovi ,, 
initial points s (a) to u In a reaporo 
fron cozoono and to know that p involve a poraon or por of who are 
tctivo in thezo +i cs thus t1oro must, car acc az conditions be 
coa~ ication botwoon the=; (b) both entail t ho r n of auccc 
after come effort; (c) thzt cucce i® won by the c,; cnt from comcn, na 
or nomcthit ; (d) th it is clear timt the tttkiu of an initistive 
in a necczaary condition for either to occur. 
Concoptually an thin - ccox with the logic of tics (a) 
#God co loved tho world that ha cve I .... pc z oa lity Is xcflectod 
hcrc; (b) 'I o Cava hiz only son $ cu czto effort and in on the 
part of the Creator; 




said to win a renporne from them insofar tja they freely respond to 
Him; (d) the assumed taking- of an initiative by God in indeed a 
necescary condition for the believer to be able to affirm that he 
has (or so he bel. ieven) been healed, restored and forgiven. 
But does he know that this its the case? I dicoasa this point 
further later in relation to F ''a views* i'urther, can he be sure 
that it is God who has indeed won his response in an actual, 
empirical sense? I think that these questions can only be aanvored 
by recalling what has been said about the distinction between a 
first person and a third person experience of knowing. It in that 
distinction which seta off participant from spectator; involvement 
from wratching. Of course such a remark acaunea that the knower, in 
this cane the theistic believer, and the known (the grace of God 
revealed to him), are necessarily connected. It feeds upon the idea 
that the 'knowledge' yielded by the commitment of trustful belief in, 
to some extent, the product of hin faith and that of the believing 
community. It in at this point that my utilisation of Wittgonstein+L 
concept of a theistic language eno has proved to be no helpful. 1 
problem has been, not only to establish rational criteria for 
playing that fie, but to nook to demonstrate what form, if any . 
the putative knowledge claim laid to by participants in it, can 
possibly take. Contradiction continues to stalk my efforts since I 
an constantly threatened with a charge of establishing companionable 
self-deludir.. g solipsism. For if only believers are able to attain 
the esoteric knowledge of theism, what hope can there be of laying 
auch a shadowy figure alongside other more publicly acclaimed are, 
of krowledµe? gush a distinction can, of course, readily be seen 
to be false. That can be shown to be so, as long an Aristotelian 
or Cartesian models are rejected. tiotiorx of a fixed corpus of facts 
waiting to be recalled or elucidated and thus 'given' to the learner; 
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or dualistic strec upon thought (conceived to be some sort of 
separate entity) and extension (the stuff of existence beyond the 
seeking rair. d)l rnwt be repudiated. It iss as we accept with Kant the 
reason of the knowing agent l and yet go beyond hie philosophy, and 
beyond the empiricism of positivism and its descendents, that we 
can appreciate the vital role played by the knower in cpistenolo, ical 
enquiry. It has emerged clearly fron try analysis of theistic beliefs 
that the concept of revelation hau its twin components of revealing; 
personal agent and receptive personal bein,. The wish to know in 
shown to be as crucial for the apperception of the issues at stake 
as is the grasping of divine agency in the procedure of revelation. 
Move=ent, progress, flowing dynamism - these are the concepts which 
apply: the static, immutable or inert (an unmoved Mover) seem to be 
inadequate. 
There are clearly considerable difficulties in trying to apply 
flyle'a idea of the verb Ito know' conceived to be a rsucces t verb 
(in contrast with verbs which express ecarchinr rather than 
achieving, like wonder, ponder, question, believe etc) to the 
central tenet of revelation, that of God making Flionelf known to 
man. If we approach the ratter fron the opposite direction, from 
that of man searching and finding God, the same notion of success 
being gained would apply insofar as the achievement of understanding 
would obtain. The Bible exhorts us "to seek and to find"t and "to 
taste and to see" (that the Lord is good). I have enphaniced the 
part played by the believer in his action in responding to the 
proclaration, and I have akown how 'belief in' is a pro-requisite 
for participation in that fora of life which I have associated with 
the Apostolic kery. 
Kant put prior emphasis upon reason in hin analysis of 
revelation. h'hilo accepting the Judaea-Christian teaching of God'e 
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initiative in =king fiiolf known to rann, he thought that hu an 
reu3on Le capable of ascertaining the truth by its capacity for 
moral reflection. It would appear, then, that Kant conceived of 
the verb to know as a success verb, but his interest lay in journey- 
ing from the human to the divine, rather than from God to gyn. Of 
courso, Buch a view precup; oses communication between two parties, 
as much as that which emphasises the divine initiative in the 
procedure. 
Insofar as come knowlcdZe - inferential knowledge - must depend 
upon active thought, the idea of knowing as a fore of achievomont 
will comprise an aspect of ny eventual conclusion on the subject of 
revelation. However, it will be in some kind of fusion between 
first person and third person claims to know that p, that I ehiall 
attempt to validate as well an to justify my experiential view of 
that subject. I shall want to easy that the presumption, yielded by 
the kerygma and its cotes, that the knowledge of a believer its 
knowledge by acquaintance! will turn out to be, on closer analysis, 
a species of knowledge by description. To the extent that to be 
able to describe X indicates the ability to do X, the notion of 
auccenn will not be entirely disbanded. It will perhaps be given 
less prominence than Rylo Cave it. Ihr affiliation to Kant will be 
that in acknowledging the part played by the theistic 'knower', 
I am reco; nisin that reason is important for the apperception of 
the Kerr a. Ultimately,, I shall be arguing that it in in the ideas 
which inform the #fora of life$ of the Christian community that the 
notion of encounter with God, -and hence an experience of God's love, 
justice, holiness and purposes for us husana, in given legitimacy. 
Acquaintance with cod - person. -to-person relationship, necessitates 
(partly because of the a otricvl factor of Bodileca Agent being 
said to com: unicate with, and to be made known to, bodily Agenta) 
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description of putative states of affairs. 
My point in discusnixu, the view that there might be a way of 
using the notion of the verb to know being ft faucceaa1 verb to 
explicate the notion of God 'vinzins' a response from man (and than 
to introduce the antithesis of this: man being said to 'achieve' 
by reason, a knowledge or understanding of Cod) # was to stress the 
active connotation given to the knowing process. Communication 
between peruoral beings - one of whom in said to be divine - is an 
activity. Agency is the appropriate concept to apply in such a 
context. This has not meant an attempt to exclude what at first 
sight appears to to a passive, receptive idea of being 'appeared 
tot. This &ea figure in the Judaeo-Christian picture of God's 
revelation to ran. Indeed, receptivity to a me= ago (in the case 
of the prophetal Mary at the Annunciation, Paul at Trass etc) plays 
a major part in the Biblical, account. It cannot be gainsaid, 
however, that by prior belief 'in' God, these people were prodic- 
posod to be receptive. My experiential idea about sin to y knowing 
God requires assent to, and thus apprehension of (through appropriate 
validation and justification of knowledge claims), a body of 
doctrines or id= relative to such, which involve activity on the 
part of the believer. It is in this re and that I have attempted to 
analyse first person, questioning and open approaches to knowing; 
while complementarily embracing third parson, observing reports. 
In the fusion of these two approaches I hope that it will become 
clear that Christian theism requires and offers descriptions which 
are both first and third parson in content. In saying this, I 
would draw a parallel with cerise data statements wherein proposition.: 
about perception made by a first parson eint, necessarily must be a 
description or report of what in claimed to be scan, heard etc. 
This will be the case in 81 wem, although different in terse of the 
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source and honco the tonor of it, skin to third person doocriptiona 
of say, for e=pla, scientific or historical facto. The keryua, 
the central feature of the fora of life which I conceive to be the 
charnel of Christian revelation, can be understood an iicpiring both 
first person and third porcon descriptions of putative encounters 
with God. 
At this point I think that noia observations about sense data 
by Charles Taylor would be helpful. He discusses the third chapter 
of Ayer's '"The Froblec of Fnowled ; o' in respect of the uco of sense 
data to "bcalo down our perceptual claims no an to Cot cooothing of 
which we are certain'". (p 102). ;o we seek a rock-bottom certainty 
by stripping down our perceptual claim which ceanz that we avoid 
"stepping beyond the bare content of experience to any claims about 
how thin Z; 3 stand which could turn out to be mistaken". Ile paraphraces 
Ayer's atten; t to argue for the incorrigibility of conze data state- 
nontc. It in in saying no more than one's immediate censor3º 
experience 'strictly warrants' that such a claim to incorrigibility 
may be justified. For to be undergoing an illusion concerning (the 
instance Ayer Gives) a neeniq ciCorotto case before him neconcitateo 
a more cautious statement. ''Toro such a caveat does not apply, 'ua 
have to paza from "it coos to to that I perceive X'" to "I perceive 
a meaning X"" with the implication that there is a seeniri, -X which I 
perceive. ' (Taylor's paraphrase of Ayer. ) 
It would appear that we can speak coherently, tbo% of sense 
data. 'All wo need to dog Taylor writeo, eio to introduce the tarry 
ca cxprczaion: dcmignnting oxporionce ... where statorontc about 
experience : ko no claim about how thingo otmnd in the world, we can 
ray ", ' cercc data are bluo, rough" and co on. I Taylor criticises 
such a view. Pe believes that the fallacy of isolating cerise data 
etateccntc to PaenninC priviloSed status, indicative of rock_bottoc" 
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certainty, lies in the mistaken notion that we can apoak of our 
experiences as boing independent of our activity. "I should like to 
argue that the renne datum iss an incoherent or impossible notion 
bocauco there is no experience which in independent of our activity*" 
Re goes on to cu ; cet that our perceptual activity . ocuooo, -celecte 
and fastens on certain features of our perceptual field on a given 
occasion. In this way it "organicon a fiold, the elements of which 
are also, identified in a certain way (for inotance, an trees and 
shrubs rather than just so Croon and brown patches, or on type- 
scripts and maS"zineal rather than just an undifferentiated reading 
satter on my deck. There in no room hero for a pure given, for an 
object which would bo quite independent of our activity. We can 
take the simplest case, one of the cart oft-quoted exa plezs of a 
putative sense datums a patch of red which is hero in ay visual 
field now .,. the words $hero # and 'now' already reflect the 
subject's activity of selection and focus. " 
Taylor concludes by reninding us that the answer to the question 
$How do we tecoi o aware of the world? t lies in our ability to create 
a unity of consciousness* Le acceptd. - ant'a view that we or ice it 
field by =king jud czcnta and so by establishing relations which 
are objectively valid. "Kant takco the fundamental point that 
experience aunt be an organined whole, shaped by the demands of 
objectivity; that anythin other than this could not be understood 
na experienceg i. e. as the subjectio awareness of the world. " 
Before proceeding; to look at I ant'a philosophy in respect of 
revelation, I shall axalyco first porcon claica to knowing. I shall 
then be able to consider the interpretative aspect, in describinc 
nenne datum cxporioccen, in rolc. tion to dcccriptiona which boliovors 
calve of their religious exporiencca. This will first involve nome 
discarsion of co-called ruainown or ineffable exXerienccs, where 
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these are conceived to be indicators of divine influence. I shall 
thus examine firnt person empirical claims, and then consider first 
perron statements of a theistic nature. The cethod will be 
e :. entially c=piriciat. I ohall then discuss? Kent try view that 
reason my be said to play an icslortant part in dotcr¬: init what 
revelation is. In co doing I shall move to a rationalist approach 
to the subject of divine coif-dincio. ure, or revelation. I shall 
then inveatiCate Popports "third world' of ideas and raise the 
queation an to how for Theistic ideas relevant to the concept of 
revelation can be claaaified an $third world' ideani in Popper's 
definition of the term. I: cre the method will be conceptual, with a 
definite empiricist element. I shall conaider third parson rather 
than firnt pcrcon claica to know in my discussion of Poppur. 
I shall than turn my attention to speech acts and performativea, 
as a preparation fordiucu. icg 1Jittgonsteintai philosophy in relation 
to first person claims to know God. I shall thus be recog-nising a 
certain relevance fron Yn. t and Popper in speaking; about Wittgen3teinto 
concern to discover the ccanir of propositions within to ge, 
rather than by reference to overt happonin, Cn. But I shall want to 
say that it is the direction, followed Caneraliy in ay work, of 
diccoverirc understanding within a specific area of discourse that 
an analysis of the verb to know will be achieved, Theistically 
speaking. horn I shall conclude that it is not so much in first 
person claim about the numinous or the ineffable, but in apparent 
third person description of states of affairs and ideas, that 
cogency will be displayed. 
Let us suppose that the view of opponents of a pure sense datum 
theory in justified, and that in each case where I cpoak of a patch 
of colour or a particular craps within the rsr, 7a of my perceptive 
vicion, I an but regictcrinG a cognitive, awarencos donotinu learned 
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concepts. fly seeing, hearing, touching etc will be the scram whereby 
recall sensibly aroused concepts. Such a view would har . onise 
nicely with tittgcnatointa wish to seek a context for our talk. of 
any putative state of affairs. I shall analyse first person c .; ent 
nentencea where private a areneowen of states of affairs are claimed. 
This will include reference to a cubject considered at ler,, th by 
%iittgcnztein, that of pain. I shall examine the apparent inccrri- 
gible status of 'paint language in relation to first person agency. 
It will bccomo clear, I believe, that the problems in respect of 
isolating a pure nenne datum, hold to be incorrigible an far as the 
regent is concerned will apply also in respect of personal sensations 
and feelings like pain and tiredness. 'T'hose states are to be viewed 
within the franework of appropriate concepts, which have been 
learned, and their appropriate rules which determine their use, 
This being so, I shall be unable to ascribe to no-called 
ruoinous experiences the kind of ultimacy which come people would 
want to eatablich for them. That will not mean that putative 
cncountcr between man and Cod, in come dytnaic, uricue way should be 
clincounted. It will mean that in c about an experience of 
God (w! th which subject Ia capocially concerned), concepts =:: atg 
logically, be invoked which would place these statements within a 
frame of reference* Such a context nu Cato social and public 
criteria of undorntandint,?, dependent upon explanation which ec tea 
fron the 'depth Cr ar' of a particular 1rnii uaCc. Thus it will be 
by reference to the Theistic lanr°ua. Co Crzno that first person claims 
will attain whatever intolliCibility can be accorded to them. 
Essauce I ah ll be influenced, therefore, by wy atte t to find in 
the form of life occasioned by the kory tic lan ;uo Caner both 
an explanation of# and a craaracterisation of reliCioun experience 
(as centred upon the Christ event) I shall reject the firnt PO=On 
.. I(. ) .0 
knowlod4«c c1. siv, cinpliciter or per se* it is for this roaon that 
'' shall consider third person statements, auch an reports and 
doscriptionr, in relation to Theßctic talk of revelation. I this 
vaty, I shall be encouraged to c =nine both the rotionalinc of Kant 
and the anti-inductionict c «piricic! of popper to cock illumination 
for cy thczo. Both Kant and Foppcr are interaatod in a posteriori 
Jukemont by h=a= upon idoaa. The Ig-iven' in their eatimation can 
only be exazincd and it ntantiated in the area of hunan intelligiblo 
diccourne when it 2 been 'tented' in come ways throuth the 
application of human re=ono 
while finding the idea of testability or subjection to rec on 
coz ; cnial, ir. sofar is thane notions cohere with the lincuthtic 
criteria appropriate to the concept of a 1anggun e f: =a, the isaua of 
first person eleinn to kknowledCe of God will not no oaaily be laid 
asides For in ctrcnoinr; the ict ortanco of aeekin, in the lang=, Co 
of the kcry tic fora of life an explanation of the C2urietir n 
belief in encounter between bu an and divine agencico, the subject 
of porfornative 1anzvato inevitably aritea. I shall cxaine 
Austin's toachinC about the illocutionary and perlocutionary force 
of certain l-. inda of aontonco, and briefly look at cone examples 
within ihaintic diacourno. Cuch a course of action will bring; no 
back to the question of first parson procls tionu and accl. a tions 
about putative oxpcrionccn with Cod. ile rccoCnicinn the cogency 
of these vocative atatcwonta ('Wo praise Theo, 0 God' for e lo) 
within Chxiatian worship and belief, it in in the conmu=l aspect 
that the idea of an experience with God see= to renido. Attention 
to the societal Kerr tic proclaaation (or area of discourse) frca 
which pertinent We= enanatod is thus of prinury importance -º co$ 
once mein it is to Wittce:., tein that I turn to cg. nine the nature 
both of perfornativen and of first person claims of I=cWlek* '-'Of 
God. 
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I shall discuss i ittr-cn. ^itcjntn distinction botvoen a cornitivo 
awareness and an "avowral. l xhcreby aiCnificance is given to individual 
(aril perhaps corporate) experiences in differing ways. Both find 
their logical grounding within an appropriate area of discourse and 
waning is to be discerned by reference to the + gar' and $rulen 
of that language cane. Perhmpa, given the obvious difficulties in 
making of God in ccpirical ter=u, the notion of apenicin of an 
experience of God partakes more of the nature of an avowal thoh of a 
cognitively attuned state--ent? In discussing thin and other 
wittgenotcinian ideas, I shall be building; a bridý7o between first 
and third person concepts of knowledge in cpeasir. of God being known 
by experience. I ch ll Co on to discos whether Theiota are justi- 
fied, in the light of my diccuneion, in ennerting P auch that P in 
entailed by their an ertion. I shall arguo that this would be 
tenable provided that core support can be given to the view that 
Chrictie. nn, in their claim to encounter God in Christ, can instantiate 
relevant ideen nuout the Christ event. But to do thin, they t bei 
able to inatentiato ouch ideas in specific, singular propcoitiona 
and not to be content to reduce their aeeertionu to general 
propositions about loving, cuastaining, moping etc where such 
predicates are said to relate to Clod. In ending the section of ray 
vork on the subject of epiotcroloi r in this array, I shall provide a 
cuitablo link with the next and ti=, l major section, concerned with 
ontology, especially an pertaining to the proposition that God is 
existent Boing. 
Before eabarking upon a diacucaion of first person claims to 
knov that pe in relation to so-called experiences of God IwIthin 
the self IsI intend to tndLz1Ze it o dicreccion. This my appccr to 
take =a arme way from tho path I era treaadinc# and curgcat cocethin 
other than what I reppear to he intonding« However, I thizlkc that it 
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is a dirresaion worth z+r ayin3, for it enables me to look a little 
care closely at two areas of theological enquiry: natural theology 
and the phenomena of theophanies or numinous experiences. I shall 
return to ay main theme, and follow the course charted in the fore- 
ooing prospectua, after making this digression. I hope that it will 
prove to bo, not a pointleos distraction fron ©y central concern, 
but a co=plezaentary exorcise, conducive to bettor understanding of 
alternative, yet helpful, viewo about the concept of revelation. 
169 - 
CITAPM T MPMUZ 
FlTCCUFF ß L. ITTfi COD: TiiRtJG P: ATURE ANT) TI P. 'tlii=TVOUZ 
aScientists, in the light of Einsteints Theory of I: olativity, 
today favour a view of the universe which Jay* stress upon dynaic 
inter-relationships in nature which hold it together. Freodcz rather 
than determinism in an open rather than closed universe in given 
increasing e=phnnia. In place of the old form of causal connection 
und natural law are now put Yield-structurea l and afield-lctiwa 1. An 
attempt to construct a picture of things by making deductions from 
observation in no longer the scientific oethod. lather there in a 
growing conviction that the richness and order of the universe 
cug; cnt. _ ever core levels of creativity. The poaaibility of a higher 
system is entailed by the evidence for growth and advance in all that 
Coca to make up our world. The Thoint, inclined to speak of God in 
terms of free creative agency, finds auch here which appears to 
facilitate some kind of fusion of thought between languzzge-area. 
The concept of person, embodying; the notion of the creative energy 
of the self, going beyond a hard deterministic interprretation, coheres 
well with the concept of a personal God who in conceived to be the 
origin of freedom and the creator of a world of free beingso 
bidillig1 Te ple cu ge$to that believers becona aware of the 
transcendent in the Immanent, re affir a that all existence in a 
nodiun of revelation, and the notion of special revelation recta 
upon this prior belief. The possibility of any revelation whatso- 
ever depends upon there not being anything which in not revelation. 
His starting point for an understanding of the transcendent, there- 
fore, in in the immanent. It is in the variety of nature, rather 
than in its unity, that Temple thinks that the divine in reflected. 
In hin understanding of progress and change in the natural order, 
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he anticipated the thinking previously referred to: our present 
scientific understanding puts emphasis upon inter-action and chance 
more than on stability and perpetuity. Temple's methodology is the 
Classic one of attempting to Co from known to unknown; in this 
case, to posit the divine by contemplating the natural. Such a 
concept of the divine will in one which sees it at work within, and 
not external to, the natural order. Temple does not ignore the 
feeribility of specific events in the world being attributed to 
divine agency. The reference above to special revelation shows this 
Iiis analysis of the concepts of process, mind, value, truth, good- 
neas and beauty leads hin to speak of the transcendence of mind in 
so far an aas is capable of contemplating these things. In effect, 
Temple adverts to a logical distinction between the 'given-neca' of 
those qualities and human awarenecs of them. Yet here we must 
recognize a possibility of confusing logical with evaluative 
determinations. From such a distinction, he infers that transcendent 
mind is expressed in the immanent, while shaping and directing its 
development. tarn is of the earthly creation, yet stands apart from 
it throuCh his ability to impose scaring and unity upon it. Go, 
Temple believes, Cod in also, in a cannot involved in the process of 
earthly phenomena, yet exists over and above them. Just an man, 
transcends the nature which he perceives and seeks to apprehend, so 
Godt transcendence is to be inferred from those qualities of beauty, 
value, goodness, truth etc which can recognizes in the natural order... 
Temple conceives of mind an being raised above those Ovensat by 
which ran interprets the physical world of experience. Zuch a view 
would appear to contradict that of lyle who refutes a dualist concept 
of mind. 11u= an rental phenomena, Temple says, suggests divine cind, 
the origin and instigator of reality* So beauty; at aufn, implies 
God by prorouucisg transcendence within, yet above, the immanent. 
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Are we entitled to crake Huch an inference? Philosophy of mind would 
Ferhapc provide a critical gnawer* c 'ylo argued that such mental 
states as are experienced in the apperception of value, beauty etc 
such be considered to be the expression of feelings which in turn 
reflect habit-menoriea and dispositions. I am but contemplating 
that which has been learned from childhood* Wittgenstein's stress 
upon cur learning of a language with its appropriate rules reminds 
us of this. My awareness of beauty or intrinsic{worth in a flower 
or landscape is a piece of learned behaviour in response to those 
sort of stimuli to my brain and nervous system. If we say that there 
is a language-gare to be played in relation to aesthetic appreciation 
of certain sons* data experiences, do wo move beyond simple 
behaviourism? As we have seen, Wittgenstein protested that he was 
not a behaviourist, because he was concerned to analyse the language 
in which concepts relative to human experience is expressed. 
Clarification of language enables us to move in an area of human 
Activity which, although expressive of and dependent upon, brute 
facts of experience permits a sharper focus to be brought to bear 
upon such experience. It seems to be unsatisfactory to try to reduce 
such aesthetic experiences solely to biological mechanisms. We have 
a deep belief that the total personality is engaged in the mental 
events which accompany the enjoyment of music, sculptures art or 
poetry; it is no less the case with our appreciation of natural 
phenomena. It would be absurd to try to circumvent the bodily 
chemistry and brain discharges which provide the indispensable media 
of our being conscious of aesthetic or any other experiences. Within 
the area of speaking of "experiences of the soup' however we may, 
rightly in my opinion, discuss those "transports of delight" which 
give an impression of being elusive of final bio-chemical definition. 
Cur language bears testimony to this, with its rich quarry of words 
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and phrases descriptive of this spiritual and aesthetic pleasures of 
can. From what I have written above, wo may conclude that Templets 
attempt to posit logical statue for the concept of transcendence is 
perfectly in order within theistic reasoning. To use 
dT. T. -ju Cj1s 
phrase, it is only by recognising the 'logical oddity' of what we 
have to say about our experiences of beauty, value and goodness (and 
the rest) tust we can offer, in Confidence, come basics for our 
assertion that such experiences are incapable of being exhaustively 
spoken about in hehavicuristic terms. So the word Itranucendencet 
nocmc to be demanded by this very logical oddness. Genen, molecules, 
proteins, neurons at alte, seem to be atrarrgo bed-fellows with those 
mental experiences whereby an appreciation of the beautiful and 
profound iss gained. And Temple's introduction of the concept of 
mind as transcending the mundane and materialistic, an experienced 
through the im anent in the world, seems to allow him to postulate 
divine Mind as ultimate source and energiser of all life. Thun 
Iiudson's view of a god who, as bodilasn agent, acts apatio-temporally 
may not be, logically, altogether remote from Temple's conatruction. 
Both recognise, that in speaking of the transcendent which is yet 
known by man within and through the lm=ent (whether specific event 
or implicit agency), we must grasp a logical truths namely that 
different categories of thought are being brought together. It could 
be through historical events or contemporary ones; or it could be 
inferred fron feelings and emotions generated by natural beauty, 
and awareness of goodness, value and unity, as it were, emanating 
from the structure and order of the world. it would also sake sense 
to consider claims by the religious to certain ineffable experiences 
as being awareness of divine influences. Karl leim's idea of a 
fifth dimension going beyond the four dimensions of space and time 




of a Swedish woran who experienced a wonderful sense of all-pervading 
love, which accompanied the very bright light which seemed to fill 
the surrounding forest area where her attention had first been 
arrested by the reflection of this light upon a snowflake and a 
spruce leaf. A new dirension of universal width, expressing Love 
as being at the heart of all creation, filled her conscious ees. 
Lyttkcne relates this incident to biblical narrations of cystic-ca: 
Isaiah in the Teople, Jesus transfigured before his disciples, 
St Paul's vision on the Damascus road. He observes that light 
played a part in each and that cultural and environmental factors 
also were significant. Would claims of individuals (or a Group as 
in the case of the disciples at the Transfiguration) qualify (a) to 
suitable contenders for the title of conditional claims to divine 
revelation to can and (b) are they core or less suitable in that 
regard in cocparieon with other contenders already discussed? 
An immediate criticism of candidates for consideration from the 
supply of ineffable experiences laid claim to by various people, in 
the obvious one of lack of external corroboration. By their very 
nature, notwithstanding the incident of the ärnnafizuration (or in 
our tines, the claim by nany troops to too $'the an el of F: onn" in 
1917), vioiora, cut-of-body cenantions, trances otc are subjective 
exxperienceo, known only by thono who experience them. I shall try 
to analyze claims to knowing God in the context to other personal 
claice - for example, 11 have a headache' - which by their nature 
can only be experienced by the one having the experience, later. 
At this point we do Coco to face a certain impasse in trying to 
credit reports of ineffable experiences with divine authentication. 
And yet to diceice them to glibly would be to clone the door abruptly 
to a ccquence of reports throughout history of experiences which 
sees to the porcipionth of then to emanate from a source other than 
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that otrokod by i=ed. iato or prior circa tcnceo. Logicall I granted 
the primacy of spirit in God end m r. 0 such extraordinary bappcninca 
are oaciblo. tc run the rare tort of risk in trying to reduce thox 
to "nothing - but" fsycholozical eveuta, as we do in talking of 
pieces of ru=n behaviour is being "nothing -but" overt ==ifcntatior: 
of brain-otatea and rmccular movements. This cart of rcductiorica 
plays havoc with all that we have tried to argue for in our attempt 
to say that the theistic view of can euzt be, given the prior 
condition of belief in a creator God, that of spiritual, creative 
being and not co lelg conglomerate of bio-chemical substances and 
rechanisc. Can weg any the core, aeou c that my learned responses 
to the external stimuli I daily encountcr, are the total po=ibility 
of interpretative co5itationa of which wl cerebral. cpporatua i, c 
car-able? %'ould it be inappropriate to recall t2: e debater in ccral 
philosophy on the illunion referred to an the #naturalistic fallacy' 
If coral judcocentn are not presumptively to be considered ass mere 
appondagea to a description of anhat in the care in any particular 
cituation, are wo any more entitled to believe that the last word 
has been said about that can be included within hui n experience? 
we are hero at the heart of tho matter. Since 
fBrcntano 
attcriptcd 
to provide intelligibility for tho notion of intentional inexistent 
objects und 'Eýt e3. I spoke of acanin in ro; ect of non-existential 
propositions, another espoctro has haunted philcoophy of mind 
bccidca the Ltoct-In-thc- chino which Rylo co decisively, couht to 
brim to rect. I have alluded to hehaviourico which nee= to grow 
apace in come qt artor8 where brain research and cx erioentai 
psycholocy hold away. That it may be ioposciblo, in the C SCO Of 
ineffability bare being examined$ to point to any referent such that 
any conceivable verification principle for empirical propositions 
clCht be applied, forcoe us to speak; of another di to iOn, unknowable 
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throucb accepted sensory perceptive faculties. : uroly it bozo the 
question to eruuo that, since a first person agency account alone to 
provided of ouch an experience, rather than a third person spectator 
one which would enable all and sundry to exanine the credentials for 
its authenticity, it is ipso facto spurious, The tank on hard Is to 
establish whether an ineffable experience of one kind or another 
could be said to be an cxasple of the percipient hrzvin encountered 
God or not, and its very private natura is both its glory and its 
iapondcrnbility. rot perhaps unlike the traditional debate about 
proofs for God's existence in relation to faith. To have faith in 
to believe; without faith one can never loGica. Ixy know what trust 
in God is. The humanist, in the last resort, is on his own in the 
world. Fie places a subjective interpretation upon his experiences. 
in the licht of various observations and presuppositions. Clearly, 
the bio-chcmiat, physiologist, or4 aychologiet express their learned 
knowledZo and the insights they have xined fron personal experiences 
so that it is they the selves who, ultimately, as self-conscious 
beine reflect upon their undoratandin of the world. 
Firstly, we cay not speak of orte canto experience an beim, 
identical with that of another without expýrenniri a self-contradic- 
tion, in view of the c"pirical irpounibility of two non having 
precisely the cargo experience. An ununual experience of A my be 
ccznicated verbally to I3, without B in any nenne being said to 
have that experience, : acondlyl it ray be said that if thin is no, 
there in little to to Gained in dicaues inu thosa ineffable erpcr- 
icaccs which lack any conceivable confirnation beyond that which 
the percipient believes he ran fand. That this in not no for, if they 
are true, they runt ipso facto be of the firmt inportanco for us an 
insofar as they point awAY fron the aundane and provide hopp and 
reaasurunce of which we all stand in need. Thirdly, there can 
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obviously be a=* link with ordinary experioncec. At an initial 
at" , the : wediah lady r aware of a anowflako and a cpruce loafs 
comothinr bible for anyone with normal ciCht. In spite of 
in respect hVittcerstein'a 
strictures upon vsinC ltxnZu&, e%f the atical, 
which he thought can only be ahoun1 men'hnye attcri, pted to record in 
words an account of ineffable experiences. The Bible contains 
several auch ccccunta. They are cat in a cultural rzilieu which both 
givcz to these records their peculiar details and their apiritual 
significance. bio face the familiar problem in biblical cxoWenim of 
trying to accertair what it iss which in being recorded, of ap rti- 
culcr incident, and of atteoptirig to diccorn the theological intor- 
pretation which in placed upon it. The question of an el ogod 
ineffable experience being prompted by religioun dornnda and neceni 
tated by cultic or prophetic exigoncica oaken it difficult to 
establish whetter any particular account can be accorded extra- 
cundane statu;. It cannot be denied that, without exception, 
physical features are dercribod which are said to be the cccom i- 
ocat of the transcendent experience in hand. Vot oLly Is there a 
particular venue like the Temple or a mountain-top; there is also 
frequently a reference, to light and nifeatationa of power such an 
thudder. In these circux tancea or similar once a cgroticul experience 
usually in said to occur. Circe we are unable to indicate what the 
content of euch an experience have boan, wo are loft with the 
actual physical phenocona an our only empirical reference. To 
recnpitulnto on this issue of putative ayotical oxporiencen, biblical 
or othcrvive, I have reflected upon the obvious subjective aspect of 
euch. I have attempted to argue, however, that the logical and 
empirical inpcczibility of one nan'a experience being identical with 
a otber'a does not in itself invalidate its clam n to extraordinarine . 
The Importance of a Putative ineffable experience could be said to be 
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co great that wo dare not dicnics it out of hard. This does not of 
course ccan that all steps will not be taken to discover whether 
there are adequate psychological p-sioloFical or environmental 
factors to account for the event. I have also referred to the 
physical aspect of any recorded "ctical exrcrienco as enabling 
us to provide a point of rofercnce in the known which, while not 
establishing any ground for cpoalcitg of the unique, nonetheless 
provides us with a framework to .y something intelligible. Insofar 
an the 'eonething cores cay seem to be elusive to verbal exprec ion, 
vittgerstoin+s belief tont the r yctica2 cannot be spoken about ray 
coo= to hold good. For ex=-ploy we sight point to the reputed 
change which Christian convorcion has effected in people down through 
the centuries. The sodorr countor-arg=cnt in respect of such 
clams, in to speak of psychological factors being responsible for 
these cbznCoa. In party this is necessarily true if only because 
any human experience whatcoover t involve p ychological factors. 
If, however, a ran's life is so changed that neither his previous 
or present circuantancoo can be shown to facilitate the transfer- 
cation, another element is to be looked for. iChrimtian conversion, 
in which a cnn recpcnd. 3 to, and opens up Ida life tot God's love 
and influence, cccr to provide an ozlanaticn of the sort of 
difference in a man's character and attitude to life which weg are 
now diccunnin . Suppono a convert refers to apocific foclinCn and 
emotions which he experiences no a result of his decision to respond 
to Godto overtures to him, cxprcaacd in Scripture and through the 
ciniotry of Christian people. 4«'crloy epoka of hin heart boing 
'atrax ely coved' Co the roalication of what was I, Rp; niTig to him 
cc he invoked Godly foreivirC grace. Such a tectinony bam frequently 
been reiterated, JPau2 sPoalm of the zcv creation which is effected 
by a eta rocpon; o to Christ, Of course there conversion e rimncen 
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would be called special ones. However, I think it would be consistent 
with the intention expressed through a human act of will to trust God 
to argue that, in the subsequent life of the convert, and to the 
extent that he continues to respond by heart and will, he has an 
awareness of being guided and strengthened by divine will. I am 
trying to say that the decision to respond and keep on responding, 
perhaps with the help of the ministry of the word and the sacrament, 
can be considered to provide grounds for speaking of a condition for 
the knowled, -; e of God by man.. It would then be a sine qua non of 
theistic understanding. Prima facie to decide sincerely to respond 
to God in trust and commitment is to experience his presence and 
influence upon one* 
hI. 
T. Ramsey's lengthy explanation of why it 
is necessary to have a dincerntaent of the "something more" of human 
experience before we can commit ourselves to God is pertinent to 
what i have said. It is when 'the penny drops, the ice breaks or 
the light dawns' that we are able to discern that which we previously 
could not see or grasp. 
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CHAPTI t FOITT=, 4 
Are axDeriencez within the nelf exa len of Nknawinrº that'? 
FIRST F' CU CLAT TO K? 4MM 
Bearing in mind nAuctin Is understanding of the illocutionary 
use of 'knowing that', I shall now invectiCuto what is entailed by 
first person, or agent, claims to knowing, I would like to relate 
this to 
bAyer's discussion of the question as to whether knowing 
consists in being in a special state of mind. Thus Austin taught 
us to recognise the performative or illocutionary use of such 
phrases as @I know that . e0 in certain inctancea. Examples of 
auch would be where the verb in an expression of u, greozant, 
emphasis or asnertion. here the speaker in performing a verbal 
action rather than a descriptive one. He projects himneif into the 
utterance of his claim to know such-and-rauch, in a way that k: ca it 
clear that he can answer for the truth of what he nayn. however, 
SAyer refutes the argument that knowing consists in being; in a 
special state of mind. "Knoving should not be represented an a 
matter of being in some infallible state of consciounneons for there 
cannot be such statoo. " Ayer says that if knowing did in fact con- 
sist in being in a special state of mind, all that would be necessary 
to discover what it is pocsiblo to know would be to exanino the 
states of mind of those who lay claim to knowledge. Even if this 
could be done, all that it would reveal would be the ex; >eriencea 
which the subjects of these slake were having. It could not 
establish that they knew anything at all, Ayer ac : erta. ho therefore 
rejects the idea that knowledge can be treated as though it consisted 
in the possession of an sinner searchlight'. The disclouure of 
certain experiences itself is insufficient to establish the existence 
of anything beyond those experiences. Ayer rejects the Platonic 
" 180- 
claim that 'the perfectly real can alone be perfectly known# as 
being little more than a declaration that one cannot know what is 
not the case. To lay claim to knowing such-and-such makes a subse- 
quent assertion that one troy be wrong's in respect of that claim, 
calf-contradictory. It would be appropriate to speak of believing 
zuch. and-such in those circumetancen, when of course admission of 
the possibility of being, wrong in legitinata. Does thin mean that 
what in known must be true? Ayer points out that, linguinticallyt 
what in known must be true$ for what in not true cannot properly be 
said to be known. But he does disticiuich being certain from 
knowing, an understood in common usage. For what is true, and 
known to be true, need not be necessary or certain in itself. 
Although the content of one's present experience ray be thought to 
be certain, much of what we claim to know would not be deemed to be 
to if restricted to a narrow definition of certainty. Zo to may 
that if, something is known it in true in correct, it does not follow 
that if something in known then it is a necessary truth. 
Reference to nececcary truth an a criterion for being certain 
that p accords with Uo1 otb'view that in caging I know that pI am 
cxprezzing a belief rather than esnorting a fact. And it also 
enables us to adopt 
dclarkra 
point about the questioning attitude 
wllich a first person, aCozcy concept of knowing cu cst8. ' he way 
I confront the world questioningly$ he writeng 'will decide, not the 
particular facts I find, but the sort of facto I can expect to find. ' 
Gs eqP. a 
And N. Green states 'Cur hwnanity is the complex of criteria, of 
evaluwttive Structures within which we have come to dwell and are 
content to dwe11. # Cho believes that it in impo ible to speak of 
value-freu facts. Thu-' }' ctcnco tor, arda the world is a disposition al 
oco. Vccory will play a ai r. ificart part in the shaping of ray aware- 
ncza and undorstandiag of it. Air experience of the world 18 
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cpecifically cy own, while intercourse with others demands that I 
participate in public, as well as private, exprocsion of that 
experience. Thus, although I ray oxprena a belief in cayir that I 
know that p, in ca far as I aharo a common environment with my 
followz, I crust also share, to some extent, a co=on f ^, owlodge con- 
ccrni. ng p (insofar as it is an iton open to public scrutiny). Any 
claim to knowledge, however, raust, in the last analyuia, rest upon 
someone observing p. Ctherwiao grounds for accepting the truth 
concerning p would be absent, and Ayer's point about experience in 
itself being insufficient to establish the existence of anything 
beyond that experience would be , 
justified. 
Within theistic discourse, this criterion concerning experience 
and objective reference to verify it, is clearly inappropriate, if 
a Mn claims to have had an experience of God, he will not be able 
to point to its referents This in logically so since a I3odilosa 
! gent will not be a member of a claw of discernible objects. Yet 
Ayer une3 this fact to rule out the legitimacy of religious claime 
to truth. Still, we are involved in a language-tee where "God" ixe 
its sine qua non. For what constitutes the religious land ne- e 
is an area of discourse which focueea its attention upon speaking 
about God. We thus cook an appropriate conceptual understandinr; 
not eopiriccl verification. What are we to rake of the s'3 claim, 
therefore, to having had an experience of God? t the #expression 
of belief', to use W'olgast'e phraze, which acconpanics this 
experience be doe mod to Lo come sort of knowledge? It it be 
conceded that his experience is something which is renl for hia# 
would the concept of the quootioning, open attitude of first person 
agency help us towards establishing come sort of claim to knowing in 
thin matter? The many and varied rarrativea concerning the oxperi-, 
anew of the con of the Bible and of numer*us others over the years 
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would seem to turn for their credibility upon the satisfactory 
answering of these questions. Ma paradi n of a putative experience 
within the theistic languaZe-enme, lot us take te sophisticated 
modern theologian's view of the resurrection of Christ. kor exam le, 
fLon Cupitt open of this as being something which we may oxpcrionce 
todayas we respond to the influence of God's prononco in our lives. 
(In "TAkilig Leave Of God' Cupitt has gone beyond this. "God" is now 
deed to be entirely internal to the believer, not an existent 
Being beyond the self. ) Cupitt's earlier view is reminiscent of 
CEultmannla existential interpretation of the resurrection as a 
present reality in my commitment to Christ now, rather than my belief 
in an alleged historical event two thousand years a, o. These modern 
interpretations of the meaning of the i: ew Testament stories of the 
Resurrection might be expressed, was a reflection of a particular 
person's experience today in some ouch form as 'I have experienced 
(as experiencing) an awareness of the presence of Cod in:: 4y life. 
I suggest that here its a paradigm case which will enable ua to 
examine the legitimacy of my adoption of first person agency concepts 
of knowing and its associated interpretation of I: nowing as an 
"expression of belief". However, such a claim would reed to be 
understood in relation to a community of believers. 
A useful starting-point might be a consideration of 
hADronla 
use of the term psi-centcnce. I ttplea given are 11 have a pain' 
or 11 feel tired. Aaron rays that for coraeone to say of euch of 
these respectively, 'he winces' or the yawns' in to cry cor ething 
different than haying *be feels p , in' or the in tired'. We cannot 
reduce one net of aa3ringa to the other without Ions of meaning* It 
in only by showing that the conontator abaroa an awureneaO of what 
it means to have a pain or to fohl tired that he cris indicate that 
he understands my experiences. Aaron calls a sentence which 
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expresses euch an experience a psi"centenco to distinguish it from a 
sentence which hass its referent beyond the self Thus to c that 
John is on the lawn or, more azzertively, #I know that John is on 
the lawn # is not to utter a psi-sentcnco. I think that Aaron's 
differentiation hero is helpful in that it cnableo us to pursue our 
scher of examining the relevance of the concept of knowing cc an 
expression of that which appertains to my self and not to another. 
If it can be shown that to toy that I feel tired is to express a 
reality which I alone as experiencing insofar an gay own golf-arenenc 
is concerned, it may be possible to chow that expressions of 
religious experience can likewise acquire respectability. It may be 
toted that, in contract with what w said about dicpocitionally- 
conditioned wogs of knowing poi-nentences reflect innediate 
experiences of the self. Cr, to be cleaner, the presupposition for 
a dispocitioral expression of knowing p is that I sh U have esxp eri- 
cncod it before in the seize that I express a learned renponAe. When 
I confront the world, questioningly, an Clerk suggests, I an 
registering my beliefs about the world which environmental education 
have helped to shape. Z. ow, it cunt be Granted that my ability to 
state that I am in pain or to tired presuppose previous experiences 
of these conditions. To use Baker tts 
iphrnce, 
a 'sensibly aroused 
concept$ is appropriated on each occasion. To that extent they 
share with non. psi-ccntencos a common foundation in the processes 
whereby I care to know about myself and the external world. For it 
r, = presumably by having objects ostensively or verbally defined 
and acquiring an understanding by verbal ncans as to what being in 
pain or feeling tired meant that I Gained my carlicst understandinn 
of things. Yet m having a pain or feeling tired now depend upon, 
for their present reality, nothing more than that I guest na in a 
conscious state of experiencing one of those conditions. ter 
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recognition of this statu In di positional but whether I recoanice it 
or not, ic .l still be award of the condition of c7 body' at the 
present time* Having tried to elucidate this point, I shall co rd 
the sort of pzi-nentenco used (I em in pain, I feel tired) with a 
roligioua-exporienco type sentence (I an experiencing or have experi- 
enced the presence of God). 
Firstly, both seta express first person experience of the self, 
Provided that the one who speaks of such an experience is sincere in 
what he says and understands the neaning of the words uttered,, he 
may be said to be giving a bone tide account of an experience which 
he in having. Secondly, they do not attempt to give a spectator 
account of sore external happening: to that extent they do not 
claim to say anything about the world beyond the experience of the 
individual. Their subject-matter pertains to the professed experi- 
ences of an individual. Thirdly, they proclaim states of feeling 
which others might and do share or experience also. They do not 
purport to be special experiences known only to the one who makes 
the particular pronouncement. An we have soon$ in speaking of t= 
putative experience lI am of necessity putting a constriction upon 
it. euch a construction will reflect cultural and social isprecoiona 
which I have, consciously or uncorcciounly, aceinilated. 
A nusber of qualifications have to be made about my attempt to 
find in the concept of a psi-sentence an opening for intelligible 
talk of encounter with God. Firnt, it will be objected that the 
statements thich refer to bodily feelings (I am in pain; I feel 
tired) are indeed co-onplaco and all are capable of experiencing 
there. Whercaa the proposition 11 am e rieneW (or experienced) 
the presence of Christ (or God)' is probably not co=on-Place: it 
may in fact be the case that only a compare tively few people would 




its justification upon the existence of a being beyond the self in a 
way that the other propositions do not. The question is: are we at 
liberty to reject the religious-experience proposition aua non- 
empirical one an positivists and empiricists would insist that we oust 
do? If it can be shown that first person agency claim to knowing 
that p must logically depend upon the self's capacity to deliberate 
upon its own experiences, it would seem that putative c]. aicsa to 
knowing Gods should experiences thought to be such be had, can be 
shown to be intelligible. yet, without a prior belief in Gods, it 
is difficult to see how any such ela. i e could be fors fated, for 
they would lack an appropriate base. Pelcted to the question is 
the issue which runs an a thread through the whole subject, sanely 
that of the inter-action of divine and hu=an agency. For wherecz 
car having a pain in my body or feeling tired are natural experiences 
which occur by dint of poaneosi a body and being subject to 
processes which act upon all sentient li. fes having an experience 
of God would appear to invoke something quite distinctive. A danger 
here in that a false antithesis between 'body' and 'spirit' ii ht 
be implied. Thus, although a religious experience in that which is 
experienced by the calf and accorded the status of a real event for 
the person who has its it seems to fall into a category other than 
than of poi-aentencc variety which Aaron has in mind. On the other 
rand, it has an affinity with the pari'eentence in as such an it is 
an expression of a personal experience rather than a statement of 
fact about external events. It may, of courtcel be induced by 
external circa atancon. A person may have u putative experience of 
God an a result of religious observance in a church service where, 
with others or alone, he is influenced by what he bears and sees 
around him much an hcaiah is said to have been aware of the 
presence of Yahweh in the Temple in Jerusalem, %120 question would 
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then arise as to whether the procucod experience of God which the 
ecclesiastical surroundings and paraphernalia have helped to excite, 
in anything more than an emotional response to those man-made 
influences. If we wish to attempt to establish coce sort of 
affinity between the sort of experience i have when I as in pain or 
feel tired and the sort of experience I have when I believe that I 
am in the presence of God, or in cone way aware of that presences 
we crust presumably be able to point to a suitable manifest physical 
activity to evince this, As we have seen, however, a third person 
consent upon a can who in in paint to the effect that it in said 
that he winces, is a deduction of a subjective absolute experience 
of the self to a physical piece of behaviour# which is interpretatod 
as being a nanifestation of the pain suffered. But no such cauiw 
festation may be apparent, just an a can might feel weary, without 
necessarily demonstrating this in an outward form, such an yawning.. 
If we can establish the logical possibility of a prompting of the 
self by an unseen agency, it might or might not be the case that 
such a prompting within the connciouaca of that self, should be 
overtly shown. I think, therefore, that we may adapt the concept 
of a psi-sentence, to Conn a sentence which expresses the absolute 
conviction of the self that a specific experience is being, or has 
been had, to the religious-type experience and any appropriate 
sentence which night be uttered by the one who experiences it. 
The claim to knowing here would be subjective, but all claim to 
knowing of a first person agency kind must be no. If we adopt the 
constructions previously mentioned, it will be recalled that we saw 
the essentially open pocttre taken up. These were firstly, the 
idea of knowing ras an expression of belief and secondly, the idea 
of a questioning rather than asserting approach to knowing. To 
theme we must note also the importance of considering the cAuBal 
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elements by which the pcrcipioit helps to define w at he porcoiveu. 
'Knowing that' wan considered in the light of the knowing aunt'3 
participation in the process. ¶C e ag^ . cy of the self in 
that source 
of enquiry without which knowing could not be said to be undertaken. 
WO are not dinclaining the fact of pi ical objects here, or the 
part played by nenne data in enabling the agent to form ideas of 
what it in hin nennen are presenting hire with. 
At this juncture, I would like to ox ine the word #absolute' 
which I ucod in relation to poi-ocntonceacxpronciona of cxperiencca 
of the individual. It waa said above that$ coterie cateribua, a 
nan who caya he is in pain or fools tired would not be doubted, 
tiara the idea of incorrigibility or infallibility of 'pni' type 
sentences in pointed to. It in corcon experience to-be aware of 
either of thczo physical conditions and taken to be indubitable that 
a cyan who speaks sincerely and correctly could not be doubted for 
ackinn such a recarh. Thins of course, includes ruling out the 
ef$ccta of dru n or haliuciratory experiences. Ito ray be said to 
have +abooluto+ knowledge of hin state of coslcciou r CCZ. 
h 
rcr soya 
that this cisply points to the fact that ouch a is having ouch 
an experience: it does not point to any piece of knowledge beyond 
it. But a so-cabled sauninoua' or riuoffable s experience of God 
revealing hi=elf to nan, would not rood to be anything beyond a 
5nio expeMonce; for the experience itself would, although unusual 
and unique rbapn, be self contained. It would not dog however, to 
isolate this from a conceptual scheco which functions through 
#belief in$. To the extent that a i-eontcnco say be said, there- 
for* to express a genuine experience of the self, the truth of 
which say (in nornel circuz tancen) be readily presumed by those to 
whom it is addroaocd, ýit 0, V also be said to convey conothing which 
in known for cure. An ban been etreanod, the poraibility of 801f- 
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deception has been eliminated, an far an one can do so. Aaron to use 
of the terry psi-sentence in adopted to indicate a class of sentence 
which enables the speaker to speak of objects that are not merely 
physical. 
1F i-oentencoa are unique in that they register what in 
significant for the speaker himself. Tao 01 em six foot tall' or 
11 an in the kitchen' are not pai-aentenceo for they do not refer 
to the experience of knowing* en the other hand 11 feel tired' or 
01 (do) enjoy this sort of music $ are just ouch references and are 
psi-t. entoncon. I an indebted to Aaron for this concept, but Ayer'a 
wish to restrict references to one's experiencoa to a sort of 
subjective unverifiable category seen to offset its usefulness. 
Still, Ayer spends a good deal of time in expounding hic own thesis 
about criteria of personal identity, the privacy of experience, 
proble= of con unication and other nirdn. In utilising Aaronta 
idea of poi-centoncen, I have chiefly been concerned to argue that 
there may be said to be a class of experiences which constitute a 
type of Bowing where the experience itself is its own justification 
for uttering such a sentence. 
An I thereby placing a class of utterances beyond the bounds 
of scrutiny? In one sense, this t be so. For, as we have seen, 
in so far as psi-, senterces cpcak of an experience of knowing which 
is =do by the subject of that experience, the only external test 
wo may apply is to look for suitable effects beyond the subjectle 
Bartion. So «I have a pain' or 'I fool tired' are significant 
to an , observer insofar as he has hiuolf experienced these states. 
I an brought back, therefore, to previous observations about the 
so called ircorriribility of sense datum statements. I have taken 
the view in reCard to these that there is no such a thing as a 
pure sense datum. I have stressed the part played by learned con- 
cepts in the interpretation of one's sensibly (or in the case of 
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ideas, as in the religious subject being studied, idoologically) 
aroused concepts. This leads me away from an attc: pt, which I think 
(largely) has not boon cuccernful, to find some kind of parallel 
between Aaron's concept of psi-nontoncca (clearly intended to 
explicate empirical personal events) and first person claims to know 
God, try conclusion about first person , mercy (poi-oontoncoc) in aua 
follows. while not wishing to exclude unusual happenings an port 
of the Christian tradition, I do not believe that ray attempt to 
relate Aaron's concept of a psi-sentence to the sort of proposition 
encountered in Christian discourse can be sustained. For one thing 
there in a dicrarity between what can only be tarried so-called 
numinous or ineffable experiences, and the well known experiences 
offered by Aaron, relating to pain or tiredness. Also, I have 
already shown sympathy with the critique of the pure tense datum 
theory. I have been inclined towards the notion of sensibly aroused 
concepts, which imply learning. ! JI this agrees with Wittgonctein'a 
view about c . -plcs and the contextual aspect of our learning of the 
meaning of words etc. I conclude, therefore, that first person 
agency, divorced from a societal 'Loot ting, will not suffice to make 
sense of knowledge claims an far an knowir, God Is concerned. It 
will be observed that I as relating this reservation to my belief 
that knowledge by acquaintance requires knowledge by description in 
the Christian perspective. 
Raving concluded that first person etatcmonta in respect of God 
being lolorru, conceived to be uniquer incorrigible oxperiencee 'within' 
the seif, uze in dnicaablo an an intelligible construction of what 
knowledge of God in! I shall now discuss the contribution of Kant to 
the subject of revelation. %rt given priority to reason in hur= 
appcrccption of divino seif disclosure and, in keeping with his 
wider philosophy, a, zicil. atea this apporccption to coal categorise. 
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By dint of man's moral nature, he is capable of aaaessing and judging 
the cutter, for he possesses a criterion in advance of God' activity 
on hits behalf. Knowlodgo of God, according to Y ant, in thus deemed 
to be ineluctibly bound up with crams moral consciousness. As I shall 
chow, at this point he appoarm to find an echo in Wittgenstein, when 
the latter looks to fundamental propositions to determine what can 
be said within a particular discipline. 
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CHAPTER FIPPEENT 
THE PLACE OF IDEAS IN AN EXPERIENTIAL VIEW OF REVELATION: 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REASON 
Kant's differentiation between inward and external forms of 
revelation partly stems from his rationalist propensities and partly 
from his recognition of the necessity for divine activity in histori- 
cal times to supplement and, indeed, to motivate, man's innate moral 
inclinations. In his a"Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone" 
he argues the case for access to God's revelation through a channel 
other than that provided by the church or its theologians. However 
Kant, almost contradicting this view, elsewhere proclaims the service 
performed by the church in cleansing "the moral relation of men to 
the Supreme Being". It is in this respect that he acknowledges the 
part played by faith in taking the believer beyond the position of 
what he terms pure rationalism can, unaided, establish. Reason has 
the task of investigating and assessing the truth of the historical 
revelation: the 'inward' or a priori judges the 'external' and 
reaches an a posteriori conclusion. On a number of occasions, Kant 
speaks of 'external' revelation as being now a hastener of what man 
could and ought to have discovered through the use of their reason; 
and now as an indispensable conveyer of universal moral laws which 
would, in all probability, not have been so completely discovered 
in the absence of it. In each instance, Kant observes that human 
reason is capable of knowing the truth of the moral and religious 
teachings thus revealed. We may note that my criticism of a pure 
sense datum and the part of description of one's sense perception 
cohere with Kant's thinking. It should be understood at this point 
that he further differentiated religion, which is conceived to be 
hidden from man, from ecclesiastical faith which might, in some 
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inntarcec, degonerat© into superstition - in other words, from the 
practice of Christian (or perhaps other) religious otccrvance. It 
is the hidden variety, which he conceived to be the Ground of coral 
beliefs and the rower to ioplecent such in human society, which he 
ran in mind in nakiz his aswertionc about the interdependency of 
inward and external fornn of revelation. 
bI3ccpland 
quotes from a 
letter of Kant to Jacobi (30th August, 1789) to illustrate this 
interdependences "For one can just to well admit that if the Compel 
had not previously instructed us in the universal coral lawn, in 
their total purity, our reracon would not yet have discovered then no 
completely; atiltf once we are in »onncnnion of them$ we can convince 
anyone of their correctness and validity using reason aloro. " In an 
earlier letter, to cU. Jung-Stilling, dated lot &arch 1789, Kant 
spoke of the Gospel eta not only agreeing "with the speculations of a 
perfected reason" but shedding "new light an the whole field surveyed 
by that reason, illuminating what still remains opaque to it". So, 
even if we any see here a recognition for revelation by God, human 
reason retains a crucial role in interpreting it. Once again, this 
observation would zoom to be conaictent with my attempt to erect the 
concept of knowing an being, in part, a tatter of description. 
Kant taken revelation to be aonothing to be looked at and described, 
rather than specific events which are independent of the onquirer'a 
survey. An empiricist would be interested in discovering what the 
putative cxperiencco are which are being Given the connotation of 
revelation. It is difficult to ace hoer fur, in this cane, one could 
go beyond subjective reports of alleged ineffable happenings. The 
ratiornliat, bovevcr, conceives of a propensity to judge what 
revelation is through an a priori understanding of what night 
constitute such a revelation. This is where Kant On concopt of 
'inward' revolution sea= to have some bearing on the satter. 
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A question which arises iss would it make cenco to my that that 
which is conceived to be unknown to can, yet concidored to ho =do 
known through divine agency, may yet in core way be known through 
hucan reason alone? Surely not. If onesc understanding of revelation 
is that it in the making known by Cod of that which he otherwise 
cannot know, it would not do to credit h u: = reason with the role of 
sole arbiter as to what rovelation is conceived to be. If however 
one apeako of enlightened reason, consequent upon response to the 
keryg na it would be a different matter. I think that a misconception 
here is to think of revelation as conpriaing the Giving of inforcation, 
rather than explanation* revelation, as was indicated in qty first 
chapter, may be taken to be one of three things: inforcation, 
experience or co Land. Thin tripartite distinction reflects the 
cognitive, conative and volitional aspects of can's responses to 
various stimuli, it could be said that, when wo are speaking of 
God revealing Nieself to can, the co=on factor in each of those 
responses is an awareness of something outside the self which informs, 
induces feelings or issues co=ands. 
In regard to each of these, however, a question arisen. what 
conditions have to be fulfilled to authenticate than? This nceda 
u: iravellinn. So-called Information from God could be true, but 
explicable as duo to purely ycholoCical sect ninfl . Yet the 
Itransport of delightI etc of ihich Christina speak, a oOn$O of 
being carried along by rin experience, not manufacturing such for 
oronalf, ciight oppoar to be authontic, And the to might be said 
of a renso of overriding; obliCation a in moral awa. reness" Such 
alight affirm an abooluto or ultimate demands beyond the individual's 
own ethical ixpetuse in both those o pla3, one concornini 
experience through feeling, and the other concerning- =Oral Warenanor 
the attribution to rooothinn external to oneself might be . 
intaired. 
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It was this kind of dual injact I had in mind when I used 
dFormer's 
reference to God as Ultimate Don nd and Final Succour. 
To clam authenticity for come kind of external revelation raunt 
mean more than this. To say that it is outside oneself sight be 
satisfactory. But may it be said to be fron God? If not, it cannot 
ho accorded the appellation of revelation. Hoer does ono test 
whether or not the feelings I alluded to above or realization of a 
moral imperative are from God? I believe that it in necessary to 
remind ourselves of ay major precuppositiors in spanking of 
revelations the exictenco of God and the communication by God to 
man. The 'outside# or external influence which in conceived to be 
God will then be understood aus a basic concept which constitutes 
belief. If we accept that the concept of god is a fundamental 
proposition in our discourse about revelation, the need for justi- 
fication will not arico. The #outside' which is God in a deter- 
minative concept for all that can be raid about revelation. In 
history wo can test the plausibility of statements about the its 
but not the statement that there is a post. Likewise we may Assess 
putative revelatory atat nta by reference to the fundamental 
propocitiono that the concept of god constitutes belief and that 
God co=unicateo to ran, but not that there in a God or that IIe does 
communicate knowledge to men. 
Eat, however, appears to submit the content of revolution to 
the test of hu =n reason. 01-le writeot 'Even if Cad were to make an 
irmodiate appearance, I would still need rational theology as a 
presupposition. For how an I to be certain that it is God himself 
who t appeared to no, or only another powerful beinj;? Thus I have 
teed of a pure idea of the understanding, an idea of a most perfect 
t, einC, if I as not to he blinded and led astray. Thun we can have 
no correct icoight into cxtornal revelation of God, and we can rake 
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no right uoe of it, until we have =do a wholly rational thoolo 
our property. But on the other hand on external divine revelation 
can be an occanion for can to come for the first tiro to pure concepts 
of God which r pure concopto of undoratanding ... With tiro it 
Za- verbal revvlatio7 becomes a.. cattor of tradition ... tiers the 
reli4ion of ro=on aluayc ban to rosin the cu. otrotun and foundation 
of every invoctigation. It is according to thin religion that the 
value of verbal revelation punt be dotercinod. So it oust precodo 
every other revelation on a 3rardotick. " 
In atreo nirg reason an the key to an understanding of Revelation, 
Kant clearly ardorceo the idea of inward rather than external 
revolution in the renne that rorzon in held to be the arbiter of, or 
capable of ndjudmini , what God's revelation to n in. Q; at r =t is 
cayin. z in effect in: 'X appcaro. X in God. To rcco rino 
God I cwt 
be able to rcco Wirr a de rco of connintcrcy in what is said about 
God co that the idea of God in given rational cohearenco# « 11ow, wo 
nay ask, in the idea of God authenticated? K=t's wich to find 
authentication throu ;h the use of rennen alone reminds us that reason 
ray be considered no both discugaive and intuitive. The latter in 
the source of fundancntrl proponitiorn which have to be understood 
throu ;h the nadiun of l arCua a. TAl: t tee appeal to raunen to make 
ccroe of the concept of revelations therefore, requirca accoptunce 
of thonc fund ncntul proponitionn which lie at the bottcn of the 
Theictlc lnn o cane. A rational cycten of beliefs then, will pay 
hoed to the overlap between l , CnCe Crams in accki to elucidate 
what can be raid. 
For it is in the normal usage of words that underatandinS is 
indicated. To isolate a word from Ito unun], 'hone' in to misrepresent 
it. UI am applyin re=-en to anything which purporta to bo the 
ctCc 1I aunt heed the raus of conmunication whereby I seek to 
-1%%, M 
t uthoaticato the matter in hand. Cth rice it would bar ir. repro- ' 
print* to cpen of rc : cou. This indicates tho discursive aspect of 
rcazon: putative facts and states of affairs are subjected to verbal 
criteria. It in, however, in the intuitive aspect of reaoon that 
crcdcuce ckV be given to K ant's wish to ray that rinraard' revelation 
has precedence over or, at lenat, ! prior status, in the proceso 
of revelation. The a priori 1Civorno a' of t rational faculty 
cuMoatc an intuitive awaroaea of how thine stand. 
In occkint; to make efts; o of our varied erperiencec, wo do so 
within an accepted framework of reference and, cizilarlyt in 
enquirinC into the nature of any proposition relative to those 
experiences we are obli ed to exorcise our faculties of rcaroniirz. 
It roc to be true, therefore, that to speak of the concept of 
revelation is to go on fro= a Lassic of theistic promises about god 
and man by applyin our reason to the propositions which expre 
ideas about the satter. This coharco with sy view trat description 
is required to interpret and explain Christian experience of God, It 
would no core be possible to rar what revelation in apart from such 
rececr conditions, than to reflect upon any putative scientific 
or historical propositions without recourse to rational thought. 
Yantis verdict on the possibility of an isodiato encounter with 
Cod, to the effect that oven such an inoifablo experience would aced 
to be brought before the bar of roaoon, testifies to this. 
Kant and W'ittrorntein 
It in at this Point that we are able to sea a similarity with 
VittZerntcin#a thirkirs; in f'tai Certainty', Thero acquiring a cyntcm 
of boltcfa by obcorvation and instruction is differentiated from 
1carniz as o', zch. 'A child lcarr. 3 to believe a hont of thirgn i. e. 
it learn to act accordiar; to t ; eaa hcliefc. Bit by bit there forma 
a cyatcm of What is believed, and in that syntci cone thing nt fld 
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imzl, akeably fcct rund core ao more or loco liable to oh ft. hat 
atrcda fczt does oo g not because it is intrin ica1 y obvio13 or 
corvincinc; it is rather hold fast by uhat lion around it. '' A 
little before thin$ Wittgeuntoin aaaai 'It to not single cxio 
that strike me a obviouo, it is a cyate in which concoquencec and 
promises give one anothor r support', and ho ro ore to our 
believing not a aingle proposition but a whole system of projc ottiona. 
It is clear that Kant conceives of moral b4licts as a system 
which $hold fasst' for the believer, orabling hin to toot other 
propositions aCainnt auch beliefs. Hera wo rocognico Kant 'a position 
as to the intuitive nature of rca; ein. oa child "akallowo" the 
conooquonce of a mountain' having existed for a lontg tiro, in 
learning that someone climbed it many years a goo %Ui3 o the veracity 
of the story of the countain being climbed aigbt be challenged, the 
question of it having existed a long time doesn't arise at aU. 
There in a cans* in which Kant adopts a is moral reason an bearing 
ac ilurity to a fundorcntal proposition which enables reasoning 
about putative divine moral injunctions to be nawyed. That in Wh. 
I atrocood hißt a priori judging faculty in diocuncin; his concept of 
linvard' revelation. Such revelation is part of what can, qua 
reononing man, in. If to tell a story about a uountaain in to speak 
urnqucotionit of the mountain's existence, to give a coral judgement 
in to oxprcco oneself in respect of a univerco of diccourco where 
the concepts of right and wrong are central. We should then imbibe 
coral concepts from childhood, but Kant presupposes n Universal 
coral under standing. If to anncon the coral standirt; Of putative 
teachir. bearing a claim to revelation is to relate auch moral 
perspectives to learned ideas, a p. ior authority gee= to be dozandede 
Wittg: r. -tein c po ka of ccm thimga standing unnhal eably within a 
system of beliefs, not bcczuso they are intrinsically obvious or 
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convincing but because of ""what lies around" thei. It seems to co 
that the problem of a threatened self-contradiction in Kant to talk 
of coral reason lies in his presumption of soon knowing the rood in 
advance of their discovering it. It would, however, make cerise to 
car that coral understanding or a moral perspective on human affairs 
holds fast in a aystee of beliefe which owes as much to ancestry as 
to present experience. Given such an a priori standing for moral 
consciousness, conceived to be inherited and implicit within nanu 
coccunal organization, anything at all which might be learned 
empirically would necessarily fail within the azbit of moral reason. 
Thus the learned teachings which, at least to some extent, are 
considered to comprise revelation, would be subject to this procedure. 
It follows that, in one sense, it must be true to may that if 
revelation is conceived to have a moral connotation, its authenticity 
an auch must be assessed by reference to those moral judcnentn which 
fors the thinea which bold feet in society. Kant implied that ouch 
coral reason an can has, independent of learned facto of an 
cipirical nature, itnolf reflects divine origination. That can has 
this capacity to Grasp the significance of moral evaluation in the 
cite ations he rxecta, hearts testimony to the. Thus there need be no 
dintinctiont in the lest analysis, between cpeakin,. 54 of revelation in 
inward and external foron, 
Hey reference to the lcarnina of Ideen in connection with Kantfry 
view of revelation, lea. ca =e to coriider a different, although not 
alto. r. pethcr disaii ilarl contribution cads by Popper's philocopi)y, 
here applied to theistic ideas. Although topper was interested 
primarily in an ezpiricicr which hic knowled4, ýa of science atirmulated, 
his notion of a 'world' of idoac may be utilised, I believes to 
further my thesia. This will tecoco appcarcnt in two gain recpectzc. 
11ratly, I shall show that the Theistic ideas ociated with the 
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kerygma could be accorded the status of so called 'third world 
ideas : in this case they might be said to be instantiated within 
the Christian form of life, and hence to qualify as 'objective' 
knowledge. Secondly, such ideas are descriptive in the sense that 
they bear upon events from which theological understanding flowed. 
In this regard, Kant's view that reason judges revelation, and the 
a priori becomes the a posteriori through human deliberation, may 
seem to bear some resemblance. And both Kant and Popper, I think, 
point to the Wittgensteinian emphasis upon learning as a means to 
understanding. 
In adopting the procedure whereby I have shifted the ground 
from alleged first person knowing of God, to descriptive accounts 
of what counts as knowledge of God, I shall be seeking a conclusion 
consistent with the total picture painted. That picture has of 
course been one in which Wittgenstein's notion of context as the 
determinant of meaning has predominated. I an, now trying to draw 
together ideas from both Kant and Popper which seem to me to be 
helpful in my quest for meaning in respect of the concept of 
revelation. In each case, I shall attempt to scrutinise their 
respective contributions in the light of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
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CIAP"°T : 1XT Y 
SPE EM ATOP OR TNIFD PER, ', Of PEPOPT., OF PUTATIVE Y, ]' WLE a^Y 
I; T ii R MR RAI, CE TO POPPER' TEIPT) WORLD OF IDEAS 
On roppor'o analynia 11of 'third, world# understanding, the 
Christian theistic picture of human belief night perhaps be accorded 
the title 'knowledge' in his aenco of the word. t; e doss not uznt to 
speak of certainty in respect of scientific hypothoccot duly tested 
and applied through technology and so on. He tells us that we are 
for over formulatinG new ideaa about the world, as we progreca from 
one system of human thought to another. So we might take an outward, 
public, spectator view of third world k owledge and apply auch to 
theistic beliefs about revelation. If Popper wants to r that, 
insofar an these 'third world' ideas can be called knowledge, for the 
time beirr (i. e. awaiting, further enlightenment) co be it. The time 
being, for =darn theists (including an impressive number of recent 
scientific writers on theistic belief), is obviously the present age. 
if wag an rational people, accept that all our beliefs about the 
world, including the world of ideas, misst be subject to further 
enquiry, no anxiety need trouble the theist on that ecoro. It will 
to observed, however, that popper probably inter-related hic "three 
worlds" in order to construct premicec from which his conclusions 
have been deduced. He included modern bio-chenical facto (or 
perhaps tentative facts in aone canoe) and cave more than a canuO1 
; lance towards the behavioural rcactiorn of humane to those facts, 
no thus included his Ifirstl and 'second' worlds in his nohomo. 
his 
o one might attempt to analyse/'third' world of 'ideas' with a 
realisation that theism tan, by tradition, attempted to construct 
an overall picture of the world as the creation of God and of its 
inhabitants (non) as ethical beings bearing responsibility for their 
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actions. 
Wittgenctein1 however, would not confer upon ouch a picture of 
the world, in its representation of physical phenomena or of human 
nature, the epithet of knowledge. As we previously reminded ourcolvcci, 
his comment about a tendency to confuse empirical facts with religious 
beliefs is a 'blunder which in too big", would he accept Popporto 
concept of a third world of ides, which includes poetic ideas ac well 
as scientific ores? Would he be willing to accord some kind of 
objective status for these ideas? ; uroly, he would want to k off 
a distinctive boundary for Popper's third world order of knowledge. 
Ve have seen that Wittgor. ctcin stressed the use of linguistic rules 
in establishing explanation and understandin . So, his insistence 
that we should take note of the way that words are used, and seek 
their r+osxzirg within the context of the particular lcnguaCe-g, ctmo in 
which they, are employed, would allow us come scope for Popper's 
cethodolo . t. We shall be concerned to see what possibilities are 
implicit Within the picture which the concept of the objectivity of 
ideas presents. If there are positive pocibilitics which provide us 
with clarification of concepts for theistic reasons g, the 
WittL erstoiuiun and Fopporian modeln may find complementary utility. 
t/ittgenstein, I believe, would not want to speak of 'third world' 
ids as facts in the sense of empirical facto, which might be 
subjected to tests of verifiability or falsification, but would 
acinzowled, go the capacity of ouch ideas to generate now ways of essirr, 
how things stand. Within the Christian langwge gano, limits are 
thus act as to what can and cannot be said. It is I think his otrean 
upon the way in which language shows how things are, how they seem to 
those who use that lang, -uage, which could be crucial here in providing 
logical support for Popper's thenic. So one might argue that the 
theistic concept of revelation cannot be eliminated - or, more 
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correctly, the conctituonta . rhich together combine to t ako up that 
concept - an a defunct idea, ouporccdod by the-Do idcan ancociatod 
with scientific cuitcrialin"z. The fundamental propositions of Theism 
relative to the concept of Cod and, as for an Christianity is 
concerned, the notion of God's procinmtion to can in the kor rt , 
remind us of the inportanco of those constativo and co icaive 
olenonta which race up the 'belief in' which in thus evoked. And 
Wittgeriatoin'o anoictsuäco in helping un to onul yoo our use of werde 
within their contextual boundorico, provider en with the vachinery 
to do two thin . Firotly, it enables `" to keep the concept of 
revelation in facto no that it can be subjected to nuatained 
ocrutiny. Cur jud ciont in called for to enable use to ascertain 
what purports to be the cans in renpoct of the truth claicin, 
aenoago of the koryga, with its nnnociatod Christian teachings 
embodied in the didachc and did nkato. Secondly, to say that 
moaning in dopcndont upon an undcrot ding of the unage of theistic 
iar uago, potato to its being held firmly whore can say guago its 
referential import, other than in the world of decorotrahlo events. 
Following popper, cy we here isolate a public, cpcctator, 
third person, oboorvablo nc othn /whether scientific datum, facet 
of human behaviour or idea which is oponly discussed an that which 
=y qualify for the description of objective knowlcc » at leant 
in no far an that particular item holde up to the ecrutiny of 
public enquiry? By deciding not, at this state, to permit first 
person cub jective and privates experiental elms to knawir that p 
to count an 'objectives knowlcdic, wo y be aided in forwarding 
coma kind of definition of ti-At tern. Ary such personal claim to 
know 'how$ or to know 'that' rant be tooted in the crucible of 
observable demonstration. Clearly, if ideas are to be given the 
status of lob, jcctivc knowlcdgo' wo cannot confine our attention to 
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to physical objects, nor even to their effects (e. g. the bombards-ent 
of sub-atomic particles in a bubble chamber). Yet auch an idea will 
be about the world in come way or another. In each and every area of 
human endeavour which is cppable of being described through language, 
concepts must be formulated and used. Ideas abound in the sea of 
human thought and inventiveness. One can have a variety of ideas 
about the game of cricket, relative to its style of play, organisation, 
equipment etc. One might equally have ideas about truth or beauty 
abstract concepts, yet contingent upon the world of experience. We 
evaluate our experiences, passing judgment upon them, and submitting 
then to the search-light of moral analysis. Pere the a priori and 
a posteriori elements of Kantle thinking may be recalled. What we 
have said about meaning as use permits us to speak of these varying 
idc¬z as being intelligible only in their appropriate setting. This 
is not to say, of course, that the sarge idea right not be applied 
in more than one area of discourse; but then it would have relevance 
to each one in coca way or another. Wittgenstein's point about 
$connections# which help us to discover what can be said indicates 
the transferring properties of concepts. lie tolls us that normal 
usage enables us to establish how we shall use a particular word; 
its use within a particular language game will not be to strained 
from that accepted usage to rob it of intelligibility. That it can 
function in a number of different "games 1 speaks for its general 
utility; a specific 'game' however will help to establish which 
particular nuance of meaning the word will bear. I am trying here 
to advert to the plurality of ideas within human speech and to stress 
their anchorage within one or more fields of communication. 
For I think it may be suggested that the term (objective 
knowledge' can be shown to cake sense in respect of any and each of 
Popper's three worlds. A datum of scientific enquiry or of historical 
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investigation, 'facto' as usually no regarded, or a piece of overt 
behaviour by a man or a group of 'people may be considered alongaido 
an idea, a concept of the intellect, an apparently abstract thing, 
all of them being the projected phenomena of human life. The 
scientist scrutinieen and later writes about his experiment, the 
newspaper records the act of robbery, the philosopher ponders an 
ideas all find their way into a medium of communication which cocks* 
if accurate, to show how things stand: if the propositions exprecsing 
these various observations are true. It is Popper's contention that 
the false crest be discarded through the means of eliminating blatant 
error. An idea maybe objective once it in public property so to 
speaks it can become objective 'knowledge' once it passsec a suitable 
test, the criteria for which will be, in fittgerstein'c reckoning, 
pra cnatic and arbitrary; they cannot simply be subjectively and 
selectively fixed. I have attempted to argue that theistic ideas 
may be retained as pertaining to 'objective knowlodge'"(a) because 
they have been looked at very hardly indeed by can of a rage of 
intellectual ability and experience (b) because they form part of a 
]. an, guage-came which may be intelligibly constructed and (c) because 
out of the twin actions of holding theistic ideas in view and of 
bringing into focus the logical structure of those ideas, an 
objective, public grasp of the putative truth to which they point 
can be obtained. And control to such ideas in the Concept of 
revelation* 
popper in the li! ht of 1ittRenatein 
Having found coca correction between Kant and Wittgenstein as 
far as second order propositions: are concerned (e. g. the concept of 
the a posteriori and the concept of apperception of rules in under. 
standing), I shall show that '; ttgorctein can be used oleo to 




grammar detormine the logical status of lane, and the explanation 
produced by reference to it can yield understanding. I want to 
suggest that Popper's demand that we treat ideas in an objective 
way with a view to eliminating those which fail to match the require- 
ments of empirical knowledo might chow a way forward for ideas about 
revelation. Truo, we are not concerned with perception in the realm 
of science as Popper was. Wittgenstein drew a sharp distinction 
between religious ideas and empirical propositions. Yet the concept 
of revelation could be subjected to a Popporian analysis as that 
which relies upon ideas which persist, which stubbornly refuse to be 
replaced by something different. In the light of Wittgenstein's 
attribution of moaning to usage, we have said that theistic concepts 
are able to be located clearly and firmly within an area of discourse, 
familiar to numerous believers. If it is the case that, from the 
Fvppcrian third world analysis of theism, the concept of revelation 
continues to hold its own, against the probability of its elimination 
ca having long since ceased to have credibility in a world dominated 
by empirical science, my twin principles of keeping the concept in 
focus and holding it firmly within its linguistic setting might 
yield a positive outcome. In this way I think that I shall be able 
to apply 
b'ittgonuteinta thinking about language, showing how thin, 
are, to good affect. "The general form of a proposition ist This 
in how things stand . .. A proposition constructs a world with the 
help of a logical scaffoldir. , so that one can actually aee from 
the proposition how everything stands logically if it is true. " I 
think the following extracts from the "Philosophical Investigations" 
will help to show how Popper's third world of ideas may be considered 
to be of "objective" significance. c"A main source of our failure to 
understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our 
words ... A perspicuous representation produces just that under- 
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standing which cornintc in #cooizg conncctiorn' .. * Philosophical 
Prob-le= ... are not of co =e empiricnl problcn; they are 
solved, rather+ by looking into the workiz of our a-ance ".. 
One cwt always ask oneself: is the word (e. g. "knowleddel',, rbe1atr", 
"object", "I", "proponition", "name") over actually iced in this 
way in the lr °ua o Came which in ito oriCinnl hone? Fhilc nophy 
cinply puts evorythin before uz ... Since crcrything lira open to 
view there in nothinZ to explain. For what in bidden, for exazplcs 
in of no interest to in. For wo can avoid ineptness, or emptiness 
in our assertions only by presenting the modal as what it is, an an 
object of comparison as - no to speak, a no=urine-rod; not an a 
preconceived idea to which reality nimt eorreapond. "' 
In these otatexente, W'ittgo tein in rain a plea for clarity 
in the use of language atd for scrutiny of it to detor ine te 
oeanine of specific propositionu. Those propooitioro which cxpreao 
Popper's 'third-word' of ideas should, according to this counnol, 
be subjected to the rigorouo irvoctigation which lin. intic analysis 
requires, We shall be able to sea from such proppositions "'how 
things stand logically it they are true"., This will nocecnitato 
looking for tconz ectiono 1, by using an appropriate 'meosuric , -rod, 
so to speak' born out of the (original homey # of the language-ZcG to 
which the propositions belong (or out of which they arsenate). All 
thoujht of a pre-conceived reality must Go. One caaonticl factor 
is that of ambiguity, Wittgenatcin illustratco thin by referring to 
the part which looking, liatanin4; or pointing play in helping us to 
give neaning to our experiences an-go cook to describe the to 
others. A1.1 important in the description in the significance of 
#surface # and $depth' Gra==r. l: erely to hear a cen tense and to 
grasp nosothing of its seng; nay be to nice its reference to how 
things stand or to fail to sae what it is that it shows. ' Interpre- 
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tatiotto by thoriolvea do not dotcraino czýnin .' Witt ertoin, of 
courses relates meaning to obcyinZ rules weich, like ring a roport 
or giving an order (or playing a zo of c} cna) are cuotor . 'icy 
understand a centonce means to understand a lane. To understand 
a lzu cage means to master a tochnique. ' 
Wittgoratein to teaching about our cyato of repro entation 
might be applied to what Popper is trying to establish by his 'third 
world' principle of objectivity. however, thcre in a darer that 
I+opiaer hero might to mistakenly using a system of roprcwontation to 
project on to reality, or seeming reality such ides.,. Are we 
entitled to seek to apply the notion of a "gram=" whi. cht when 
interpreted aright, enables us to see how things stand$ in respect 
of the so called "third world" of ideas? Wittgenstein abandoned his 
picture theory of moaning in which lie tried to establish a relation- 
ship between facts in the world and the words which ware hold to 
represent them in 'atomic propositions'. Could the coccopt of 
revelation, understood to mean the notion of trod In revelator* 
imparting of knowledge to real which thoy otherwise cannot gain, 
utilise the 'measuring-rod' metaphor to probe the 'surfacer' and 
'depth' grammar of its appropriate linguictic envirormont? By 
cxsgining the 'connections' which theistic language provides, an 
te 'ccacurinC-rod' is set against its propositional claims, may 
the seeming opaquonosu be unmuddied to produce the sort of clarity 
und creative energy which Popper requires? in it then a matter of 
rtantering a technique and rightly observing a custom by obeying 
appropriate rules which can give to the concept of revelation 
meaning for our world today? Of these idiomatic terms used by 
wittgeratoin, the metaphor of a ccuauring-rod and the notion of 
'connectional might appear to be particularly apposite in rattc2ptir ; 
to meet Popper's criteria for'the acceptance of a 'third world of 
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ideasI and an application of the concept to theistic ideas. The rules 
to be observed are those relative to the theistic language games its 
'depth' grammar must be elicited by a careful study of its interior 
logic. k'hut could be conceived to be an appropriate Imoasurine rod' 
to help us assess the v rility in the world of those ideas? May I 
cugect that this would be the connections therselves by which 
'objectivity' can be measured? Logically, theistic ideas my be said 
to possess cogency insofar an they throw light upon that concept of 
revelation. Within theistic discourse, with its recognition tf God 
as creator and upholder of life, it cakes cease to say that the 
knowledge which cyan attains of hier creator results from his response 
to that which in revealed to hic. An aorta of 'connections# have 
been advocated to try to establish a logical basis for relating 
theistic ideas to human experience; thus moving outside the theistic 
sphere of discourse itself. The classical arguments for the 
existence of God did just this: ontological, corraolo, ical, tele- 
ological and coral ar ents. Each has occasioned ouch debate and 
none perhaps provide the sort of 'proof' they were intended to 
display. But Wittgcnstoin'a idea of 'logical space' enables us to 
follow through the implications of ideas expressed within theistic 
discourse. 
An F"x. erience of God Understood in Relation to 1? cscri tion Yet, 
Parndexically, rerhars, in Relation to Performatives 
I conclude from my discussion of the part played by descriptions 
within the Christian lanrua e.. gaz e, that it will be through the 
cediun of pertinent language that intelligibility can be given to 
the Christian clam that, in Christ, an encounter with ,, od may be 
said to take place. Thin leads no to a consideration of the role of 
performative language in Christian worship. It shown that the 
*EL4rent detachment from referential criteria is the product of a 
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mistaken, attitude. For the kind of language which the ideas of the 
Christian religion stimulates requires for its meaning an understanding 
that reference is indeed found within that language. The explanation 
indicated by the believer's ability to use that San go correctly, 
both in acts of worship and by way of elucidation of hißt beliefs, 
in the explanation of all the aspects of his activity as a Christian. 
Thus the notion of revelation, of the calf-disclosure by God to can 
and can1c response to that encounter, in irradiated hero. I believe 
that my stress upon firstly the koryý, c, and subsequently upon the 
verbal significance of the describing element in the kind of know- 
ledge claims advanced by "Theists, have shown the concept of 
revelation to be bound up with the literary genre in which it is 
described. It in in acknowledging thin, that I was persuaded to 
relate to my central Wittgcnntoiniun thoco, the paranount place of 
the kind of ideas which aeon to occupy the attention of East, from 
a rationalist positions and Popper, fron an enpiricict one. In all 
this, an overriding aic has been to lead us away fron any pre- 
occupation we ray have that an experience of a pristine nature must 
be isolated to decorstrato Godis relationship with can. So I 
attacked the pure sense datum theory, the concept of IgivenfessO 
and referential ideas of meaning in respect of empirical proposition. 
And so it is that I have come to take an experience of sod to mean 
an experience which ores its rationale to correct usage of language 
by believers; a correct uuaagg rhich enables their descriptions to 
provide explanation and understanding. 
If it SOY be said, then, that an experience of God, interpreted 
in traditio. 1 Christian tercaa, finds its reaning thraugh knav1ed 
by dcncription and, if that description ia, at 1caat in part, a 
description of ideas relevant to divine ool. f-diacionurG, the ai ni" 
ficaznco of 1ang^ e in apparent. Will it be aufficient* now to onliwt 
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the idea of speech acts and performatives to provide the required 
confirmation of knowledge claiming propositions? I shat examine 
attempts by come Theiuta to argue in favour of a subjective assurance 
which religious performativea occacion, rnrhen Ltccd in appropriate 
worohippinC situations. These views will be utilicod to cuggeat 
that the knowing # tlhat $ clement of the Chrriatian'c claims, is taken 
case of by the cart of ideas I have been discussing. These, it will 
be recalled have becns (a) Ideas relative to the kerygr , as the 
proclamation of the Christ-event, which forms the foundational ideas 
of the Christian Theistic larsrvr. F e-moo, (b) Ideas which form the 
subject of descriptions which have the status of explaining what 
human experience of Cod could mean, (c) it, ntva view that revelation 
waits upon reason and thus upon the jud oment by believers to 
arrive at a posteriori understanding of Theistic ideas; (d) Popper's 
theory of a 'third world' of ideas which gain the status of 
objective knowledge insofar an they become instantiated as trust- 
worthy explanations and as harbingers of further underfstandin .I 
suggested that those idoaw associated with the Christ-event might 
qualify for thin definition. Further, I have tried to locate ideas 
of God, and of his revelation to responsive man and women, to the 
idea of a form of life, understood to be both a community of 
believers and a logical structure rooted in certain fundamental 
propositions. The central proposition is that concerning the concept 
of Cod, which I have taken to be constitutive of Theistic belief. 
Associated with this hen been the kerypea concerning Christ and his 
caving, work which has been taken to be a fundamental proposition 
for Christian Theism. 
U1. ile the ideas which comprise ouch an important part of the 
language C. =o played by believers are able, perh+apa, to provide an 
explanatory role in respect of the concept of revelation, the notion 
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of grad remains a difficult one. This is not because it is necessary 
to revert to an e irical, in place of a conceptual$ attempt to 
identify god. It to because the idea of communication to an intc&ral 
part of my experiential view of revelation - of men and God being 
said to relate to each other in some kind of knowable co union. 
This idea entails the diccersa ont 6f not the identification of God, 
so that intelligibility may be Given to the claim that through God's 
self disclosure to sen, a bridge han been erected whereby humans may 
experience here and now the bic, ningo of hic presence. In lookin 
at performatives, thoroforo, I shall discuss Wittgenstein on the 
idea of avowals in relaticn to Christian beliefs about experience 
of . 'od. 
I shall conclude cy enquiry into the juxtaposition of belief and 
lsnowled^o in respect of CYriotian claims about knowled e of Gcd, by 
aceing whether Chrictin, nz are entitled to assert P such that P in 
entailed by their assertion of it. This will be firmly* consequent 
upon all that I have bann cxiphaaicing concerning the primacy of 
ideas on Theistic diocourno. I will, therefore, bear in mind the 
whole graut of arguments I have na ay ed, and philosophical opinions 
which I havo exanined. Yot ny quest will not thereby reach an end. 
For the loose end of a thread which keeps re-emerging remains to 
be grasped and tied. To the question: hat the existence of God been 
begged in the language Came which I have repeatedly referred to? 
Some kind of unawor runt be attempted. Beyond the problem of the 
epinto: ology of Christian, boliof, there lurks an ontological problem 
concerning the activity of cod. yiy final section will atte t to 
Hake zen o of the idea of Bodiless Agent communicating with eon and 
being said to have an encounter with con. 
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CTIAP'iM IPSWE vTM, I 
SPEFCI1 ACTS AND P FOWATIVES: TZ1ETE ROTE IH REIA1 TOV 
TO TIM, IDEA OF E1 CCUI*? F i WTTH CO 
Epistemologically, it is to be appreciated that further distinc- 
tion would have to be cado in regard to the verb to believe. In the 
sense in which it is naybe used when we speak of knowing that p, as 
being an expression of belief about p,, we use an inceutictary 
device or speech-act. If said in good faith, and with due understand- 
ing of the words used, profession to know that p is an acccrtion 
that that is how I perceive or understand p. when I take claim 
about the first century founder of Christianity, I an expressing my 
belief eý r with a certain porlocutionery force. In an much an I 
am not trying to describe or consent upon tote datum of my present 
experience, and am not simply reporting a putative historical event 
car expression of belief scans to carry with it a persuasive 
characteristic. If I cay that I believe euch and euch about Christ 
or God - he redeemed mankind for example, - my expression of belief 
carries with it a commerdstory element in the way that saying I know 
that p (i. e. express my belief that p in an perceived by so) does 
not. It was said earlier that theistic affirmation of Christinn 
belief embraces interpretation as well as descriptive data e. g. 
'Christ died for our sins', The historical proposition about Jesus 
of Nazareth who yes crucified at the hands of the Pecan procurator, 
Pilate, takes en a vastly different nesnirg when interpreted as that 
act whereby Cod 'was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. ' 
Two different dimensions of belief are possible in this pccpooition. 
Cue concerns the historical fact, a It. 1ed tb by Tacitus, Suctonius, 
Josephus and Pliny that Jesus died such a death. Tice other and 
obviously controversial claim upon belief is that Cod affected his 
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saving purpose in and through that redcptive act of Jesus, the 
Christ. The former expression of belief, proclaiming the death of 
Jesus at Calvary wider Pilate provides the basis for an aseertion 
having illocutionary force. I can assert or state that item of the 
Christian creed in a way which would find analogy in any nu ber of 
putative historical propositions: for example Wellington defeated 
rapoleon. at Waterloo in 1815. When I proclaim that, by He death 
Jet= effected a caving act of grace for ucnkinrd, I ca expressing a 
belief which , r: oeu beyond Illocutionary perfornative lnngua e (in 
this instance the giviu of come information viz - Jesus died on a 
cross). I as inevitably, consciously or uncorcciously, producing 
some sort of feelings in thorn who hear or read what i says my 
statement that Christ died for the sinn of rhkind has perlocutionary 
force. This means that there etw by the nature of the belief 
expressed, be an empirical and psychological significance in the 
words used. Yet the distinction can be oyerstated. I have 
previously remarked on the impossibility of distinguishing fact and 
interpretation in respect of secular historical events. One sight .............. 
conceive of emotion being aroused in those who learn of the 
circumstances attendant on the executions of lady Jane Grey or 
t'ary Cueen of Scots. The fact of their deaths alone does not convey 
the historical. reasons for such. On discovering these reasons, an 
enquirer may be influenced emotionally by what he or oho discovers 
of the circumstances leading up to the executions* Wittgenatein'a 
language-Came model will again be aeon to provide helpful aid to 
asking sense of such hintorica3. material. Circumstances, including 
the events cited about the Tudor executions, touch upon raw nerves. 
Historian and layman-. can become implicated in the moral d. ilez a 
faced by opposing factions of these tires. A rapport is established 
with them which illustrates Witteeratein's point stout our language 
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beirr: an factin3I pcrfor ancc. Itzofar a theistic proponitior:. a 
about Gcdla involvement in the life and death of Jesus carry corioua 
inplications for ua a11, we are not icztzno to the considerable 
influence which such written or spoken propocitionc may have upon 
u: s. They cxpreza the sort of philosophical Was for the benefit of 
can which, by cozpcricon, communists would claim for thrxist 
propositions about economic determinism and the historical process* 
It ray be tbatq since our enquiry has been Co firmly rooted in 
lin iaintic Fhilc. nophy, wo shall have to pursue it solely in 
lingu. ietie terna. I do not mean the obvious here in that anythirr 
at all which is ccz unicuted by bunara can have (but does not need 
to have) exposition through larguage. I man rather that any 
attempt to reach a cognitive acccrtion, leant of all one which 
could be shown to pccacra referential ctatuc, of the experienco of 
revelation by any human being or cor= pity, night be said to be 
doooed to failure. Instead to should, perhaps, adopt another of 
ltittgcnatoin'c words. We should speak bf avowal by C: hriatiaro 
concerning Codla rcvealint ce to them. Now %ittgonatein used 
the term 'avowal' to speak of psychological first person assertions 
which he claiced were non cognitive. That is to say they did not 
apeok of a state of affairs to which publicly determined aethoda of 
verification or falsification could be applied. They rather voiced 
the rood, feelings and perconal experiences of the cponkors they 
were an avowal of what to him, to agent, was the case an for an his 
own experience went. WittCcrotein had by the tine he apole of 
avow"ala rid hinnelf of any vestiges of colipuisa, a suspicion of 
which tango around his truth conditional analysis of 
batomic 
proposition in the 'Tractatuc'. Ilia roving away from the picture 
theory of nearing to the Position where criteria and rules were 
dccWcd to be the ncceccary conditions for enabling people to ascertain 
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tho oeaninZ of a proposition, squarely placed the ic3ue of pGycholo, i. - 
cal first person statements within the framework of public cam. 
Thta one is able to discern the meaning of a word by oboorvir ; its 
use within a specific context, a language-=o, and its norm l Usage 
would, inevitably, reflect the appropriate criteria which deter . rod 
which rules were to be followed in Ito application. An avowal, on 
the other hand, lack. cognitive atatur. i, although o cker disputes 
this conclusion drawn by Witt ; criatoin on the ground3 that $ for 
a= plot an avowal of my being in pain at this moment could be opokert 
of descriptively (and thus with coi*nitivo ci nificnnco) if cy 
'avowal' of the nonont wore related to provioun pain of yesterday 
about which I spoke. Hacker launches an onslaught on Wittgenstoints 
doctrine of avowaic. It would be inappropriate hero to discuss 
further the threads of his arcunent. I an hare concerned to 
invecti, ate the possibility of applying the concept of an 'avowal' 
(i. e. a first person psychological utterance, I an in pain,, I think 
that p, I beliovo, wonder, an curpriced, etc) to proclamations by 
believers of their 'knoujrg S or in come way fcxporiencing l the 
presence of Cod. I have dincuancd lpoit contoncca previous, and 
clearly there is an affiliation between the concept of an avowal 
and that of a psi-sontenco. I concluded, then, that first person 
clam to I mowing (psi-ºccntcnces) were inadequate for my purposen. 
What than mould conz tituto an avo al, in tho thei atic 1a Cuýo- 
Came? If, as Wittconotcin su&; onta, an avowal has the 1oZica1 
atati of a nigh, exclamation or other cxprcanion of fdcliz , o: 1° 
cwt suppose that Chriaticna, cziaged in worship or private dovotiona, 
nicht be e akin . avow when they rcn ond, in other than Propositional 
ferne, to certain credal, proc1n tiona. Even the sayirlS of "Aces" 
at the end of a prayer or in relation to a co,; nitively cpokcf 
acocrveration of Chrinticn belief, might be domed to be an Avowal, 
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in that it expre: aes ono s pcycholocical state. 
I think that Wittrenwtein'c doctrine of the autonomy of mar 
is another important contribution to ghat I have to vay* If it can 
be chovn that there are performative utterances which have the 
character of avowals 01 boptieo this infant +; 11 take this woman'; 
the words of the once: "In the name of the Father, on and flo 
Spirit" etc, it aico be appropriate to relate theca cort of 
rer. rka to the broader icnue of the autonomy of gruff err 
b1ittL-enztcin intended by this doctrine to bkow how the picture 
theory of ccani. nLL of the 'iractatua' and the Au tinian codel of 
lanciua, e which lay behind it, were turd nentel y misconceived. 
They had worked from the erroneous premise that wordsf to be cccnin- 
ful, crust relate to some 'thing' in the external world. Wittgonstein'c 
concern with Iai=pleal and #atomic' proposition, where he found 
come affiliation with well, reflected this preoccupation, once 
he care to Zee that it in the 'depth'grao sr, reflective of those 
criteria which pinpoint the logical apace in which moves in a 
lnng; uz ne ray legitiratoly be made (by adherence to appropriate 
rules for that gare, learned from childhood or at such time as 
initiation into a new area of discourse coaenced), he was able to 
establish the prf.. acy of lrjn, ue in his search for the understanding 
of propositions. Precu. 'iably, therefore, to ascertain the aecninr of 
an avowal one t examine the gras, nýar of a particular 'gone'. It 
might make sense to may that acclarations Bade wig tan Christian 
Theistic dialogue and worship express non cognitive, yet significant 
avowals of belieft of how things stand an it wore for believers 
an they experience the presence of God. 
With thin in mind, I shall proceed to discuss the role of 
performative language in religious devotion, especially as described 
by Price and Aldrich. I shall recall that, the danger of confusing 
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what some would terra 'cub jectivo' assertion with objective facts can 
be circumvented when Wittgon tein'n view in observed that religious 
belief may be understood rya the holding of a picture before one. Any 
experience whatever of course is subjective: interpretation in 
influenced by the particular picture used. bearir this qualification 
in mind, I believe that the role of porfor tine uttcrctnceu (whether 
deecod to be avowals or something aloe) is a constructive role in the 
Christian epiatacolo y. 
Thcce philosophers who seek counin, g in iini; uistic ucago inform 
us of the illocutionary and perlocutionary forco of "performance" 
language- We may $do things' with words, expressing through them our 
intentions and ideas. We persuade others to join us in entering 
into new experiences as the coc iosive and affective force of our 
words is appropriated by there. Group psychology will be inevitably 
at work in the communication of religious traditions and in the 
powerful emotions released. Whether an 'advanced# religious 
experience (Chriatiant Jewish etc) occurs in the company of otherst 
as in an act of worship, or alone in the privacy of one's room, the 
recounting of it to others could be done in a manner which would 
perlt the adjective fperfor ativo" to describe the method of communi- 
cation. In a sense, the experience itself would also qualify for 
this description. The accompanying thoughts, unspoken ideas and 
emotions may be seen an the reflection of previously acquired 
beliefs. The idiomatic '1 3 gunge" in which they are couched, whether 
spoken or not are, as it were, a performance # an activity born of 
those beliefs. I an not discounting here the phenomenon of a unique 
happening which previous events might not seem to have inspired: for 
auch a vision or ntartlipg event are not infrequently claimed by 
those who speak of religious experience (Mohammed in the cave at 
al Y-adira, St Faul on the L saascuo Road Wesley in Alderngate Street 
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chapel etc). I so arguing for the primacy of activity and an aware- 
ncss of such activity in the discourse which embraces religious 
cxpcrience. Whatever the encounter may be $ and however the content 
of the sensory intake Is interpreted, the verbal description of a 
religious experience has a performative note. A Christian may 
speak of his soul reaching out to God, or of Godta Spirit taking 
hold of hin, of gripping him and possessing him. To be sure, 
feelings aroused may have a passive emphasis: he my speak of 
'waiting' upon God, being still in His Presence resting in the 
'Everlasting Arms$ etc. It can be seen that oven these concepts, 
however, include the idea of reaching out, of encounter between 
believer and God. I have tried to show, with special reference to 
religious experience, that an experience is both a happening to 
one and a response and initiation by the self. however much my 
brain, nervous system and sensory equipment may be the medium of 
my having an experience, my ideas and the impressions gained by 
reflection (Popper's 'third world$ of ideas) make their contri- 
bution. dNcr=n Clark says "I find myself passing from the atti- 
tude of one reaching out for God and praying to hin a if he were 
there to the conviction that I an engaged in loving discourse with 
a personal Presence actually there. " ; rice stresses the perform- 
atory nature of sincere obeervanco R including privately said 
prayers. Elen comentn that you do not Just imagine you are saying, 
for example the firnt lines of the To Daum, you actually nay them. 
"To Daum laudamus" can still be a perfornatory sentence, in which 
one in not stating that one praises, but actually praising. 
Siailarly If I aay 'forgive is our trc pac ceo', I arg making as 
request or a petition, not stating that I- unke it. i" rrfee auade 
this observation in reaporse to Aldrich'a challenge as to whether a 
ran really roans what he says in religious utterances, and in 
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response to the question as to ghat is being addres ed in prayer or 
worshipped. Central to my a al oic of theistic belief 4° boon the 
dual facts of encounter and rocponoe, 6 To speak of each of these 
entails the use of perforctivo lan go. ti at totter to chow this 
than the Ablical injunction "lraw roar to God and He will draw near 
to you"? 
It opt be said that the kind of relationship which the 
Christian believes he ban is with God; it is not _ 
like just any other 
experience; not simply another example of a personal encounter on the 
human level. For if God in the One with whom the b&liover has this 
relationships it necessarily must be other than a simple human 
relationship. Yet the notion of personality and the related 
principle of personal relationships have to be understood to speak 
intelligibly of such a belief. 
; Aldrich drawn a helpful distinction 
between the concept of a possessor of something and the thing which 
is possessed be it an object beyond the self or an attribute of the 
self. He contracts the following (a) your body in wonderful (b) your 
sind is wonderful (c) your personality is wonderful (d) your person 
is wonderful, with (0) you are a wonderful person. In the latter 
example "nouns are dispensed with and by-passed in favour of a 
personal pronoun as the key word". It is when the vocative case Is 
used that the one being addressed in viewed apart from any possession 
belonging to him or her. let the attribution of personality Is 
extended even, according to Aldrich, where one may be addressing 
an inanimate objects like a nountain: "You are wonderful. "" The I" 
Thou relationship, stressed by tuber in his attempt to point u to 
the significance which attaches to cox jon between selves, as 
distinct from our standing with non-personal "things", endorses this 
use of the vocative appellation towards another. 
Price and Aldrich help us to appreciate the strength of the 
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perforativo in ro iCiouc worchip and devotion; further, they 
encourage us to corridor corioualy the use of the vocative in our 
Zur ago about the divine. JJo are able to see that it in not in 
the posscccion of qualities or characteristics that the beneficiary 
of our adoration in to be praised or addreceed. That there are a 
whole range of appropriate attributc3 cad to "belong to'# Cod in 
not hero being denied. Vero we are aialycing the concept of 
addreazing the deity in a believing, sincere rranz er, such that our 
belief urco all the elezaantscot addrecaing evo*-are t Kich attach to 
the normal use of the vocative case. lf, na Christin believe, the 
addressee in conceived to be unlike any other recipient of adorin , 
respectful and trusting praino, the principle remains the same. 
What can we establish from the fore-going dincucaion: If a 
believer in ano who spoaka of experiences with God for which he 
ucen, on occanionn, the vocative case n ho would do in addrennirg 
another heran (or ani al or thing) with whoa or with which he has 
eotablinhed a rapport, these experiences are clearly contingent in 
nature. He exprccccn the in the world. They occur in the course 
of a multitude of worldly activities and partake of the bonfite 
and liritatiora which characterize them all. To that extent r any 
putative rolationohip with God which the believer lays claim to, 
must be seen within the context of empirical facto. Now it is 
central to Christian belief that Jesus lived in the world and 
affected caving benefits for mind through his life hers. .' urther, 
it in believed that the Holy Spirit continues to be active in 
naking Christ real for each generation of beliovorr. 
Yet it must be conceded that the one layin , claim to experiences 
with God is pre-erinantly r1articiT tin in a form of life and using 
lAn6%a c-mac. Vittgenate nsc C, zaalra ,r of the taking hold of a 
towel as being liho the taking hold of corothing without having 




where a clam to knowing would be superfluous, rakes this point 
beautifully. For does not the Christian in the exultant nood pf 
praise, thcnkagiving or rejoicing utter joyfully his conviction that 
he matt not God? tiittgenztein immediately warns us that, the 
analogy of 'taking hold' of a towel, as a picture of 'taking hold' 
of a proposition, corresponds to aurneam not to kroowin . And lie 
goes on to caution us . against 
beire too hasty in asserting that 
there are things that we know. In fact $ such a clam can do little 
more than indicate ono 1o feeling of sureness. It is when we use a 
sentence outside its context that it appears in a falso, lighto Then 
it in that we try to justify ourselves by wing ciais btknowin . 
Does thin roan that the believer hen legitimate grounds for his 
assertiorn, provided that ho keopn within the bounds of his laa *a c- 
Came and avoids unsatisfactory 3rowlodm cla oo? ire would then be in 
a position not dirninil r to conic-ono playing a language rAzo in 
respect of physical objects* In m king reorarkL or giving orders 
about trees or books, for example, it would be, * on toat occasions, 
inappropriate to introduce the concept of 'knowia t (! know that is 
a tree# or #I know that in a book'). An Wittgonotein renarkas 
"Children do not learn that books exist - they learn to fetch 
books etc" and tcka O'Wty opt one know that the objects concerned 
exist? To it not enough that experience does not later show the 
opposite? " In aiailar fashion v'ittgonatcin co onto that one need 
not believe More when he says be knows that there's a tree in front 
of hin. It in sufficient that wo have learned the appropriate 
lange g¬ o, enabling us to stake hold' of suitable lin uintic 
usages: it is in the perforce that wo show our understanding of 
the "for1 of life) which lion behind the particular : tan A90 ' e" 
what can the application of his question cited above fron 'On 




know that the objects concerned exist? lan't it enough trat 
experience docnntt later chow the oppccite? " Althoujh there are 
Chriatio. i who would say that their coavercion to Chrirt has boon 
tindicatod by aubaaqucnt experiences end they have no rannen to 
deny the validity of their rclatiorchip with Godq it rinn true 
that what they cay is of a fundamentally different crdcr to one to 
talking, cc Wittgonctcin doeain the context quoted above, about 
towolc, loose, traces and r. e. In his 'Lectures on ä: oIi ; ioua 
Ealief' w. tteenctoin contez-no any attempt to adduce c piricnl 
evidence by thcictat irnictin that the lege eazo to be played 
by thotata is emphatically not one in which empirical evidence in 
forwarded. The theist äa different "picture"' which guided and 
influoncee hits, from that of the agnostic, who to uidcd by a world 
view where 'Cod' in into prehenaibla. 
COT. MXMC ;s TTt C ISTIAWZ I UGT T TO f%Xr, A KM1W1, DGE CI AI 
110w in a believer in a position to mak* a knowledge chit 
conccrnini a relationship with God? By dozonntrati that he hAs 
learned correctly what the n ninC of o'ecitic propooitiorc In. 
Theo* proposition are these appertaining to the concept of the 
Christ event. Dy rcspondin,; in faith to hic whom the Apostles 
proclaimed nay the rovcalor of God to n, he identifies hi=Q f with 
the Christian fort of life, This han been the conictont contention 
of my opintcooloaic3l enquiry* I want now to recall Wittcenatainla 
ccrn of Iboro when the latter claimed to know for ro, that the 
object he hold aloft was his hard. VittCenntein pointed out that 
this taut an Abuse of the verb to know becausas in the public 
circunntancco where : "bore spoke, it wcui4 not ko canoe to doubt 
that the object referred to ,a hand, Witt , onotein 
dcirclo od, in 
relation to his idea of l 'i o oe, the view that owled o 
claims require a context to , ju 
tify them, and that that context is 
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logically dopondont upon tur: damontal proposition, which do not 
roquiro criteria or justification. Rules determine the correct 
uao which the autbnooous Cra=ar of the appropriate area of 
diccourco or language grans fuses upon the subject natter of that 
particular area. It is by learning that any knowledge claims which 
are apposite to the icaues at stake there can be . 
do. 
With thin in mind, I believe that it makes sense to say that 
the Christian, innofar as he faithfully adheres to # and in informed 
by, the depth grci mr of the kcrymatic lange e, e# can take a 
knowledge claim that encounter with God in experienced. T have 
shown that, usually, this will involve a communal profession of 
meeting Cod in and through the practice of the religion. The point 
I an cooking to take In that his critic's demand for overt "evidence' 
of a putative godly mAnifestation .a andern-day thcophany or 
chrictoptomy - will not, ucuclly# be in order. For his critic can 
be shown to bo confusing the justification with the validation of a 
claim. t'1: at he taken to be a validating requirement, in his view 
something empirical and demonstrable# turns out to be a justifying 
factor: the Christian does have a particular experience or cot of 
experiences. These will merit the epithet #religiioua ' in that they 
will occur during worship! Bible.. ctudy, meditation, activity on 
behalf of others etc and will probably be similar to those experienced 
by the coma unity which share his beliefe. Were he not to have any 
sch experience he could not justify a knowledge claim that he meets 
or has met God. But the critic must look elsewhere for the validation 
of the class. That is to be done by locking and seeing how the words, 
phrases and center-con which comprise the depth grammar of the 
Christhai language Came are tu3od. Only then can a validation of a 
claim to know God be given its necessary logical support. It in, 
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then, not perhaps fanciful to apply Wittgenstein's criticism of 
Moore to the criticism levelled by those who would seek validation 
for a claim to know or experience Cod in some external (and 
presumably startling) event. Moore was rebuked for his abuse of 
the verb $to know't the context on the occasion when , ooro spoke of 
knowing (that what was before his was a hand) was inappropriate for 
such usage. It has been my endeavour to try to any that the context 
provided by acceptance of certain fundamental propositions (concerning 
'god$ and concerning the Chriut-event) is an appropriate one for 
speaking of encounter with the God of Christian Thaina. 'rho 
believer justifies his knowledge clams by certain experiences which 
the Christian foam of life facilitate and help to interpret. Be 
validates hie claim by showing that he has learned (i. e. gained the 
requisite knowledge) to apply rules correctly, whore the depth 
gr r of the Theistic lan e game is concerned. Against Miles, 
Phillips, Braithwaite, Cupitt and others, I maintain that a believer 
is entitled to speak of an apprehension of divine self disclosure, 
where the initiative has not been his but God's, and where the 
response which he makes through belief in God-in-Chri t indicates 
how he has begun to apprehend. 
He can speak of cognitive awareness of God because of his 
conative response to the kerygma. It is a proclamation which 
impinges upon hin from without yet (as Kant insisted) he hau the 
rational faculty to turn the a priori into the a posteriori. In 
judging and appraising, he discovers that be has been 'revealed to', 
as it were. This is because he has learned what are the ideas in 
thin matter of selecting and understanding relevant facts about 
Christ and about the faith. So the constative and cosnissivo 
elements of his 'belief in' Christ reflect the dual characteristics 
of what I have ter. -4d *ideologically aroused concepts'. To be able 
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to speak rationally and coherently of these concepts in to show 
publicly what is entailed by the proposition that through the Christ- 
event there is a knowledge of, i«e. an encounter with, God. 
Can Thelnta assert 'Ps such that 'I'" is entailed b their annertion? 
What rernaira to be analysed La, the question as to whether 
Theists can caert P such that P is entailed by their assertion. 
That in to say, we must look, at the postulate that, in the realm of 
ideas which I have isolated as that area where a knowledge claim is 
cede, there is the possibility of an assertion of what is the cane. 
reforo I proceed I want to suggest that Christian theological beliefs 
cy be separated into four major topics, an follows (a) creationist 
idezw (b) coteriological ideas (c) ethical ideas, and (d) ccchatologi- 
cal ideas, (i. e. an distinct from the philosophical ideas I referred 
to a little while ago). These, together, I would soy, comprise the 
ideas which I take to be instantiated within Christian Theica, now, 
in the past and must continue to be co in the future. They comprise 
those ideas which husars have expressed through the paves of the 
Bible and the writings of the Church. It in to be noticed that 
their pre tic impact is fundamental for all that Christiana hold 
to be precious in their It<itb. Thus ideas of creation inspire modern 
conservationist and ecological thinking well as concern about 
nuclear energy. : oteriologicnl ideas provide the basis for modern 
insights into the nature of forgiveness which have psychological as 
well an moral and spiritual icplicatioro. The Ethical ideas rooted 
in Decalogue, ihophetie utterance, Sermon on the 1ttunt and other Ncw 
Testament Teachings guide coders behaviour in the Christian co=unity. 
Finally, hope is inspired by ccchatolo ical ideas, paannenberg's 
concept of the Power of the k^suturo, which impinges upon every present 
huun situation, provides a coders interproation of this belief. 
The Christian will contend that it these ideas are not about 
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what is true then his very belief in God must be seen to be ill- 
founded. In seeking to discover whether it makes sense to speak of 
an assertion of P which entails P in respect of theistic ideas (those 
ideas which constitute Revelation and define this concept) two 
things must be faced. First, we may wonder whether it is peraicz- 
able to accord to the specific ideas associated with the Judaeo- 
Christian tradition the status of divine revelation. Circularity 
and question-begging would sues to be prrionsly close to the surface. 
Für in not the concept of revolution part of the package which 
theists deliver in their boliof-syotesa? I shall argue that, although 
there is substance in this view, it need not be so dsmaGing as 
might be thought. Secondly, if it in argued that the meaning of 
Revelation in to be discovered through an understanding of the ideas 
above referred to, it say be le, gitis atcly asked whether other note 
of ideas also qualify for cc=* tort of revelatory basis. I would 
here mention the ideas of two major current philosophies, Evolution.. 
irs and l; arxica in this connection. An a matter of facts no such 
claim is =do by each of theses their beliefs emphatically exclude 
and reject any notion of divine agency. To the degree to which 
Theism makes a special claims to that extent we must Say that it is 
intrinsic to theistic ideas about the world and life upon its that 
man has boon granted knowledge of God, 13y the name token, Evolution- 
is= (which suet not be confused with icory of biological evolution) 
and 1 arxicas specifically disclaim all such knowledge. 
To assort P where P is conceived to be those instantiated ideas 
which Theism holds to be true, vo assert specific, singular propo- 
citiocu. P in conceived to be about creation, orlvaation, CoodnOo3 
aced future hope for who Lo around the theistic belief in God in 
related to experiential facts of the tort previously diacu zed, all 
of which have, a pracaatio implementation. Although, collectively, 
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the: would rnrear to be rercral propomitiono about the predicttes of 
loving, creating, inapirin and nustnini T, they are in their 
theistic cettinr, centred upon an object, God, without whose initia- 
tive and a rcncy human boin, s could not experience creativity, love 
etc. I on cwirning hard o isst a tide of rcüuctionict reaconin ,. 
I an not contending; for love in a broad, ill-defined cence as beine; 
a substitute for Cod (an John f; obir ton in 'Tonest to God" or 
D. Phillips etc appear to do). I as contending for the appropriaticn 
by believers of voll defined ideas which, worked out in living 
experience and mich, without the Christian revelation, nuct roanin 
unknown and hence incapable of implementation in human cocietya 
That is what I mean by instantiation. Concepts about interaction 
eng believers and the world are tested out in the hard school of 
life. 
}ty attcrpt to offer theistic idcac an the irntantiation at the 
heart of h =an experience of God1s revelation to can, prccuppoccd 
faith in Cod i. e., that a step of belief had already been token. 
Gto 1o kx cwledZo of Cod would then be that knowin;, ° which encounter 
with the objective ideas occasioned. Given once#n belief in God 
through faith in Christ, it would not cake ocrzc to say that one 
doubted the cr entinl ideas by which the structure of belief in 
undcreirdod. Thus in the natter of the martian of P there in no 
hidden conditional for the conditional olc. cnt has been taken care 
of in the choice to believe or, at leant, in the act of docidinz, 
that one will act as if' Theism is true. The claim to know that 
P is a later ctu o in the procedure of adoptir. a Theistic position 
in roCard to the world. To leave out the idea of God as crerator, 
saviour, inspirer of coral actions and ultinato hope for the 
futures would be to contradict came-colt in respect of those very 
ideas which are neon objectively by the believer. 
; r. nnnartiz ; 11 the thoict tan in mind a cet of sir, uler 
propositions which collectively conpri e the inst uitthtion of those 
ideas, whose concretion in the actual eapcricrces of the Christinn 
community provide an empirical is lecents. tion in the world. Fe is 
able to arnart that r ontni2s P because P itself to the sine qua ron 
of Thcinz2. P in P in analytically true; not both P und non-? 
cntablinhec the fact of P an far as his own experience teaches him; 
either r or not-P establishes the o; ecific nature of thong ideas 
whose realization co=prize the cuhotence of hin belief. no criteria 
for the truth of P have centred upon the logical possibility of 
caking nenne of revelation,, being conceived to be those idean which 
theitun has irutnntiatod. From a Biblical stand point it in Clod who 
instantiates thoinc through Ilia word# if I seen not to have advanced 
beyond the position held by Witt enntoin, whereby the ricenft,, - of n 
propocition in determined by its ufre, I believe I may have indicated 
wherein lies the significance of theistic b©liefe. I have tried to 
maintain cy view that the concept of revelation neceesitetco, cc a 
foundation for belief, some part of knowledge claim. It has been 
cado clear, I thinks that Chrictierc are justified In king ouch n 
clam=. M--at evidence there is has been shown to lie in the area of 
idea:. If it appears that I have failed to lend credence to Po er's 
'third world of idese' as bearing upon the concept of the concretion 
of theistic ideas, it cecnn to no that euch falls with thin defect* 
ifs on the other tend, I have given a deZreo of intelligibility to 
this concept, I believe I may buvo cone coca way towards applying 
to the idea of God 'c revelation to can the appellation of "know- 
led: e" on the t in of Popper's nothodolo y. Undoubtedly it is a 
cpecien of "weak" knowing (t alcolm) and the c tausch believer would 
not allow hit; claim to knew to be invalidated, re would not, 
however, be entitled to 4=-crt that he could nee no waY in which it 
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could be invalidated. Ilia degree of certainty would, though, enable 
him to make a knowledge claim and he would be justified in so doing. 
I can only suppose that counter ideas of a kind supported by human 
experiences would count against his claim, should they be available 
to agnostics to use. 
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CHAPTER, EIGETEEPN 
THE PROBLEM OF C YING THAT X EXISTS 
My awareness of a state of affairs of which I am a participant 
indicates my ability to conceptualise what I take to be the case. Put 
like this, I am avoiding the two components theory of knowledge, 
wherein a 'given' element is taken to be reflected upon by me, or 
registered in certain mental states. I am also avoiding the notion of 
a pure sense datum which is isolated from prior perceptions etc. It 
suggests, rather, an open situation in which my role as first person 
perceiver permits me to explain to myself or to other people what is 
sensibly or ideologically aroused consciously to me. A description of 
an experience of my past life-will invoke memory which similarly draws 
upon concepts for its articulation. Either present or past reports 
may add auditory, tactile, olefactory or gustatory aspects to visually 
perceptive ones. From Wittgenstein, we may take his counsel concerning 
correct usage, indicative of having learned meaning through appropriate 
application of words, phrases and sentences, within the boundaries of 
a specific area of discourse. Exactness is not called for so much as 
the clarity which ability to indicate samples and map definitive 
characteristics shows. 
aBaker has coined the phrase 'sensibly aroused concept' to describe 
a sense datum which I experience at a given time. He means by this 
that in visually, auditorially, tactiley, olefactorily or gu. statorily, 
having certain sensory impressions of whatever impinges upon my 
consciousness, I interpret the same by reference to conceptualisation, 
learned from childhood. Concepts pre-date percepts or, at least, my 
present perceptions are understood in. the light of prior cognitive 
awarenesses. I have learned to identify objects, smells, colours, 
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tastes etc, and my ability to grasp what I believe to be the case, in 
respect of a current experience indicates that a learned concept is 
being sensibly aroused. I share with my, fellows, apparently, this 
knowledge as to identification of sights, sounds and smells from a 
shared environment, wherein our capacity to locate meanings of words 
correctly displays mutual recognition of communal signs. There is a 
cultural element in determining how I perceive the world. 
If we adopt 
bWooziey's 
criticism of those philosophers (like 
Malcolm) who request confidence in the claimant to knowing, as a 
condition for such knowing, we might be persuaded to avoid speaking 
of 'being sure' when a claim is made. On the other hand, Prichard 
and Cook-Wilson each spoke of the need to profess certainty where 
such seemed to be justified, even though (as fallible humans) we may 
sometimes make such a profession of certainty in respect of a know- 
ledge claim and subsequently discover that we were mistaken. Ayer 
recognises that we have to earn the right to be sure in those 
circumstances propitious to a knowledge claim: these he held to be of 
an empirical nature, for which some kind of support in favour of the 
claim could be adduced. From these observations it might be said 
that a source of confusion lies in the tendency to argue from the 
premise that in staking a claim to know that p, and so being merely 
under the impression that p, or be merely thinking that p, necessarily 
entails the proposition that in no case can I really be confident in 
asserting that I really know that p. 
When, therefore, I address myself to the question "What can I 
know 5w ether stated in the guise of being sure or otherwi522? " I 
cannot use the strength of my conviction that I know such-and-such but 
may, reasonably, say that in respect of a sincerely made knowledge 
claim, this is what I know. And here I am not seeking grounds for my 
belief in the 'objective' nature of my piece of knowledge. What I am 
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saying looks to the Wittgensteinian view that my understanding of the 
knowledge claim I am making (and hence the credibility of that claim) 
will depend upon my ability to use correctly those concepts which bear 
upon it. I have indicated already my intention to follow an open, 
questioning view of knowledge which looks to coherence of the concepts 
enlisted in making knowledge claims, rather than to 'privileged' facts 
which are supposed to provide some kind of indubitable certainty for 
those claims. In adopting this approach, I must say that I have been 
influenced by such philosophers as cM. Williams, E. H. Wolgast and 
Malcolm Clark. As I have shown, the epistemological attitude taken 
up by these writers finds an echo in the philosophy of science of 
diarl Popper, whose attempt to find 'objective' significance for 
human ideas (the $third world of ideas') may be aced to marry an 
experiential view of revelation to those teachings of the Apostles 
which are rooted in, and blossom from the Kerygma. And in so far as 
Ayer counters the sceptic's demand for a near perfectionist standard 
for a putative knowledge claim, by pointing out that such a demand 
must be impracticable, and therefore of little epistemological value, 
I am attempting to keep in mind his request that the would be knower 
must learn the rights to be sure. Indeed, I hope that my dissertation 
is itself an exercise in seeking to earn that right for Christian 
Theistic beliefs about revelation. Yet with due regard being accorded 
to the afore-mentioned, it is to Wittgenstein that I owe my central 
postulate, that the kind of ground or giveness to which my experiential 
view of revelation looks, is not an empirical but a logical one. For 
if my searching for intelligibility for the idea that God has made 
himself known to his human creatures, and is thus able to be known (to 
some degree) by them, is to be pursued satisfactorily, it will be that 
fundamental proposition concerning the constitutive concept of god (as 
definitive of religious belief) which enables that to be done. Hence, 
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I trust that I shall not be accused of self-contradiction in my 
apparent repudiation of empirical grounds for belief concerning 
encounter between God and man, while firmly adhering to the ground 
provided by that fundamental proposition. 
I must now turn to the question as to what it means to say that 
'X' exists. I shall consider three answers to this question and 
notice that each, necessarily, implies some kind of experience by 
deans of which S comes to believe that 'X' can be said to exist. 
Firstly, we may ask whether the concept of existence is necessarily 
bound up with the concept of causality. Does our grasp of the meaning 
of IX' being said to exist depend upon our understanding of those laws 
which determine contingency? Certainly, we find ourselves using the 
principles of causality in much of what we record of our empirical 
experiences. Thus we believe that our perceptions are caused by a 
confluence of visual, auditory, olefactory, tactile and gustatory 
sensations with appropriate light, and sound waves, odour molecules 
or impulses and vibrations such that the sights we believe that we see 
or the sounds we believe that we hear etc are caused by prior combi- 
nations of physical forces. Suppose alternatively, with eHume, that 
we speak of 'bundles of perceptions$ to denote sequences we experience, 
each separate and only loosely related one to the other. In this case, 
we may not argue inductively that contingent relations obtain, linking 
together all that happens in our lives. What is can only be disparate 
in respect of continuity and permanence. If the world is all that is 
the case, its being so, as far as each person is concerned, is dis- 
jointed and ephemeral. Suppose, yet further, that the notion of some- 
thing being said to exist is a verbal location, serving as a predicate 
or extension of what we need to say to make sense of our experiences 
(or what happens to us). Fdr something to be said to exist, it would 
then be necessary for certain conditions to be fulfilled. The verb 
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'to exist' would be logically contingent upon our having particular 
experiences and being able to verify them in some runner. Thus verbal 
definitions require empirical reference. Idealists like 
(Locke have 
spoken of secondary qualities of colour or scent being given to a 
flower by our senses, while others like gBerkeleq have spoken of all 
phenomena as being dependent upon our awareness of them: "esse eat 
percipi". Then in theism, a case has been made, notably by 
hAnselm 
and 
'Descartes for the concept of necessary being. This finds 
expression, not in the contingency of causal relations, but in the 
immutable and permanent essence of that which cannot be other. 
The concept of existence is, in these different arguments, bound 
up with an understanding of experience. In giving accounts of our 
experiences and being aware of having had them, or currently having 
them, we are able to proclaim our belief that there exists around us 
a world of objects and events. Thus what we pay of our experiences, 
reflect concepts which suggest a unified area of public knowledge. 
That we may sometimes be mistaken in this respect, deed not deter us 
from making some positive inferences as to existent selves and 
phenomena. 
Philosophers use words like redundant or degenerate of the verb 
Ito exist' when in some instances of its being used as a predicate it 
adds nothing to the meaning or sense of a proposition. Thus to assert 
that this room exists or does not exist (spears) or to state Descartes' 
'Cogito, ergo Sum' (kAyer) are examples of redundancy. Since it 
would be a referential tautology to say "This room exists" and a 
referential contradiction to say 'this room does not exist' it has 
been argued that existence is not a predicate. The addition of the 
predicate does not appear to tell us anything beyond what is already 
stated by the demonstrative, at least in the affirmative statement. 
Ayer points out that, although there are occasions when to say 'I exist' 
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or 'I am conscious' make sense, they do not differ from the information 
conveyed by a gesture or an ejaculation, for to be in any state what- 
ever is to ensure one's existence, even if not onets consciousness. 
To adopt 
lRussell's distinction between the substantive and 
existential import of X (by naming or denoting) suggests the possi- 
bility of our being able to assess a class of existent entities. 
However, Pears remarks that the anomalies, which his minimal formu- 
lation for stating that existence is not a predicate indicate can be 
avoided if Russell's way of treating existence is adopted. The notion 
of reference itself may be abandoned. For it is by naming that we 
reach reality. "Names, if they are names and not frauds, just go out 
like arrows and encounter reality, " Russell asserts. It is by the 
variable and existential quantifier that descriptive phrases 'encounter 
reality, whilst themselves not being names. Hence Russell's use of 
the existential quantifier 'something' or a surrogate for it. By 
reducing the elements in a descriptive phrase or phrases to particulars 
which were thus existentially quantified, he was able to point to 
possible areas of acquaintance whereby we might identify clearly what 
is the case. "Every proposition which we can understand must be 
composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted" he 
states. mRussell's application of these principles to his proposition 
"The father of Russell was a viscount" (something was the father of 
Russell, not more than one thing was, and that something was a vis- 
count) might be used to illustrate the use of the existential 
qualifier. 
Russellfs association of acquaintance with ontological claims 
indicates a referential theory of meaning. nJames Thompson shows how 
we can avoid using the word sexists' at al]., so that although we do 
utter sentences in which 'exists' occurs as a predicate, we have no 
need to do so. 'For example, instead of saying that the round square 
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does not exist, we can say instead that no square is round, or that, 
whatever figure you care to take, that figure will not be both square 
and round. ' So too the "logical relations of the assertion that 
unicorns do not exist are probably better grasped through the sentence 
'No animal is a unicorn' than they are through the sentence 'Unicorns 
do not exist'. " We are not entitled to conclude from this that 
'exists' is not a predicate. We cay, however, agree with Russell 
that it is a second order predicate. It is not to be viewed as one 
among a list of the features of a described entity as 'red', Isquarel, 
'heavy' are. °Russell argued that the job of 'exists' is to record 
the fact that these other terms really apply to something; it demon- 
strates that they are instantiated. (It is precisely this lack of 
instantiation which some would use to deny the intelligibility of 
propositions about God. However, it can be countered by Theists 
that, given their understanding of God, as Bodiless Agent or 'Spirit', 
they would seek a different logical placing for this concept than 
that provided by the concept of an existent object, instantiated in 
the world. ) 
If our attempt to discover whether the question "what exists? " or 
"what is there? " is an intelligible question, - we are obliged also to 
excaine the meaning of the concept of reality. To say that X exists 
is to state that X is'heal". What do we mean by this assertion? 
K. Nielson informs us that "what is real and what is unreal is a very 
context-dependent notion ... We have no antecedent understanding of 
reality such that we could determine whether language agreed with 
reality. " So coherence is given to the concept of reality through 
those determinants in ordinary language which do not strain customary 
usage. On the ground that notions of God, as talked of by Theists, do 
in fact strain such usage, Nielson rejects any application of the 
epithet "real" to the word "God". Nielson's view gains support from 
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Wittgenstein who tells us to look and see how words are used in order 
to discern their meaning. %hat is "real" can, according to this 
requirement, only be discovered by careful examination of each 
situation; by, paying attention to the particular language-game in 
which a claim to reality is being made. Although there may appear to 
be circularity in this argument: what is "real" is that which common 
usage indicates, and ordinary language determines whether something is 
eligible for the epithet "real", it is nevertheless tautologically 
true that our notion of the concept of reality must at some point 
consort with common usage. However, it surely is not so much in its 
manner of being located in various areas of discourse, but in its 
function as a predicate, generally, that we may ask questions about 
its bearing upon our understanding. 
Children divide their world into those events and experiences 
which are "real" and those which are "pretend". Sometimes the lines 
between actuality and fantasy may be blurred. Adults, too, share 
the problem of finding the distinction, on occasions, to be difficult 
to make. Normally, of course, they would not think that there was a 
problem. Underlying this bland assumption there would appear to be a 
degree of taking things for granted, thinking "as if" such and such 
is the case or accepting a situation without question. gBakerrs idea 
of sensibly aroused concepts and some kind of correspondence theory of 
truth might seem to be apposite here. In view of what has been said 
about the tendency we have to rely upon beliefs which may or may not 
be well founded, and bearing in mind the predilection we often betray 
for making knowledge claims where assertions of belief might be more 
appropriate, it would seem that our determination of what is "real" 
may be open to some criticism. Yet it would seem to be true that, 
where the "real" is less than verified through lack of attention to 
the case in point, wo have or might have the possibility of correcting 
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our error. AU this assumes that it is within our ability to give a 
verdict as to what reality ia,. L. if only we take sufficient trouble to 
ascertain carefully what the facts of the case are. A correspondence 
theory of truth seems to be in mind here. We are reminded again of 
Russell's observation "Every proposition which we can understand must 
be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. " 
But does acquaintance with the constituents which make up a 
proposition, consist of verifiable pieces of information which a 
person's sense organs enable him to have? I want to argue that 
acquaintance with some-one or some-thing requires essentially and 
previously an understanding of concepts which have been learned in a 
particular cultural environment. To say that one is acquainted with 
constituents which collectively comprise a putative piece of sensory 
experience is to speak of sensibly-aroused concepts. Such concepts 
embrace such things as perceiving, feeling, wondering etc as well as 
those relating to such things as hardness, brightness, shades of 
colour, differences of shape etc. The processes of perceiving and 
explaining necessitate a comprehensive set of concepts to enable one 
to show that one understands any proposition which speaks of a 
specific state of affairs. Russell seems to hold to a view of know- 
ledge by acquaintance which Wittgenstein showed to be mistaken. For 
to be acquainted entirely with those constituents which make up a 
proposition appears to require the adoption of the 'anum nomen, unum 
nominatumr formula whereby it is assumed that for each and every 
component named correctly, I am in a position to corroborate accurately 
those objects which are perceived in my field of vision, range of 
hearing etc* Wittgenstein, as we have seen, moved away from this 
view to one which sought to find meaning and understanding by 
reference not to an assumed correspondence between a name and an 
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object so named (or by descriptive phrases relative to specific names), 
but by appraising oneself of the context in which it was customary to 
apply that name. In no doing he was following Frego who disapproved 
of the J-urrum nomen t view and argued for a contextual view. Not that 
Russell was unaware of the significance of thin view, yet preferred in 
his earlier philosophy his own method of seeking to reduce knowledge 
by description to knowledge by acquaintance. May point in to ask 
whether the believed acquaintance with what Wittgenstein in his 
Tractatus termed 'simples' can indeed do what Russell claimed for it. 
Or, do we in fact acquaint ourselves with components of perception, 
apart from the learned understanding (and I do not, wish here to imply 
a conditioned deterministic theory of learning) which we have acquired, 
and which thus places concepts before percepts? I do not think that a 
protracted discussion as to the merit or demerit of the view that 
ostensive familiarisation in childhood through being taught to name 
trees, books, tables, animals etc is called for. For as Wittgenstein 
remarks a child learns what books are by fetching them from the 
shelves. It is in an appropriate situation or series of situations 
that he comes to understand what is intended by the use of the word 
lull 
"book". Its existence as a separate entity, fulfilling a particular 
function in human affairs, is grasped through the learning and 
application of concepts whereby ability to read and so to use one's 
eyes, and concepts concerning degrees of texture, colour, print etc 
are paramount. 
My recall of what I have already discussed of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy, has been done to re-inforce my contention that it is 
in an open, enquiring approach to knowledge that I wish to proceed: 
not open in the sense of anticipating constant novelty, but in the 
sense of being open to fresh understanding. Words like 'acquaintance' 
should be understood in relation to other concepts with which they 
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possess some kind of affinity; e. g. proximity to, related to, contin- 
gent upon, -etc. To be acquainted with Xt therefore, is to be in a 
position whereby 3 can correctly state that he can correctly identify 
X. ' He is in possession of a vocabulary and has a grasp of appropriate 
words and phrases which enable him to show that it makes sense, in that 
situation, to assert that he is acquainted with X. In doing so he 
does not speak erroneously! I think, of sensations, feelings, thoughts 
etc and objects beyond the self. Rather he speaks of concepts which 
are sensibly and ideologically aroused (i. eo through sense experience 
- "sense data's as some would say - and through ideas formed by long 
association with the sort of situation in question) and which include 
his subjective awarenesses as well as what he takes to be the case 
beyond him. 
In so for as one may spear of 'given' elements - perhaps considered 
to be those, patches of colour, shapes etc which one perceives - one is 
not appealing to a category of privileged facts or unassailable pieces 
of informatien: thus not to 'pure' sense data. Rather one is able to 
take something to be the case to the degree that one's understanding 
is shown by appeal to the coherence of what is said, relative to the 
matter. It will reflect one's learning in that one is able to demon-- 
strate understanding of the correct usage of words by being able to 
explain if necessary their 'conceptual significance. Thus in speaking 
of my visit to the park and in my description of beds of flowers, well 
kept lawns and majestic trees which I observed, I have and use concepts 
not only of flowers, openness, fresh air etc but, on reflection, 
concepts of sights, smells, touching etc. The overall picture can be 
depicted because I have learned to take sense of what was going on, 
of which I was a spectator and a participant. In speaking of the 
experience, I indicated that I had learned an appropriate language 
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whereby I could speak of samples of trees, flowers and lawns together 
with appropriate sights, sounds, smells etc. This is not to say that 
my perceptions sere 'unreal'. On the contrary, I could envisage a 
reality which conceives of knower and known being interdependent. My 
nervous system, cortex and eyes, ears and nose were able to ascertain 
that certain concepts were being stimulated, recalled and used, while 
" 
other inappropriate concepts (e. g. my working as a schoolmaster in a 
classroom) were not. 
To analyse 'exists' would seer, therefore, to require some 
attention being paid to the particular area of discourse in which the 
verb is being employed. If we accept the definition Isooond order 
predicate' it would be in one's ability to show the meaning of the 
first order predicates that its particular significance would be 
illuminated. Thus to say of the park with its flowers etc that it 
exists, or that Il as an observer of the flowers, exist, is to explain 
contextually and contingently a state of affairs which, logically, 
entails existence. Would it make sense, Wittgeriatain would ask, to 
doubt that this is so, in ouch circumtances? 
As a first person agent, able to voice my understanding of a 
world of physical objects, and thus able to give a subjective inter- 
pretation of sights, sounds, sidle etc currently experienced by me, 
z proclaim $existence# and (reality#. These are concepts which, in 
this instance, derive from prior events in my life, and my present 
articulation encapsulates a continuum of personal consciousness, which 
combines elements of immediate sensory perception with accumulated 
learning, stemming from numerous varied, yet not altogether dissimilar 
conscious experiences. And this concept of a 'real' world beyond 
personal sensory experiences extends to so called abstract notions, 
like the approval I give in respect of the Beethoven Symphony to which 




of meaning take on significance. Or I might speak with disapproval of 
man's inhumanity to an when I hear on the radio of brutal killings 
of innocent people. Loral values are appealed to. In my judging a 
situation of this nature to be immoral, I include within my definition 
of what is 'real' not only physical data, not only memories of past 
experiences, abstractions relative to music but also to principles of 
ethics. And all these categories of my experience may be subsumed 
under the general term 'existences. By this I mean that in as much as 
they are demonstrably not figments of a fevered imagination, or 
occasioned by drug abuse or other hallucinatory mechanisms, I take them 
to denote aspects (first order characteristics) of which the predicate 
'exists' has determinate, if secondary, meaning. I have already argued 
that first person agency claims to knowing are complementary to, and 
not to be considered in conflict with, third person spectator accounts 
of what is taken to be the case. Hence, eß Ihzhave ernphaaized, public 
language and those areas of discourse in which men collectively engage, 
reflect tho-se concepts which I have taken to be definitive of the know- 
ledge to which groups of individuals or populations lay claim. It is 
not so much in an assumed 'given' element, therefore, or appeal to 
privileged fact or unassailable truth that talk of something or some- 
one existing or being real finds logical foundation. I have attempted 
" to say that what we mean by $exists$ and lrealityS do require experi- 
ences of subjects to provide their necessary empirical anchorage. 
And while mir own experiences are for me as a spparate being avenues 
whereby I am led to understand and to explain notions of existence and 
notions of reality, my involvement with other peoples who share a 
co n languae and culture, ensures that I do not wander too far from 
the pathway of publicly acclaimed intelligibility. For we share 
concepts and together respond to aroused concepts, whether through 
direct sense perception or through the stimulation of aesthetic, moral 
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or religious ideas. Fiere I agree with rQuino tos well as with Ayer, 
both empiricists, in the belief that I can trust societal inspirations 
in locating the objectivity of verbal constructions; and appreciate 
that, in so for as verification for my perception of the world might 
take the form of a direct realist approach or, what nay be said to be 
akin to it, a 'scientific' one, its verifiability rests within a 
sphere of shared communication. Concepts are mutually endorsed and 
socially established: their acceptability is in proportion to their 
utility in enabling the community to find at least cope intelligibility 
for their beliefs concerning states of affairs, in which individuals 
and groups recognise coherence rather than confusion. It is in the 
joint holding together of the 'existent' and the 'real'; in the 
conflation of participation and observation - of subjective enquiry 
and overt happenings - that experiences of humans gain significance 
and acquire meaning. All of this does not, I think, detract in any 
way from what I have said of fundamental propositions, which inform 
or determine the sort of concepts which will be possible. 
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN B 
IDENTIFYING GOD: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY THAT GOD EXISTS? 
Who or what is god, and in what sense is god defined in the 
language game itself? "Does god exist? " can be said to be a viable 
question here; but is this question begged in the 'game'? Also, one 
must recognise a further question in respect of those predicates which 
are attributed to god, as he is conceived to be within Christian 
Theism. The question of the objectivisation of the subject thus 
arises. To say that the answers to these questions are to be discerned 
within the language game which has as its core the language of the 
kerygma needs examination. Will it do to make this claim? It is one 
thing to seek to find meaning for the concept of man's encounter with 
God through playing a language game, and in the process to be able 
perhaps to say what sort of god he is. This would be to demonstrate 
correct usage of certain concepts. It is another thing to attempt to 
say that knowledge of god in the sense of objective support for the 
existence of god is thus irradiated and indeed established. Yet it 
is surely here that talk of God being known can be given intelligi- 
bility. Let me explain how I think this may be done. 
It will be recalled that comparisons were drawn between religious 
discourse and moral and scientific discourse. It was seen that each 
area of discourse is determined as to what can or cannot be said 
within them by certain fundamental propositions which lie at the 
bottom of the respective games. In playing any oke of these games, 
one is committed, ipso facto, to an acceptance of those propositions 
and to all that they entail as regards explanatory and experiential 
implications. Thus to be able to debate the ethics of, say, capital 
punishment one is by necessity, not choice, obliged to accept the 
principle of moral obligation. It is not something apart from the 
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language game: it determines what it is possible to say within it. A 
more apposite comparison, perhaps, for my purpose, is that concerning 
the concept of a physical object which lies at the bottom of the 
scientific area of discourse. For it would not make sense to attempt 
to speak of chemical reactions or d. n. a molecules, atoms, protons etc 
if one did not presuppose the existence of physical objects. However, 
the important comparable factor is that which appertains to the problem 
of my belief in physical objects on the strength of, principally, 
sense data perceptions which enable me to support such belief. We 
have discussed the view that my perceiving, for example, the bushes 
which are now before me is dependent upon my having a concept of 
something I have learned to call a bush and of which therefore my 
perception at this moment may be said to be a sensibly aroused concept. 
Yet, however much I take my sense datum of the bush which is now 
before me to provide a true state of affairs, I cannot logically 
reduce what I say about physical objects to sense data. There is 
always the possibility that my perception, although conceptually 
aroused and so indicating a cultural, environmental and communal 
causative nexus, is inadequately or mistakenly conveying a frealt 
situation. This difficulty does not, however, lead me to doubt the 
general reliability of my senses in providing me with some kind of 
assurance as to what I conceive to be the case. in any particular 
situation, assuming normalcy of vision, hearing etc and absence of 
deleterious circumstances (like my being 'high' on a drug, suffering 
from mental aberrations etc). The logical gap between my talk of 
sense data or sensibly aroused concepts (or whichever phrase one 
substitutes here) and my talk of existent objects, does not logically 
preclude intelligible talk of events and happenings relative to my own 
experience. 
I have tried to show that this is indeed so, not by appealing to 
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a given' element in isolation from a perceiving mind. I am not here 
suggesting, necessarily, a Berkeleyan idea of 'esse est percipi', where 
for something to be conceived to exist, a perceiver of it is deemed to 
be required. My point is linked with that openers towards fresh under- 
standing which I believe epistemological enquiry requires. It seems to 
be consistent with this view to speak of my present perception of the 
bushes as being occasioned by concepts of bushes and numerous cues 
relative to sight which have been accumulated during my life, and thus 
are conceptually stimulated. By careful attention. I may, then, acquire 
a glimpse of hues, colours, characteristics previously not noticed in 
the bushes. The 'given' factor will be the concept of a physical 
object, taken to be a fundamental proposition in the sense previously 
discussed. 'Exists$ as a second order predicate, as it has been 
termed previously, will serve to indicate that my perception of bushes 
refers to instantiated patches of green, degrees of lightness and 
darkness, measures of height and breadth etc, as well as specific 
details such as leaf shapes, colour variations etc. Integral to the 
concepts firstly, of a physical object and, secondly, of a perceiving 
agent is the concept of extension and distinctiveness appertaining to 
what a physical object, is taken to be. Thus the logical foundation 
for my talk of bushes which I see before me is the constitutive concept 
of a physical object, and the logical relations relative to the act of 
perceiving refer to eyes which function normally. The empirical 
requisite which permits me to use, if appropriate, the verb "exist" is 
my being in a position to see the bushes on one occasion in suitable 
circumstances. My description of the colour, shape and size of the 
bushes would suffice to satisfy an enquirer as to my act of witnessing 
such and it would be superfluous, in most possible circumstances, to 
add that the bushes 'exist'. Yet in so far as existence was mooted or 
impugned in respect of these particular bushes, it would be apposite to 
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describe their location and characteristics to lake it clear that that 
is indeed the case. 
When we are examining the question who or what is god? ' or the 
question 'Is the question of god's existence begged in the Theistic 
language game? ' comparisons with the use of 'exists' so far discussed 
are relevant. It will be recalled that I have taken the proclamation 
of the kerygma and the form of life emanating from it (or inspired by 
it, perhaps) as the 'given' element in Christian belief. This was 
said to be, in effect, a fundamental proposition in so far as belief 
in God, with its constativo and commissive aspects, was held to be 
illuminated and informed by the proclamation concerning Christ. It 
has been argued that the word 'god' has been given content by the 
kerygma which, as Pannenberg suggests, proclaims the Christ-event, 
the central happening in human history: that is history as interpreted 
in the light of the Judaeo-Christian concept of divine initiative and 
soteriological activity in the world. Logically, there can be no 
language game or form of life from a Christian point of view (as 
traditionally understood) if one impugns the kerygma, understood to 
be at least a part of the ontology of belief. It might perhaps be 
considered one among two or three fundamental propositions upon which 
all that is said within the language game rests. As such it is not 
hypothetical and does not require logical analysis in order to ascer- 
tain how the verb 'exists' is to be used. In so far as 'exists' as a 
second order predicate is summoned to enable intelligibility to be 
given to empirical representations of God's putative encounters with 
men, its location is among those first order predicates whereby 
generations of believers have endeavoured to describe the sort of God 
whom they believe they have met and in whom, as a pre-requisite for 
such encounter, they have come to believe. Thus they would speak of 
Hic: love, compassion, forgiveness, warnings, corrections etc as 
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experienced in their relationship with Him through prayer, Bible study, 
worship, service of others etc. I would want to say that by analogy, 
and clearly not by existential parity, these predicates may be said to 
refer to God in a similar way to the predicates of greeness, toughness, 
glossiness etc referring to the leaves on the bushes. 
If it be accepted that the kerygma helps to constitute what is 
meant by Christian belief in God, with its twin characteristics of 
constative propositions (historical propositions and assertions about 
what is taken to be the case, and theological propositions about 
creation, redemption, salvation etc) and commiasive response to such, 
any claim about encounter with, or experience of, God is logically 
dependent upon such. ter doubts concerning what it is which I believe 
I am encountering within that form of lifer and how I can objectivise 
the subject of my assertions in such a way that a genuine knowledge 
claim can be made may be compared with doubts about physical objects 
and sense data. There is a logical gap in respect of saying that I 
perceive S and being able to be sure that my sensations enable me to 
know that p in respect of S. To say this indicates an understanding 
of concepts e. g. of a bush and what is meant by seeing, feeling, etc. 
There is a logical gap likewise in whatever assertions I might, as a 
believer, make about encountering what I take to be God when I 
worship, pray, read the Scriptures etc, and my ideologically aroused 
concepts about God. 
I think that the comparison is satisfactory. I must now try to 
demonstrate why I think this to be so. IV attempt will be to utilise 
what I have said about Wittgenstein's discussion of the autonomy of 
grammar which a language game evinces. Such autonomy does not imply 
detachment from other games; Wittgenstein makes this point plain. It 
does;, however, suggest that learning how words are used and the rules 
which enable the learner to use them correctly, by mastering the 
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technique of producing samples and showing how what one says relates 
to one thing rather than to another (by suitable comparisons and 
contrasts), is a pointer to one's being able to explain the meaning of 
what one says. It is obvious that talk of physical objects or talk of 
moral responsibility not only presupposes concepts which yield talk 
about sense data and talk about moral values respectively, but shows 
the mastering of the appropriate language by which such talk can be 
intelligible for all those who, through acceptance of the basic 
presuppositions of that talk, are able to indulge in it. Each area of 
discourse has its own autonomous grammar, the intelligibility and 
coherence of which is logically bound up with those concepts which can 
be aroused by suitable criteria - sense data and ideas of right and 
wrong respectively. 
The Theistic language game, I have argued, when given its 
definition by reference to the kerygma, similarly has an autonomous 
grammar -a depth grammar - enshrining fundamental propositions which 
is learnt by Christians. In so far as the concept of god is constitu- 
tive of belief, it does not make sense to challenge or to deny the 
part played by God in the events and teachings around which the 
kerygma is constructed. The 'gap$ therefore, such as it is, between 
what believers say about encounter with the deity through their 
response in faith to what Christ is believed to have dote and said, and 
the corroboration of specific empirical events or the veracity of 
specific teachings (if such corroboration can be in any way considered 
to be feasible) need not be a damaging factor in respect of the case I 
am seeking to establish. It is not inimical to the coherence of 
scientific talk or to moral talk that Caps exist between, in the 
former case, my talk of sensory perception and the existence of 
physical objects which I believe to reside in the assumed phenomena to 
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to which they point; or, in the latter case, between my talk of moral 
values and the assumed principles of morality which are taken for gran- 
ted or found to be written into the concept. Taking something for 
granted, to be sure, can be dangerous. This is precisely what the 
attempt to apply Wittgenstein's doctrine of the autonomous grammar of 
different language games has sought to avoid. 
There is an important distinction to make here which is particu- 
larly perspicuous in respect of talk of physical objects in relation 
to talk within the kerygmatic language game. It is one which has 
been carefully drawn out already. I refer to the distinction which 
needs to be made between 'belief that' and 'belief in'. For whereas 
my assertion that I am now seeing bushes before me involves me in the 
claim that I believe 'that' there are bushes to be seen (as a matter 
of fact), my assertion that I am encountering god through kerygmatic 
activity indicates that I believe 'in' god. And while the former 
claim may be taken to be a knowledge claim, although I would be unwise 
to say that 'I know' that there are bushes before my visual field 
(given that others might equally well perceive the same bushes), it 
would appear that any such knowledge claim in respect of the putative 
facts in which I am said to believe when I speak of belief in Christ 
etc is not at all lucid. Yet it is precisely through the medium of 
the autonomy of grammar (which must embrace the concepts of uniqueness 
and distinction) that talk of knowledge by encounter, or acquaintance, 
can (I believe) be shown to be viable. 
Who or what, then, is god? is a legitimate question in the 
context of speaking of the kerygma, conceived to be a language-game 
reflective of a community of believers whose form of life enshrines 
the working out in practical ways, and in meditation, of the impli- 
cations of that belief. At the heart of our enquiry there exists the 
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question of identity. And since god has been defined or understood 
to be bodiless agent, of spiritual rather than corporeal nature, know- 
ledge of him through human physical sensory perception has been ruled 
out. Of necessity we cannot, logically, speak of physical encounter 
and the category mistake implicit within demands for perceptive 
'evidences' for his being must be borne in mind constantly. Yet such 
caution bedevils the issue, apparently, in respect of meaningful talk 
of human encounter with the divine. It is salutory I think, as a 
consequence of the appropriateness of heeding this caution about 
category mixing, to analyse carefully the concepts of knower and known 
respectively, and to seek to understand how these concepts may be 
related to talk of revelation. In assaying this task I would like 
briefly to allude to Don Cup. tt's recent work. 
aCupitt reduces the idea of God, as traditionally conceived in 
Christian Theism, to spiritual energy within us. Christian faith, 
for modern man, thus becomes response to principles of dynamic 
spiritual influence about which Christ spoke. It is essentially a 
liberating and creative energy which sets us free to practise 
'disinterested' love. I think that Cupitt comes near to D. Phillips' 
definition of god here, whereby the releasing of new powers of feeling 
and deeper realisations of our capacity to love others and rise above 
our banal, self-centred preoccupations, are taken to be what the word 
'god$ means for today's believer. Twat I think is particularly 
interesting for my purpose is Cupitt's view that the church has, in 
the past, tended to be identified with power structures. A hierarchy 
of authoritative figures has been shown in the claims made by bishops, 
priests etc. And still today the church seeks power over the lives of 
its adherents. Believers, instead of being led in to the 'liberty of 
the spirit' through encouragement from Jesus' teachings about a non- 
legalistic formula, based on the development of spiritual potential 
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for disinterested love, continue to be under authority. In this 
structure of power, god himself is seen to be the apex. To win a 
convert to Christianity, therefore, involves the acceptance by the 
convert of a power structure to which he submits. Fears of hell and 
judgment reinforce this emphasis upon the power exerted by some men 
over the lives of others. Psychologically, preachers and evangelists, 
clergy and popes establish a hold over their flock and hearers in so 
far as the submission to a powerful elite is effected. 
Cupitt is anxious to replace all this by a genuine spirituality in 
which the freedom of the soul is made possible through the achievement 
of individual apperception of a truth which lifts one beyond the 
mundane and the ordinary. Disinterestness becomes a possibility as 
personal spiritual growth - through prayer, meditation, altruistic 
concern for others etc - is practised as Jesus recommended. The con- 
cept of a god who is above us or beyond us is unnecessary and made 
redundant by dint of one's recognition of that new dimension of 
living which a deeper awareness of the self can bring. For god is now 
found to be within in the sense of that spiritual power to which the 
believer is admitted, or made aware of, as he responds to the teachings 
of Jesus. The Law and Power structures no longer form the basis of 
religious belief and activity. Freedom of the individual and enrich- 
ment of human experience go hand in hand with ethical demands which 
willingness to learn from what is said of agapsic love and its communal 
implications inspires. Cupitt, I believe, is happy to accept the 
appellation 'Christian Buddhist' and clearly his views have affinity 
with Buddhist ideas about meditation, ethical demand and a deeper'level 
of being within the self. I do not wish to discuss Cupitt's views 
except in so far as they bear upon my view of revelation. I think 
that I have sought to establish that in the kerygma we find religious 
language which appears to elucidate, through the medium of the 
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Apostles' faith, the concept of a god who is understood to be apart 
from men, and graciously seeking communion with man through the life 
and teachings of Christ. Cupitt subjectivises and internalises 'god' 
and thus offers a different interpretation from nine, and thus of 
traditional Christian Theism, Fie does, however, support my contention 
that the dunamis of that spiritual awareness spoken of in the kerygma 
is essentially a liberating, agapeistic power, experienced by, and 
through, believers in response to proclamation. I think that I would 
agree with him in his claim that the Church has (at least in some 
instances) reinforced the concept of human power (exhibited in 
governments and structures), with the idea of god being used (again, 
in some respects) to further the power of some men over the lives of 
others. What, of course, runs counter to my thesis in Cupitt's 
argument is his contention that Jesus did not intend to speak of God 
us being the altogether other, or whatever phrase one might adopt. I 
have, by contrast, attempted to see in the kerygma, understood as that 
proclamation originated by Christ, and interpreted and conveyed 
further by his followers, a path-way to intelligible talk of God, 
deemed to be Bodiless Agent, Divine Spirit etc. Cupitt, I feel, 
rightly deplores that dogmatism within Christianity, traditionally 
understood, which stifrrgc openness towards new vistas of understanding. 
Since my whole venture has endorsed the idea of openness in 
respect of epistemological enquiry, I hope that I may be exonerated 
from CupittIs criticism of dogmatism in Christian Theistic apologetics. 
I have been concerned with meaning, in respect of the concept of 
revelation and in respect of those philosophical principles which 
guide one in seeking to explicate the meaning of that concept. Such 
principles include those relating to the concepts of knower and known, 
first person observer and experiencer and third person report of 
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interpretation of putative knowledge. Cupitt's brave attempt to meet 
the secularisation and the scientific materialistic assumptions of our 
day, draws attention to the importance of cultural determinants, 
psychological elements and prescribed doctrines in helping to shape 
what people have believed, and continue to believe, about the relation- 
chip between themselves and 'god', 
one thing which emerges from my brief mention of Cupitt's recent 
thinking, is thus the importance of noticing the part evaluation plays 
in our caking of knowledge claims. To this extent I raust concede that 
there is a hint of circularity in what I have said of the encounter- 
response juxtaposition within the kerygoatic language game. For 
according to my experiential view of revelation, a believer learns to 
experience of 'know$ god by learning to play a game in which the 
necessity of responding to linguistic formulations which are held to 
contain the roots of meaning in regard to the concept of encounter 
with the divine, is integral to the rules of the Wie. 
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN ($) 
a CUPITT, Don: Taking Leave of God London, SCM, 1980 
CUPITT, Don: The World to Come London, SCM, 1982 
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CHAPTER NINETEEN 
THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING GOD - RLSSELL'S REDUCTION 
OF KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION TO KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 
Russell demonstrated in detail that to describe something is to 
be less accurate than to name the constituent parts of the thing 
described. In On Denoting' he indicated how a particular variable X 
might be ascertained by the reduction of a universal or universals so 
that its identity could be indubitably established* 
alüs formula for 
this purpose was: 'There is something which alone is so-and-so, and 
that something is such and such'. In the example he provided: 'The 
father of Russell was a viscount' there are two universals, father 
and viscount, Russell analysed this proposition to show how the 
variable X (here the two variable universals) might be reduced to the 
required particular to identify him. Thus he wrote: 'Something was 
father of Russell, not more than one thing was, and that something was 
a viscount'. His use of an existential quantifier further enabled him 
to show that a deputy proper name was intimated here. Thus he forwarded 
another formula: 'X is F, or Y is F, or Z is F, ... or n 
is F (and X, 
Y, Z... n are all the particulars there are)' taking 'F' for to 
father of Russell'. We shall not here attempt an enquiry into the 
success of these formulae in respect of descriptive perspicuity, nor 
become involved with the problem as to whether Russell really clarified 
the juxtaposition of universals and particulars. (Do we regard the 
word 'something' as a particular whose meaning is a universal, or do 
we acknowledge that, as understood, he has given as no particular? ) 
bSuffice it to say here that Russell became convinced that all know- 
ledge starts from particulars: "Understanding the particular is prior 
to understanding the universal" he proclaimed. So to be able to denote 
a specific particular enables us to name a putative constituent of 
- 258 - 
fact. Russell observed that it is a mistake to assume that denotation 
can take place outside of a sentence which gives such denotation its 
proper contextual setting. Here he anticipated Wittgenstein's idea of 
use being the determinant of meaning in linguistic understanding. That 
is why a descriptive proposition per se (in so far as it is considered 
in isolation) according to Russell, will be inadequate to establish 
the truth of what it describes. 
Can we denote and understand the particular in respect of the 
object of Christian theism? Certainly the Christian claim is of a 
unique person: a particular. Something was the Christian Messiah, not 
more than one thing was, and that something was a first century Jew. 
Here the first descriptive phrase comprises proper names, as found 
within the Jewish religious tradition. If with many modern scholars 
we take the view that Jesus himself did not use the title 'the Christ' 
or the Messiah' it would remain true that the tradition points to the 
fact that the early church used this of him. He was so named. It was 
he and not some other Jew who merited the title 'the Christ'. The 
second phrase $a first-century Jew' is a universal which would qualify 
for the other part of Russell's formula 'X is F' etc. This would 
enable us to establish the claim that it was one and only such a man 
who was identified as the Messiah. To reflect Russell's first 
proposition we might construct one having the universals 'religious 
leader' and 'first century Jew' 'Something was a religious leader etc. ' 
By substituting the name the Messiah or its equivalent we introduce a 
particular which purports to say who the first century Jew is. It 
singles him out from all the others. Since history has confirmed that 
Christianity owes its being to the belief of the apostles that Jesus 
was the Messiah, doubting this tradition does not seem to be wise. 
There is, of course, the question of scholarly enquiry into the roots 
of the tradition. What we must ask is whether a philosophical attempt 
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to construct descriptive propositions, which seem to contain denoting 
elements, may qualify as knowledge by revelation. Or are we left with 
the sort of presumed non-existent classification provided by the 
c'King 
of France' example? A fine distinction might be drawn between a 
doctrinal and historical proposition about a first century Jew who was 
conceived to be Messiah, and a present day proposition concerning the 
validity of belief in him. 'The present King of France is bald' is an 
example Russell gives us. Could we intelligibly substitute "The 
present Christian Messiah saves men"? In asserting descriptions about 
a king who neither exists nor subsists (and whose baldness is therefore 
a non-sequitur), might be thought by the sceptic to be akin to trying 
to reconstitute an historical figure (a first century Nazarene) in 
order to attribute present attributes to him: We seem to salvage a 
doctrine and little else from this analysis. Obviously, we have 
strayed into the territory of using the verb 'to know' - or attempting 
to use it in respect of the concept of revelation and descriptive 
propositions - where we may more correctly use the verh 'to believe'. 
And yet we did observe that to say one knows X of a present sensory 
experience is but to express a belief about X. All of this suggests 
that my reference to Russell's 'King of France' paradigm for meaning- 
ful non-existent, non-substantial propositions seems now to be 
inappropriate. It is not the case that the theist who sets out to 
describe events pertinent to God's purposive saving activity in the 
world, is attempting to speak of past happenings which are no longer 
fraught with psychological significance for mankind today. 'The 
present King of France is bald' was analysed by Russell to show that 
it is possible to create meaningful propositions which lack present 
existential or substantial content. Christians speak of the presence 
of Christ - in the Communion service, during prayer or more generally 
- to indicate that their belief about his presence is in continuity 
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with the historical events and the ages beyond them. They have to 
concede that in expressing such beliefs, relative to descriptive 
historical propositions which purport to have present existential 
content, they are conveying by their beliefs something other than that 
which they express in everyday epistemological propositions about their 
sensory experiences. 
Whatever complications surround mundane pronouncements like 'That 
is a treeI (or I see a tree over there) and fI have a visual image of 
a red patch before me', clearly the difficulties relative to my 
uttering theistic historical propositions are of a different order. 
Questions of authority occur. Philosophical questions about the 
logical status of doubt in respect of putative historical propositions 
must be examined. An attempt to understand how the verb 'to believe' 
is being used when theistic propositions are existentially affirmed 
must be made. Thus I must ask what is the historical authority upon 
which the basic facts are founded? Secondly, I must see whether it is 
reasonable to doubt these facts, recognising that I have learned then 
like other historical facts, gleaned from books or teachers. Thirdly, 
I may understand their significance by acknowledging that their context 
is that of the theistic language-game where 'belief in God' is a 
condition for its being played. Fourthly, I must recognise that in 
the speech-acts which comprise the language of theistic belief, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary propositions are to be discerned. 
Fifthly, not only must I analyse the descriptive propositions which 
form the essential material of the language-game, I must also look to 
see what it is which is being denoted within those propositions. And 
so, sixthly, I must ask what sense does it make to speak of these 
items as being objects of knowledge within the structure of epistemo- 
logical understanding. 
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It is in respect of the final question that I shall be judged most 
plainly to have begged the question. My plea has been to cite 
Wittgenstein in his remark that knowing entails my being in a 
position to know X. By various circumlocutions, I have continued to 
follow Wittgenstein in regard to how one comes to know theistic 
propositions and more significantly the One about whom such propositions 
purport to speak and in regard to their placing within a specific 
language-game where doubt, though not excluded by any means, is under- 
stood to be the logical counter-foil to belief. I have further 
analysed the latter psychological word in its relationship to another 
namely, the verb to know. It has not been easy perhaps to find one 
overall interpretation of what it means to believe that p, for 
existential, historical and theistic elements have become inter-woven. 
It would be precarious in the extreme to claitiknowledge-by-description 
has been shown to define the sort of knowledge which theists profess 
to be intended when they speak of God making himself known by 
revelation. Having used 
dRussell's 'Theory of Description' and 
mentioned his argument 'On Denoting', it is appropriate to look further 
into his pronouncement that knowledge-by-description may be, in the 
last analysis, reducible to knowledge-by-acquaintance. I have 
examined the view that Knowledge by acquaintance might be adopted as 
the view most appropriate for theistic talk of knowing God. Although 
I reached the conclusion that the kind of knowing implicit in the 
Christian language game is knowledge by description, especially as 
that which is pertinent to the ideas expounded by the kerygma, it 
would not do to dismiss altogether the concept of acquaintance. 
That would it mean to say that a believer may know God by 
acquaintance? Clearly ostensive definition of the object of know- 
ledge is ruled out. Theism has established a descriptive picture of 
what God is like: his is said to be omnipotent, holy, righteous, 
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loving etc. Does it make sense to speak of someone knowing one who, 
having the attributes mentioned, yet remains beyond physical sensory 
perception? To say that I know that John is kind and thoughtful 
cannot be abstracted from some sort of picture of John which also 
comprises his having bng legs and brown hair etc. The logical 
complement of characteristics which make up his personality is a set 
of physical characteristics by which a is recognised as a separate 
individual. My acquaintance with John embodies a knowledge of what 
his appearance is as well as the attributes of his character. It 
would not be thought to be rational to speak of moral characteristics 
abstracted from physical components. Of course, my saying of 
Nicholas Nickleby that he evinced stalwart concern for the ill- 
treated and a magnanimity towards the unfortunate, is not beside the 
point or deemed to be senseless, when we realise that he is a 
fictional creation of Dickens. In describing him thus I am acknow- 
ledging a prior acceptance of his being the hero of a novel. Sceptics 
would not worry if a similar pre-condition was attached to propositions 
recited by theists concerning God. His being said to be knowable by 
acquaintance is held to mean that knowledge of a real, not fictional, 
being is intended by the assertion. Yet it is clear that no such 
acquaintance can be established such that confirmation of the one 
possessing n attributes may be pointed to or otherwise shown to exist 
as John may be given living identification. In recognising that to 
speak of acquaintance with God is to play a particular language-game, 
we show that the word acquaintance is being used as a vital complement 
of the verb 'to believe'. My saying that I believe in God, in the 
sense of Christian understanding of relationship with him, entails a 
belief that I am acquainted with him. It is by revelation that he is 
said to be known. He has taken the initiative in enabling an 
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acquaintance with him to be made. And the corollary of knowledge of 
him is understanding of his nature. Plow it would not do to speak of a 
believer knowing by acquaintance unless an experience of God could be 
established. What would this experience include? What would it con- 
tain to indicate that it was an acquaintance with the divinity and not 
an illusion or invention by the one making the claim to the experience? 
The issue of what can be said of the tself' and experiences thereof 
awaits further investigation. The experience which theists speak of 
as a feature of revelation suggests the experience of encounter. Any 
sensible use of the word 'acquaintance' must imply an encounter with 
the one with whom one is said to have that acquaintance. 
The critic may say with good reason that if acquaintance with a 
can, namely Jesus, is ultimately being spoken about, the Christian 
has no grounds for speaking of acquaintance with "god". Also it should 
be acknowledged that, in the case of Russell's example of the present 
King of France being bald, the concepts resident in the proposition 
are intelligible, even though there may be no existential referent. 
The concepts of king, baldness and the present day are each perfectly 
acceptable in everyday parlance. What of the concept of god, however? 
Attempts to offer substitutes for "god" in the form of agencies 
deemed to be channels of cod's revelation to man - the Bible, prayer, 
human agency through the sermons of ministers etc - would not qualify 
for the sort of knowledge by acquaintance which Russell believed to be 
the medium of assurance. So the problem of showing that what counts 
as an acceptable form of encounter with God turns out to be a hopeless 
reduction of talk about humans - Jesus, or priests or human writings 
and words. 
Yet those writings I have held to be crucial for the making of 
knowledge claims by the Christian. Worship, Bible study and 
- 204 - 
instruction enable the ideas at the heart of Christian belief to be 
given in propositional form. Wittgenstein, however, points out that 
my saying that I believe X is not to be confused with my claim to know 
X where it would be inappropriate to go beyond an expression of belief. 
He acknowledges that claims to certainty are fraught with Cifficulty 
in the empirical sphere, while doubting common-sense perceptual 
experiences may be unsound. A rational man is able to differentiate 
'only believing' that p from making a claim to knowing that p. 
Within the appropriate language game expressions of belief, where 
doubt is a logical corollary of such, make good sense. 
It follows that to try to say of the Christian revelation that 
it provides a basis for knowledge by acquaintance is to speak analytic 
truth, as long as the boundaries of the language-gatte are acknowledged. 
For to be a believer who plays that game it would be singularly inept 
to say that aids to worship and growth in knowledge of the faith, 
precluded acquaintance of the One who is held to have revealed 
himself to believers - that is, has made himself known through word, 
sacrament and prayerful communion. Obviously this gets us no further 
in giving intelligibility to the notion that the universal concept 
#godt can be reduced to a particular tGod' known through come kind 
of reference to Jesus of Nazareth. It might not seem to take us 
beyond efrentano, s intentional inexistent object: i. e. that which is 
willed by human thougit but which lacks existential or even substantial 
content. Unicorns, centaurs and Russell's 'present King of France' 
provide examples (although in the latter case, historical identi- 
fication of the object was a reality, not an illusion). Following 
Russell, it would be possible to discover some sense in Christian 
talk of God, although there would not be knowledge by acquaintance. 
Lack of existential reference would ensure that this is so and 
reduction to talk of Jesus would be inadmissable. A deity who is 
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believed to be beyond sensory perception, however, could hardly 
qualify for the kind of empirical identification which always 
figured so prominently in Russell's attempts to ground knowledge 
in discernible entities. 
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CHAPTER TWENTY 
GOD AS BODILESS AGENT BEING SAID TO OPERATE IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 
This raises the question as to whether biblical - and other - 
events may be said to be sufficient conditions for speaking coherently 
of God, conceived to be divine agent, doing actions within the spatio- 
temporal environment in which we, as human beings, function. What 
would count as evidence in favour of the presumption that divine energy 
has been at work (or is at work) in particular, identifiable events in 
history (or today)? To attempt to answer this question, we must see 
whether it makes sense to postulate the proposition that God as 
Bodiless Agent could (logically) be said to act within a world, where 
actions appear to depend upon bodies being present to implement 
intentions to act. 
aRudson thinks that such a state of affairs is logically possible. 
He illustrates his view by drawing a distinction between a man's 
situation, say being in debt, and his standing back, as it were, to 
review that situation. There is a logical distinction between the 
agency involved in Uncle Fred drawing a cheque to send to his needy 
nephew and the actual hand movements involved in writing the cheque 
and its being delivered by the postman. The cheque's arrival is 
consistent with the nephew's knowledge of his uncle Fred's generosity, 
Such is registered by specific acts. So Theists take certain occurences 
in the world to reflect God's agency, since such are believed to reflect 
His character. Hudson attempts to show that the theistic belief that 
a non-bodily agent may be said to act in the affairs of men, and in 
the world, has logical consistency. In the Bible there are said. to be 
events, observed by men, which were hailed as the work of God. In so 
far as such events are putative events in the world, they might be 
taken to qualify for the status of a necessary condition for divine 
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agency in the world. Gould they qualify as a sufficient condition 
for such agency being known to men? I do not think so. To say that 
it is essential that there should be something in the world, known to 
and by men, as counting as evidence of divine initiative is one thing. 
To say that putative historical events, like the Exodus or Return from 
Exile, can count as sufficient evidence of such agency seems to beg the 
question decisively. However, Hudson is not discussing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for some kind of supra-historical happenings 
which might be thought to demonstrate godly intentions towards mankind. 
He attempts to show that it makes sense to say in respect of the theis- 
tic claim that a bodiless agent has acted (or acts) within the world. 
The crucial issue here concerns the question of self-contradiction. I 
must make clear a distinction here between a contradiction and a self 
contradiction. The former may be illustrated by the idea of God being 
said to be man in the person of Christ: this forms one of the para- 
doxes of Christian belief. As such it plays a legitimate part in the 
theological talk of God. Here I am concerned with that apparent self- 
contradiction of attempting to speak of God, as transcendent being or 
Bodiless Agent, who is yet conceived to act spatio-temporally. 
Hudson points to the logical distinction which must be discerned 
between the concepts of agency and the overt actions attributed to 
such. In his 'uncle Fred' analogy, this distinction finds expression 
in the contrast between receiving uncle Fred's cheque and the action 
performed in the cheque being signed and drawn by him which may be 
seen as purposive agency at work. Hudson acknowledges that it would 
be possible to see uncle Fred signing the cheque in a way in which it 
would not be possible to see God initiating some action in'the world. 
If the logical distinction between the effects of a specific initiation 
of action and the initiating action itself can be sustained, it would 
seem that logically some intelligibility may be given to the concept 
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of bodiless agency acting spatio-temporally. Can it be sustained? 
Here we are facing a theistic problem of fundamental import. 
The first thing to be noticed is that there is not, fundamentally, 
an attempt to argue from events in the world, or from natural 
phenomena, to the existence of a creator. Here, we are intent more on 
showing how what we say about God's agency may be given support from 
within the 'form of life' which may be said to constitute the 
philosophy of Christian Theism. Given the theistic understanding of 
God as the Creator and Sustainer of the Universe, his activity in, and 
on behalf of, the world he has made is a corollary implied by that 
concept. The picture presented is of a god unbounded by space and 
time ('the Holy One who inhabits eternity') upholding and energising 
specific events in the world. This picture may fit the scientific 
picture of inter-action among and within atoms and molecules, planetary 
systems and inter-stellar space. 'Unbounded' in so far as it is held 
that divine spirit is not subject to limitations of human life or 
cosmic conditions. Rather it is the case that human beings and all 
that occurs in the world are dependent upon and kept in being by God's 
power. It would seem to be logically necessary to extend to certain 
events in the world the concept of the unlimited (or self-limiting) 
power of God. Having created the world and instantiated free respon- 
sible beings within it, his wish to intervene on their behalf would 
be justified. The ultimate intervention in the person of Christ may 
be seen within a framework of events initiated by divine agency. Here 
reasons are being provided to explain divine intervention - theo- 
logical reasons. Can we also speak of causes of events in terms of 
that agency? Granted that there are reasons why God should initiate 
events in the world, is it intelligible to speak of his causing those 
events to happen? A causes an object B to roll down a hill by 
projecting it with his foot. The gradient of the hill is the reason 
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why, at that particular situation, B moves as it does. In addition 
to the physical factors involved in B's projection forward, there is 
the possibility of A having resolved to kick it, although he might 
have done so accidentally. If the former is the case, we say that A 
had an intention to kick B. He deliberately caused it to roll down 
the hill. Had there been no hill there, his intention would have been 
frustrated. It is conceivable that B might have been moved without 
either an intentional act of a human or by human agency at all. Some 
sort of earth upheaval, severe weather conditions or a chance hitting 
of B by a force generated by some other natural cause might account 
for the event taking place. Clearly it is not a necessary coddition 
of object B rolling down a hill that intelligent agency should be 
associated with it. Were it the case that A intentionally kicked B 
to see it roll, a sufficient condition for its movement would be 
provided. 
In attributing certain events in the world (e. g. the return of 
the Jews to Jerusalem after 538 B. C. ), to the intentional activity of 
God, we recognise that a sufficient condition rather than a necessary 
condition is being stipulated for such an event. It can only be such 
when the theological interpretation put upon the event by 
bEzra, 
and 
by the prophets Haggai and Zechariah, is accepted as an intrinsic 
part of the story of the event. Cyrus' decree to liberate the Jews 
from Babylonian captivity would be just as relevant a sufficient 
condition for that happening, were it not for the divine attribution 
accorded to it by the narrators. They go beyond naming Cyrus as a 
sufficient cause of their return home. They establish a reason for 
the event in the providence of Yahweh for his people. In our' 
example of A propelling B down a slope, the reason for its occurence 
was said to be the nature of the terrain, namely the gradient of that 
hill. Beyond such a reason lies the prior one concerning the 
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gravitational pull on the earth's surface. It would be sensible to 
speak of Cyrus' diplomatic reason for liberating the Jews as being 
compatible with, and inspired by, God's purpose in saving his people. 
We have seen that there may be intentional or unintentional causes 
for B rolling down the slope. There is some X such that the con- 
junction of X with the position of B causes action C to occur. It 
is of course not unreasonable in the light of predictive prophecies 
by Jeremiah and Ezekiel (as well as those of Deutero-Isaiah), and of 
the overall covenant relationship between Yahweh and Israel, to postu- 
late that the X factor was divine agency. If Cyrus' diplomacy and 
God's purposes coalesced, the idea of God influencing Cyrus' decision 
to release the Jews is perfectly in order. We return here to the 
acknowledgement that the event itself is to be construed as a spatio- 
temporal event engineered by bodiless agency, untrammelled by the 
limitations of space and time. The ultimate instigator of the event 
is unseen by men. Only the historical phenomenon exists to proclaim 
his action. In Biblical terms, Cyrust defeat of the Babylonians was 
a divinely executed act which is presented as the necessary condition 
for the return home. Without such a victory, they were prisoners of 
a foreign power. Their chances of liberation were probably no better 
than those of the Hebrews enslaved in Egypt in Moses' day. The prior 
condition for speaking of God's purposes, expressed through covenant 
cult, law and prophet, is seen once more to be a logically necessary 
condition for theistic discourse. Logically the X factor in both 
the Exodus story and that of the Return from exile could be human 
agency. Within the 'form of life' which directed and informed the 
editors of the biblical tradition, it was inconceivable that such 
events could occur zpart from divine agency. Wonder may be excited 
by the enormity of the odds ranged against Israel on either occasion. 
Talk of miraculous happenings may be in order. Alternative human 
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explanations as to causes are possible. The notion that men communing 
in their spirits with God - the establishing of the covenant at the 
Edodus: the tightening up of the ritual laws during the Exile - and 
receiving spiritual help is recorded each time. In Hudson's distinc- 
tion between the causal factors of the action performed and the effects 
of it, we were shown that an interpretation inevitably was involved. 
The recipient of the cheque understood (that had happened. The 
Israelites understood (or came to understand) because of their 
spiritual experiences and perception (or at least that of their 
respective leaders) what events such as the Exodus and the Return from 
Exile entailed. They were participants in dramatic episodes which 
showed to them, by the interpretation they placed upon them, the 
instrumentality of the One who was without peers among the gods of his 
day, and whom to represent by any form of image was anathema to them. 
Thus it is within the boundaries set by linguistic rules, here the 
confines of the Theistic language-game, that speaking of human spirit 
and divine spirit meeting through specific physical events may be 
found to make sense. 
WhAT KIND OF GOD IS RECUIRED TO PROVIDE INTELLIGIBILITY TO 
THE CONCEPT OF AN ACTIVE BODILESS AGENT? 
While it would not cake sense to speak of a human action in the 
absence of an existent perpetrator of the action, it is less than 
satisfactory to attempt to establish in respect of divine activity the 
validity of the concept of necessary being. That a performs action b 
is a contingent matter, causally dependent upon prior conditions and 
antecedent factors of which the decision of a to do b is a primary one. 
It is performed in a world where empirical verification or falsification 
enables appropriate propositions to be formulated and tested. Theistic 
belief in a God who acts in the world presupposes, however, something 
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different. Suitable descriptions are 
cPannenberg's 
concepts of 'the 
origin of freedom' and 'the power of the future$ (or Tillich's 
'ground of our being') for they enable us to move away from talk of 
'existent' or 'necessary' being to concepts which offer some logical 
basis for understanding the idea of God. He is not here conceived to 
be one among a number of objects, but rather something other than a 
spatio-temporal entity. That is to say, although theists speak of 
divine agency at work within the events understood by men to consti- 
tute cosmic creativity and human history, they hold that this agency 
is itself independent of the media through which it is expressed. 
Although criticism has been directed. against the attempt to speak of 
a bodiless agent conceiving of and implementing physical events, the 
suggestion that such agency could be conveyed in certain spatio- 
temporal effects possesses logical coherence. For just as the 
message written on a letter is logically distinct from. the paper upon 
which it is written or the ink used to write it, so the effects of 
divine creativity may be seen to be logically distinct from the agent 
who instigated their manifestation as in the example cited from 
Hudson. It is for this reason that Pa. nnenberg's concepts provide 
suitable models for the principle of God's ultimate control. !; ants 
free-will is seen to be dependent upon a larger freedom ('the origin 
of freedom') from which it originates. And man's use of his freedom 
to make decisions for his future is subject to that 'power of the 
future' which his limited freedom prevents him from utilising. The 
necessity of speaking of power relates to the idea of taking an 
initiative, rather than to authoritarianism. It is of course, within 
the field of human experience - be it that of the people of Israel, 
of Jesus of Pýazareth, the Apostles or Christiana through the centuries 
- that theists maintain their belief about God's activity is focused. 
The sceptic may not be impressed by such putative claims to divine 
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agency in human affairs. Such agency is marked by love and justice, 
not by despotism: Cupitt may wish to recall that the 'power' is that 
of love not might. The theistic philosopher is concerned to demonstrate 
the logical soundness of the concept itself. Only by so doing may he 
be caved from a charge of unintelligibility. In seeking to chow that 
it is not self-contradictory to postulate divine agency through certain 
cpatio-temporal effects, some logical status for the concept may be 
accorded it. For the concept of revelation, and especially the 
experiential view which I am adopting, requires that the notion of 
encounter between God and man be given a coherent foundation in 
respect of what it makes sense to say of God as Bodiless Agent. 
In speaking of God'a motivation to act on behalf of man in self- 
revelation, we are referring to those dispositions of his character 
which Christian Theism holds to be fundamental: love, concern, passion 
for justice etc. Thus when we try to speak intelligibly about God, 
as understood within the definitive language which that theism holds 
to be constitutive of its beliefs, we are not postulating an abstrac- 
tion behind the manifestations of those characteristics in overt acts. 
It is as though I am here suggesting a behaviourist model in respect 
of God's redeeming acts. We have already spoken of the verb "exists" 
as a second order predicate, and so here. To be sure, it would be 
inappropriate to speak of God learning how to love, forgive, care, 
judge etc as we might do in describing a man's character. But the 
analogy holds sufficiently to enable us to say that God's actions in 
the world stem from, and express, his nature just as we might say of a 
gracious human that his kindness and compassion are reflections of his 
loving disposition. Thus there are reasons for holding God to have 
made man, guided, redeemed and saved him. The principal one is God1s 
character. By being what he is, he has been motivated to love his 
creatures, to redeem and draw them to himself. In the words of the 
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Bible God is spirit is love and is good. He is defined as such. Thus 
we are able to subsume under a general law what may intelligibly be 
said of God having motives in his dealings with mankind. This is to 
say something other than to speak of God causing X to happen. Heavy 
rainfall may cause a river to burst its banks: that is an explanation 
as to why it occurred on that occasion. It is to say something 
different, however, to refer to the river's tendency to flood when 
surplus water flows along its bed. Thus a general rule may be 
applied in this case to the effect that, whenever excess water is 
added to the normal flow of a river, it will tend to burst its banks. 
The heavy rain was the cause; the nature of the river, qua river, was 
the reason why it overflowed. So we speak of a man+s tendency to lose 
his temper as a dispositional feature of his character. Psychological 
and conditioning, perhaps genetic, factors will play their part in 
helping to shape that character. An observer will predict, on the 
basis of his knowledge of that man's character that, given certain 
circumstances, he will lose his temper. Any one of a number of causes 
for this happening may obtain: the reason can be given as the disposi- 
tion of his character. So, God's tendency, as understood within 
Christian Theism, is to love men and to seek to convey that love to 
men by revealing himself to them. In a sense, it might be said that 
man's sinfulness has been a cause of God's intervention on man's 
behalf, although the Bible tells us that God intended to reach out 
towards his creatures in saving power prior to those events associated 
with human wrong-doing. 
dG. Ryle in his 'Concept of Mind' taught us to avoid the 
conceptual error of 'the ghost in the machine' principle. Thus he 
demonstrated how in speaking of the motives for a man's action wo 
should not search for 'occult' explanations, abstractly believed to 
reside in the mind, but to recognise that such motives are dispositionally" 
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founded. He cites the instance of a hotel proprietor who, in his 
desire for more money, cultivates politeness and consideration for his 
guests. Ryle points out that motives may be complex and in a way in 
conflict. The proprietor's greed, -. therefore, might not seem praise- 
worthy yet his good manners, designed to facilitate the pursuance of a 
baser motive of greed, would be accorded praise. I have tried to show 
how in speaking of God's motives in taking action on behalf of man (by 
revealing himself in a number of ways), we do not need to seek for 
hidden, mysterious or even (because they are said to relate to God) 
essentially unknown entities to explain his motives. That is not to 
say, of course, that man's understanding is capable of grasping God's 
mind in all its fulness. Rather is it to show how, in linguistic 
terms, what we are saying of God having motives for revealing himself 
to man is simply to rehearse those basic attributes which the Christian 
religion has ascribed to him. 
It will be said that I have really spoken of human motivation in 
speaking of God. The problem of making sense of talk of the divine 
through the medium of language reserved usually for human affairs, 
bedevils philosophy of religion. I have spoken analogically. So, 
likewise, the bogy of mind might be thought to be irrelevant in 
referring to the concept of bodiless agent. I can only here draw upon 
Wittgenstein. He stresses the shifting of the issue. Intelligibility 
is to be sought, therefore, in the direction of looking to see how we 
use language in a specific lange-game. Here it is that of Theism 
and Biblical exposition. For it is a defining feature of Revelation 
that God himself has made known the characteristics which enable us to 
discuss his motivation in so revealing himself. To be sure, theologi- 
cal scholarship would have us recognise the human element seen in the 
redactive editing of sources and in the prophetic voice, etc. Again, 
however, we must reply that it is a constitutive fact of Theistic 
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belief that, in some way or another, these editors and proclaimers, 
through their faith and insight, were able to speak godly thoughts. 
Does this reduce attempts to speak of the divine voice to that of 
human talk? I have tried to analyse this problem. Hudson stresses 
the need to view our speaking about the concept of God in the light of 
the content given to that concept by Christ: this, he points out, is 
the distinctively Christian element. I have looked at Wittgenstein's 
acceptance of fundamental propositions as a basis for language games: 
also his contention that our beliefs ultimately rest upon others 
which lack presuppositions. I shall now examine Wittgenstein's 
philosophy in relation to the problem of identifying God. 
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CHAPTER TWMY ONE 
WITTGE? STEIN AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING GOD 
Sense, explanation and meaning 
AWittgensteinºs belief that the mystical could not be spoken 
about, only shown, might seem to preclude talk of God. However, his 
later philosophy provides us with an intelligible medium for theistic 
discourse: the appropriate language game. As we have seen, this 
centres upon the constitutive concept of religion, namely belief in 
god. Considered to be a fundamental proposition of theistic discourse, 
we may say that explanation and meaning are to be discerned within 
the boundaries of that language game. What it makes sense to say 
hinges upon the intelligibility of propositions which acquire coherence 
by reference to their use there. however, it is to be recalled that, 
in his Tractatus, Wittgenstein spoke both of bedeutung and sinn 
(reference and sense) as being required to give meaning to a propo- 
sition: such meaning was inherent in the truth-functional calculus 
conditions which obtain within logical space and are demonstated by 
logical form. That is to say, the sense of a proposition is subject 
to verificationist testability in events of the world (a state of 
affairs), yet the method of indicating such is itself shown and not 
stated. Wittgenstein spoke of the propositions of logic being 
tautologies or contradictions: symbolically they are significant, 
although they say nothing. They lack sense$ yet are the method of 
showing hoer events in the world may be spoken of in propositions 
which, as he believed at the time of the ºTractatusº, mirror reality. 
? ow while his position shifted dramatically in his later 
philosophy, we may wonder whether his talk of the mystical and of 
this being shown rather than being capable of manifestation in 
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objective terms may not analogically be connected with what he says of 
the propositions of logic being without sense, yet symbolically 
significant. If we are to take the view that the mystical in some 
way embraces what we have held to be #Codt, it may make sense to speak 
of this concept as lacking sense yet having significance. For by 
definition, we are not trying to say something about contingent facts 
of the world. There is neither bedeutung nor sinn in regard to the 
mystical. But our concern has been to discuss traditional Judaeo- 
Christian beliefs in the light of Wittgenstein's later philosophy: as 
a language game in which it can be shown that intelligibility resides 
within the discourse itself, not in respect of points of reference 
beyond it. 'The explanation of meaning is the meaning. ' The sense of 
theistic propositions is something about the world, given the idea 
that God reveals himself to men in the world. Yet we have hot solved 
the issue, inevitably, of sceptical criticisms about evidence beyond 
Theistic claims concerning putative historical events. We should be 
informed that, even on the later Wittgenstein's terns, the concept of 
God lacks sense. It would of course be conceded that talk of Jesus of 
Nazareth is an empirical matter. 
bSo historical propositions as ouch 
are one thing; trying to make sense of theological ones is something 
quite different. Is the situation caved by putting them beyond sense? 
I moan by this question, that there might seem to be a way towards 
achieving a modus operandi for speaking about God here, It would 
enable us to avoid the charge of unintelligibility as would be the 
case if such were associated with what turned out to be more gibberish. 
That theistic assertion is not this, is widely, I believe, recognised. 
Implicitly it is accepted that believers maintain an honourable 
tradition of human thought and practice. It would be conceded, by 
many humanists, I think, that the word 'god' possessed more than 
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circumstantial placement in the ideologies of earlier ages. now, 
however, they might aver its lack of sense in a technocratic, secular 
world. Without wishing to suggest that unbelievers should be 
encouraged to call the tune as to what can count as theistic 
propositions, it might appear that meaning requires that attention be 
paid to the concepts of reference and sense. 
It will be recalled that Wittgenstein spoke of bedeutung and sinn 
- reference and sense - as being the criteria for demonstrating that 
an empirical proposition can occupy a position in logical space. 
They likewise depict logical form. If it be said that theistic 
propositions lack sense, but do not reduce to gibberish, is it con- 
ceivable to speak of the logical form of theistic belief as being 
shown but not stateable? Just as a tautology or a contradiction say 
nothing about the world (a state of affairs) yet display logical form 
and evince the logical space in which empirical, (contingent) claims 
about the world can be made, co perhaps what Wittgenstein calls the 
mystical, as he himself tells us in the Tractatus, may, by its being 
shown in some way or another, point to the logic of theistic concern. 
I cannot see how such a construction could take us into the prolix 
sphere of theistic dialogue, characteristic of philosophy of religion. 
It might conceivably provide a link, however, with Wittgenstein's 
emphasis in tOn Certainty' upon fundamental propositions which are 
said to be about those things which are there 'like our life' and at 
the 'bottom of all our language games'. By seeking to find an exit 
from the labyrinth of the quest for sense in talk about God, we may 
be taking a step in the right direction. If the mystical, logically 
speaking, may be conceived as being beyond (as empirically it is seen 
to be), truth or falsehood, in its not speaking of contingent matters 
of the world, it might gain significance, rather than sense, by being 
understood an the foundation for what then can be said e. g. historical 
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propositions, propositions purporting to give experiences of believers, 
propositions about forms of religious observance and worship etc. If 
this is so, it would then be possible to investigate the second-order 
data which form the material comprising the theistic language game or 
games. What is capable of being said in a sensible manner is then 
discovered to be that which relates to human experience. And this, of 
course, is to be expected and is both the ground for my attempting to 
find the $roots of reference' in the kerygmatic proclamation, the 
didache etc of the early Christian communities, and the source of 
understandable scepticism in the minds of unbelievers, who are inclined 
to accuse theists of reducing talk about God to that of humans. If, 
however, the explanation of the meaning is the meaning, some attempt 
at explanation of theistic propositions is required and, necessarily 
(given Wittgenstein's remarks about the mystical) they will be 
explanations of that meaning disclosed in the use to which theistic 
propositions are put. As in the case of the early church, it will be 
in the context of the modern Christian community and in the discourse 
which is there adopted that the meaning of such propositions may be 
ascertained. But this in simply to reiterate the point that rational 
man indulge in a particular language-Came, and thereby are enabled to 
discuss and, through worship, practise their beliefs. 
This can be set out schematically in accordance with the later 
Wittgenstein's teachings. Suppose, for example, we acknowledge his 
shift from any attempt to identify simples as being the referents of 
atomic propositions (of which complex propositions were held to be 
truth functions) to the request for samples to show how a word is 
used - where it has its 'home'. It would enable Christians to seize 
upon the fact of Christ as the example or examplar without equal, whom 
his followers over the centuries have sought to emulate, and to point 
to 'Saints' who have come nearest to achieving that objective. They 
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would havo Biblical and ecclesiastical support for sich a procedures 
'Let this mind be in you, that was in Christ Jesus' (St Paul); 'Looking 
unto Jesus, the author and finichor of our faith' (Epiotle to the Febr ws) 
, -nd the thorn of the 'Ilitatio Chriati' by x Kempffs, boing c plea. 
We might further reck to chow that the rube which regulate what 
can and cannot be said within Theism and the criteria by which those 
rules have become cstabliabod, emanate fron'the Christian co unities, 
past and present. This would be aeon to be ca once we were able to 
appreciate the depth graxunar which the form of life, characteristic of 
Christian faith, manifested. Thus we would be led to understand that 
the logical status of Theistic language is discernible, not bfr dicoe- 
tion of bolieveral assertions by means of the propositional calculus 
which would permit the respective signs of the propositions themselves 
to be interpreted aright, but by correct learning of those words and 
phrases which constitute the essence of Christian belief. In this 
way understanding of what in said within the Theistic language Cams 
would be demonstrated. 
All this, however, might appear to leave the central issue 
implicit within the concept of revelation untouched. If by bin early 
analysis, Wittgenstein in at least partial agreement with Russells 
might have spoken of a failure to interpret a sign in the proposition 
adequately in speaking of Clod, (and to by implication, no far an 
Logical Positivist thought was concerned, for e ple as stated by 
Ayer in his early philosophy a failure to eliminate unarlynable or 
wrongly analysed concepts); in his later philosophy we find that the 
notion of God in to be regarded as an integral element of what theists 
have to say. Reference (todeutung) and Sense (Sinn) have now become 
ineluctibly bound up with linguistic criteria. To discover the meaning 
of what one intends when one speaks of Cod's activity (especially, in 
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our case, his revealing activity) one must look and see how the 
doctrine is spoken about by Theists. Willingness to learn alongside 
Christians what is said of this doctrine will enable one to come to 
an understanding of what is entailed by it. Explanation of meaning 
is the meaning. 
We have argued that Wittgenstein's adoption of the notion of 
fundamental propositions to elucidate epistemological questions, such 
as those relating to the juxtaposition of belief, knowledge, doubt 
and certainty, has given us the lead in adopting, as Hudson does, 
the concept of god as a constitutive concept for religious belief. 
This simply means that without belief in god, in some form or another 
(however or whatever he is conceived to be) nothing can be said by 
Theists - there could be no Theistic language game. It would seem 
that the sceptic's barb has been blunted if not put out of action by 
the adoption of this procedure. For if we are entitled to take for 
granted the notion of god, just as we take for granted physical 
objects in our scientific discourse, or the idea of coral judgements 
in our ethical discussions, we are 'home and dry' in respect of 
seeking philosophical ground for speaking of God and his alleged 
activities. 
It will be clear that my suggestion earlier that Wittgenstein's 
treatment of the mystical and his contention that logical fora can 
only be shown and not stated would seem to be reflected in that aspect 
of his later philosophy which, finding meaning not in reference beyond 
language but within language itself, craw fundamental propositions to 
be the indispensible factor in providing a logical terminus for what 
we are able to say. The later Wittgenstein uses the phrase 'there 
is no such thing as .. .' and spoke of the sense of a proposition as 
being demonstrated by its method of representation. I attempted to 
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explore the possibility of the word 'god' beiký7 conceived to be 
sir-nificant although lacking sense in so far that, like the propo- 
sitions of logic, it cannot be a matter of contingent facts in the 
world: no state of affairs could be conceived to exist to which we 
rar adduce evidential criteria. It looked as though the concept of 
god might be placed in this area. This being so, we can see how the 
form or method of representation of theistic propositions, especially 
those which refer to, and stem from, the kerygmatic proclamation 
through which the Christian concept of revelation has been histori- 
cally transmitted, has again and again drawn us into the net of 
linguistic practice. Thus it has been to the extent that words have 
been clarified that understanding has been Cleaned. Wittgenstein 
speaks of language remaining closed in within itself and so autono- 
mous. The Fray we see the world, the method of our representation of 
the picture we hold, exhibits those grammatical rules which appropriate 
learning evince. 
In the light of this it seems to be inescapable that the concep- 
tion of revelation we have endeavoured to analyse is ineluctibly 
bound up with out method of representation, grammatically projected 
from the collective understanding of participation in the theistic 
language game. 
Something is now required of Wittgenstein's concern about the 
method of representation and its capability of being confused with 
what is being represented, thus perpetuating illusion instead of 
providing insight. Wittgenstein's insistence upon the 'autonomy of 
grammar' is related to . our forms of representation. Given a Parti- 
cular form of representation, prompted by the exigencies of societal 
and ideological formulations, it is in effect our language which 
constitutes that form of representation. What we must not do, however, 
is to take our grammar as a projection of reality. Instead of this, 
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Wittr-enstein asks us to take our conception of the structure of 
reality to be a projection of our grammar (presumably what we conceive 
'reality' to be). 
When I endeavoured to use the Tractatus concept of logical form 
being shown rather than said, and noting the corollary of this 
assertion, namely that propositions of logic (tautologies or contra- 
dictions) lacked sense yet had significance, I postulated for the 
concept of 'god' a similar placement in 'logical space'. I also 
tried to show that what can be said, rather than simply shown within 
Theism were all those propositions which express various aspects 
of belief associated with the kerygmatic proclamation, through which 
Christian Theism initially was formulated, enabling; rules to be 
established for a language game, the criteria for which resides in 
empirical events of early Christendom. I have been able to show that 
the doctrine of the 'autonomy of grammar' enables us to erect an 
intelligible structure or edifice of theistic discourse for which its 
fundamental propositions are determinative. Because it would not make 
sense to doubt a fundamental proposition, since it lies beyond empiri- 
cal verification or falsification, but is rather 'there like our life', 
that which we are obliged to take for granted (for to fail to do so 
would be to plunge us into a quagmire of unintelligibility and 
incoherence), we are lifted above the rigors of truth-conditional 
formulae. We are not however removed from the necessity to observe 
that a fundamental proposition logically yields criteria for enabling 
a language to be learned, and necessitates the formulation of rules 
which indicate the various moves within the appropriate language game. 
Our talk of god, then, conceived to be axiomatic for theistic discourse, 
is the starting point for all that is to be said, whether by way of 
empirical facts as to the origins and development of Christianity, or 
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the minutiae of devotional worship, or the nexus of propositions 
whereby logical coherence is sought. Once established, Theism can be 
seen to appeal to those concepts which the "autonomy of grammar" 
permits to be verbalised as being integral components of a language- 
game. All the tension and worry, badgered as one is by agnostic 
demands for tangible evidence in support of Theistic assertions as to 
God's revelation to man, is dissipated once it is clearly seen that 
evidence is not the criterion for speaking of God. This is to say 
no more, as has previously been indicated, than to say of other areas 
of discourse that evidence is inappropriate in physics, for example, 
where the uniformity of nature or the existence of physical objects 
are not subjects for dispute or concern in the task of testing 
hypotheses and enlarging our understanding of physics. The historian, 
likewise, in his research into a particular poriod of time and into 
the influences, social, economic, political etc which helped to 
shape events of-that period, does not find it intelligible to ponder 
whether the earth existed then. What is at stake is the coherence of 
what is said within the respective language games of physics and 
history. Fundamental propositions concerning the uniformity of 
nature, the existence of physical objects (or sub-atomic particles? ), 
or the great age of the world all enable sensible things to be said 
by the physicist and the historian in their respective spheres of 
interest. So the Theist, with the fundamental proposition concerning 
belief in god as his accepted basis for discussion is able to debate 
important issues of belief. By putting the problem of the existence 
of god beyond empirical truth conditional methodology, he is able to 
proceed with other matters. Does this mean that, within Theism talk 
of god is intelligible and capable of use in numerous Theistic 
proclamations and assertions of belief, while without or outside 
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Theism, it could be argued that the concept of god, given the general 
assumption of evidential criteria for empirical propositions used by 
people in daily life, lacks sense but not significance? It lacks 
sense because it has nothing to offer to the empirical enquirer, 
subject as he is to space-time criteria, and dependent upon obser- 
vation, hypothesis and testing procedures. It has significance in so 
far as oven he, qua modern, secular man, can, although he functions 
outside the boundaries of theistic thinking, recognise that rational 
people indulge in worship, exhortation and morally guided social 
activities which fall within his frame of reference. 'God' is not 
a referential entity, but no matter; language in the broad day-by-day 
exercise of human communication, has criteria and rules for its use 
and reference is to be discovered by learning correctly how to use 
phrases words and sentences in thoir appropriate setting. The 
unbeliever has the opportunity to translate that which lacks sense 
but which has obvious significance into a something new where under- 
standing and meaning stem from a correct learning of the language, 
and so come to appreciate how autonomous grammar, not dependent upon 
reference points in empirical observation can, in this particular 
matter, show the sense of theistic asssertions. 
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE 
aI have used Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Philosophical Investigations 
and On Certainty and have also drawn upon W. D. Hudson's 
disucssion of the twin concepts of bedeutung and sinn in his book 
Wittgenstein and Religious Belief MacMillan, 1975 in this chapter. 
b NIELSON, Kai: Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Modern 
Introductions to Philosophy Series) London, MacMillan, 1982 
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CHAPTER TI- ; TY TWO 
JUSTIFYING AND VALIDATING CLAIMS TO A KTNOWLEDGE OF GOD 
From the views discussed appertaining to existence in a philo- 
sophical sense, I would like to draw some conclusions concerning 
Theistic talk about God's existence and activity in the world. Since 
I presupposed at the start of my dissertation that God exists, my 
as 
interest is in seeking rational criteria for speaking of God, An some 
way being said to be known by man, as a consequence of His revelation 
to man. 
I rejected Cupitt's proposition that the concept of god as 
existent beyond the self is no longer tenable by arguing that, in my 
view, the kerygma and its attendant language game can provide a 
logical setting for the concept of god, as traditionally understood 
by Christians. I thus related what I have subsequently sought to say 
about God to Wittgenstein's request that it is as we examine the 
depth grammar of a language game that its system of representation 
can be ascertained. The representation of the god about whom the 
kerygma speaks is to be discerned by due attention being paid to 
that grammar, and those fundamental propositions upon which it rests. 
I discussed the view, held by Russell and others, that the verb 
'exists' might properly be called a secondary predicate and, as 
such, serves to establish the location of primary predicates which 
describe a particular object. To the extent that I have accepted 
this view, it is necessary to establish the primary characteristics 
of God. It would therefore be in the attribution of those character 
identifications which Christians ascribe to God 
(his loving nature, 
his justice, his goodness etc) that the verb 'exists' would find 
meaning. A? o sense could be granted this assertion, I believe, unless 
the prior acceptance, by response in trust ('belief in' - the commissive 
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element of beliefs about the Christian God) to the kerygmatic 
proclamation was made. Hence it is in the playing of the appropriate 
language game of Christian Theistic belief, and in being involved in 
the form of life of Christian persuasion, that 'exists' in respect 
of divine attributes of love, justice, goodness etc can be applied; 
and the issue turns upon whether it can be shown to be rational to 
play that game. 
However, I discussed at some length, Russell's request that a 
knowledge claim by description must be analysed in terms of a claim 
to acquaintance with the constituents of that description. I believe 
that my attempt to apply his formula, using universals in relation 
to a specific instance of a particular to enable identification of 
that particular to be established, to Christ was not entirely mistaken, 
once the stipulation about the language game is acknowledged. So 
talk of acquaintance with Christ through faith, and so through the 
kind of response the Apostles required, to enable unbelievers to step 
over the line into an assured position of 'knowing' the One in whom 
they had exercised trust, became intelligible. All this requires a 
descriptive framework to clarify theological ideas. Yet I conceded, 
as indeed I must$ that Russell would no doubt wish to refute my 
application of his doctrine to an assumed existential encounter with 
some-one whom, for him, mere historical location might be secured. 
The fact that Russell changed his mind about knowledge by acquain. 
tance, while retaining an empiricist view of knowledge, was duly 
noted. 
It was thus, to Wittgenstein's discussion of the 'mystical' and 
to his teaching that bedeutung, in addition to sinn, raust be indicated 
for an empirical proposition to be valid that I turned. Recognising, 
as in the case of Russell's earlier preoccupation with acquaintance 
with the immediate contents of our sensory faculties, that the 
_289- 
doctrine of the Tractatun was clearlyn°ý`intended to provide criteria 
for speaking of putative knowledge of God, I pursued Wittgenstein's 
distinction between the sense of a proposition and its possible 
significance even where sense could not be made of it. In doing 
this, I moved with Wittgenstein away from a referential theory of 
meaning (which appears to have dogged Russell's efforts) to his view 
that the explanation of the meaning is the meaning and that the pre- 
requisite understanding to provide such an explanation necessarily 
(logically) depends upon one's grasp of the grammar of a language 
game. However, I felt that Wittgenstein's earlier talk of significance 
where existential reference could, for logical reasons (e. g. in the 
case of tautologies) obtain, was not without value in my efforts to 
pass from a discussion of problems relative to existence, per so, to 
a discussion about the object of revelation, conceived to be about 
what is existent. Ilan's knowledge is considered possible to the 
extent that God is believed to have disclosed Himself to receptive 
men. 
The latter aspect of the matter does of course point ahead to 
further discussion of the part played by the knower in the process 
of coning to know, and in being persuaded of one's rihht to make a 
knowledge claim in a given situation. I shall argue that although 
the distinction between first person and thiid person assertions is 
important, ray experiential view of divine revelation to man requires 
both first and third person aspects to enable an intelligible view 
to be maintained. However, if, an I argued in a previous chapter 
the verb 'to know', while having general usage in our language and, 
while suggesting 'success' rather than the inquisitive and explora- 
tory character of the verb 'to believe', requires logical placing 
within a language game to enable us to discover how it is being used, 
it is in the uniqueness of the kerygmatic language game that attempts 
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to grasp what 'knowing Gods means will be appropriate. If, further, 
the logical kinship of believing, knowing and doubting is acknowledged, 
one's being in a position to know will reflect that openness to a 
situation which a first person concept presupposes. It might be said 
that this is a move to blur the distinction, which I appear to have 
made by my reference to 'know$ being a success verb. I do not think 
that this should be so understood. For the prior condition which I 
have specified as to the need to investigate how the verbs to believe 
and to know are being used within a language game helps to clear up 
this apparent confusion. And so it is with the discussion I have 
undertaken in respect of the verb to exist. The knotty problem of 
its application for Theism has, I have argued, ultimately to be 
resolved, as in the case of physical objects, in relation to those 
fundamental propositions which are beyond empirical justification. 
In his, perhaps hesitant, attempt to make a knowledge claim 
from the position of 'belief in' which the Christian commissively 
adopts, he may say that he is justified in his attempt. For to deny 
a form of knowledge in respect of having understood what God's 
saving acts mean for him would involve him in a self-contradiction. 
That this is to say no more than that acceptance of the idea of 
God's initiatory activities in the Christ event and in its precursors 
of the Old Testament dispensation, is incumbent upon him, qua 
believer, is to state a truism. It will be objected that an idea is 
logically distinct from a putative empirical event. Yet given the 
presuppositions upon which the concept of revelation rests the 
believer could do no other than assent to the proposition that, in 
Christ, he believes that he has encountered God* in assenting to 
this proposition he thus lays claim, however tentatively, to the 
further proposition that, in some way or another, he has (and he 
does) have an experience of (or with) God. Can he, or is he required, 
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to validate the claim? 
What would it mean to validate this claim that, in response to 
the kerygma, and in entering-into a form of life which is mirrored 
in the Christian language game which he plays as a consequence, he 
has some (perhaps very limited) knowledge of God Himself? To avoid 
the question by claiming logical immunity, in the sense of making the 
matter a purely verbal one, would not seem to suffice. For a know- 
ledge claim to be a bone fide one permits a sceptic to challenge the 
claimant as to how he is in a position to know in this respect. 
This request takes us once again into the arena of Wittgenstein's 
discernment that meaning is ineluctibly bound up with the use to 
which words are put. It in not in the 'idling' of language that we 
shall discover pragmatic usage. Any demand for validation, there- 
fore, of Christian claims to know God through encounter with Him 
requires the kind of scrutiny of the language game which I have 
indicated. The avoidance of the charge that such a procedure is a 
purely verbal one, and as such cannot qualify as a genuine knowledge 
claim, can be made here. For the., language gerne, as we have seen, is 
that verbal expression of response to the Apostolic proclamation, 
which adverts to and emanates from a form of life wherein, in 
principle, questions of falsification and verification apply. 
I do not think that I am confusing conceptual with empirical 
propositions or indulging in category mistakes. For it has been 
central to my argument to stress the factual data which form the 
basis of the kerygma. The Apostles proclaimed a proclaimer who had 
announced to the Jews of Galilee and Jerusalem a gospel of love and 
justice, and eventually died for his views. His coterie of followers 
found in Him the clue to the identity of the God in whom they had 
been taught to believe. Their ancestral belief was in God who was 
said by the narrators and prophets of their Scriptures to have 
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revealed Himself through theophany, legal enactments and prophetic 
voice. flow they were convinced, at least in retrospect, that that 
God had disclosed Himself more fully than hitherto in the person and 
teachings of Jesus. In the light of all this, it would not seem to 
make sense to say that a believer in God who has identified himself 
with the form of life established by the Apostles and, in sorge 
measure, perpetuated in come ecclesiastical fellowships, could ignore 
the implications of the response his commitment demonstrates. The 
modern believer, qua believer, assents to those propositions which 
his willingness to heed the gospel led him to entertain in a positive 
way. 
Such a positive approach is entirely in keeping with Wittgenstein's 
idea of religious belief being a matter of holding a picture -a world- 
view - ever before one. For the participant in the Christian form of 
life today may be said to be influenced cognitively, affectively and 
volitionally. If he is sincere, he is necessarily (that is, logically) 
committed to both those constative and commissive elements to which 
his 'belief in$ God lead him. It makes sense for him to say that he 
encounters God through those practices within the form of life in 
which he participates. Some would put emphasis upon communion with 
God through the Eucharist; others would stress prayer or fellowship 
or perhaps consciousness of being guided or possessing peace. In the 
light of his belief that God is Ultimate Demand and Final Succour 
(two notions which I mentioned in my introductory chapter) all of 
this would make good sense. MIy concern has been to try to argue that 
in attempting to make a knowledge claim in respect of encounter 
between himself and His Creator, the Christian utilises verbal criteria 
to establish experiential validation, Not only may he be said to be 
justified in making the claim, but he may claim validity for it 
within the logical structure of the game he plays. 
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It may be said, then, that the 'knowledge that$ element has been 
shown to be historical, concerning events long ago which provided a 
basis for the kerygma, wherein modern believers are able to discover 
understanding concerning the importance of the Christ-event for belief 
in God. The 'knowing how' aspect has been corrrvborated in the company 
of believers who find assurances of the presence of God through 
worship, fellowship and service. Here they utilise performatives to 
express praise and petitionary supplication to a God about whom they 
have learned and to whom they have conscious awareness of being 
related in a bond. In pointing to empirical manifestations of what 
the knowledge is to which Christians lay claim and in arguing that 
the form of life in which it finds practical expression demonstrates 
where reference and meaning may be sought today, I have given to the 
word 'experience' something of its customary usage. In so doing, I 
believe that I have countered the kind of philosophical thinking of 
T. Miles, D. Phillips and D. Cupitt. They want to deny to extant 
Christian religious observance and practice anything other than an 
expression of unconditional commitment. While each one give_ his own 
exposition of what he conceives Christian belief to be, they agree 
in avoiding or negating the traditional view of an existent God who 
enters into a relationship with his human creatures through response 
to Him by faith and trust. I have attempted to find logical support 
for my view that to say that one has an experience of God is to use 
words normally, while allowing for the largeness and the complexity 
of the subject. I have principally done so by examining what it 
makes sense to say within Theistic discourse. It has been a salient 
feature of my att6npt to elucidate this that cot only a language 
game but a form of life exist. To the question, how can one know 
God? I have been able to reply, look and see how the tae is played. 
And it has been made clear, I hope, that when one looks one finds 
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the language of encounter and response. The encounter cannot be 
written off as mere imagination for the notion resides deep within 
the autonomous grammar of the game and is thus an integral and 
crucial element of it. An experiential view of revelation requires 
some reference beyond the self to justify it. 
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CHAPTER TWENTY THREE 
CONCLUSION 
KNOWING GOD WITHIN THE FORM OF LIFE OF CHRISTIAN THEISM 
My experiential view of revelation has led me to a position 
wherein an assumed knowledge by acquaintahcoe has been transformed, or 
at least considerably modified and qualified, to become Knowledge by 
description. I have shown that first person claims to know that p, 
when conceived to be claims 1concerning encounter with 
God through 
personal, direct experience, require third person descriptive 
accounts to explicate them in conceptual terms. Reference to concepts 
has been shown to specify learned understanding, which enables the 
one who describes to indicate whatever intelligibility attaches to 
them. This, in turn, has been seen to be ineluctibly bound up with 
the autonomous grammar of a particular area of discourse, in this 
case that pertaining to Christian Theism. The system of represen- 
tation does not project on to reality that grammar, but is informed 
by it and enables a sincere enquirer to ascertain and to identify 
crucial guide-lines. It has been at the centre of my argument to 
locate in theologically interpreted historical events - the so called 
Christ event or kerygma. Since this has a clear empirical element in 
respect of certain historical propositions, to say that my experien- 
tial view of revelation is determined by rules which the criteria of 
the autonomous grammar impose is not to conceptualise a non-referential 
entity. The distinction which philosophers recognise between empirical 
and logical propositions is found here. I have attempted to examine 
the logic of a language came to seek meaning for the concept, in a 
Christian sense, of encounter between God and man. 
Knowledge by description will require conceptual land marks but 
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also empirical reference. I believe that my twin categories 
mentioned above provide these two requirements. Thus there is a 
state of affairs without which concepts alone could not explicate 
the idea of experience of God. Yet it has been found to be through 
pertinent ideas, instantiated through long usage and refinement 
within a form of life, that explanation for a believer today is to 
be achieved. It would be relevant to say that the knowledge by 
acquaintance which the Apostolic encounter with Christ presupposes, 
has become the knowledge by description which features in the 
Christian language game today. As Russell moved from an adherence 
to knowledge by acquaintance (in the sense of direct awareness of 
the constituents of a proposition) towards a concern for "basic 
propositions' (being those which are caused as immediately as 
possible by perceptive experiences), so, with Wittgenstein's 
prompting, I have attempted to explicate knowledge of God by 
providing for ideas of the Christian language game, a denotation 
determined by rules. Such rules have been shown to be uniquely 
determined by an autonomous grammar, kerygmatically instituted and 
theologically sustained. To the extent that such description is able 
to he demonstrated as a description of reflexive verbs and nouns, I 
agree with Moore that to describe accurately is to lend to the con- 
cept of knowledge a greater perspicuity than to trust fallible 
perceptive verdicts of what one takes to be the case. In any case, 
it has been shown that the pure sense datum postulate finds little 
support in regard to issues of perception. And I have argued that 
the unadorned acquaintance with God through first person experience 
can only, I hold, be given meaning when set within a descriptive 
framework. The kerygma proclaimed events theologically interpreted. 
That interpretation was not only of the Christ event, although it 
centred on such, it also harked back to prophetic utterance, the Law 
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and even to creation. Putative happenings, considered to be set in 
motion by divine agency provided the substance for theological 
explanation of what precisely experience of God can be said to be. 
The consequent 'grammar' of the 'game' therefore focuses upon those 
vital elements which a modern believer would need to grasp, to some 
extent, to understand the explanation of the meaning of propositions 
concerning encounter with Christ. 
But what-does the believer know? My reference prericusly 
to knowledge of ideas relative to the kerygma would appear to be 
damaging if such ideas are segregated from the form of life of 
Christian belief. How, then$ can the participant in that 'form of 
life' stake a knowledge claim concerning God? I think he may do so 
in so far as a number of threads of my argument for an experiential 
view of revelation are brought together. Firstly, I have studiously 
avoided a referential theory of meaning, and tried to expound 
Wittgenstein's doctrine that the explanation of a proposition is the 
meaning, by careful analysis of his contextual theory of meaning. 
From this I have attempted to say that for 'god' to find a logical 
placing in human verbal communication, the concept itself must be 
seen to be a fundamental proposition which constitutes religious 
belief. Secondly, I have argued that, in one sense at least, the 
'roots of reference' may be said to be found in language (to quote 
Quine). To this assertion may be added the caveat (as in the cases 
of Quino, Russell, Ayer etc) that an empirical proposition must 
never be allowed to be too far removed from perceptual entities for 
which some kind of direct obseruation mould be possible. While 
stressing the distinction between the logic of propositions relative 
to an experiential concept of revelation and empirical elements in 
the Judaco-Christian tradition, I have been able to postulate a dual 
foundation for knowledge claims in this sphere. This provides a kind 
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of empirical and, in principle, verifiable element. The first is 
encapsulated in those historical propositions which enable the 
kerygma to be viewed as the sine qua non of Christian Theistic 
belief. These are, of course, not only those which speak of the 
life and work of Jesus, but events depicted in other partscof the 
Bible, in both Old and New Testaments. The second has been discussed 
in relation to the practice of religion: ceremonies, devotions, 
prayers, activities and in relation to the performative language 
which gives to the sentences, phrases and words of the kerygraatic 
language gare, and associated form of life, a certain ultimacy for 
the bbliever. They enable him to feel, ponder and reflect upon those 
emotions, thoughts and wishes which comprise the ideological body of 
the Faith. 
Thirdly, I have attempted to say that in place of (or perhaps in 
harmony with) sensibly aroused concepts, there are ideologically 
aroused concepts which inspire, comfort, guide and stimulate those 
who are involved in the form of life. It can, I have argued, be said 
in this respect that ideas are instantiated and so acquire an 
objectivity appropriate to their source and subject matter. By 
being implicated in the procedure, by dint of his having responded to 
the proclamation of God's self disclosure supremely, although not 
only, in the Christ event, the believer as knower has been found to 
play an important part in the process of knowing God. he does not 
originate this procedure but by assenting to its primal challenge, to 
trust and obey him of whom the kerygma speaks, he confirms its truth 
claiming capacity. I suggest, therefore, that the idea (supreme 
among the several-ideas which may be said to be instantiated within 
the Theistic language game concerning God and Christ) of God 
revealing Himself to free humans, carries positive connotations of an 
epistemological nature. 
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First, the believer is privy: - to ideas which his involvement in 
a way of life and his indication thereby of absorption of moral 
imperatives and compassionate concern for others, establishes. 
Secondly, these ideas are positive in speaking generally of God's 
interest in humanity and particularly of specific acts of creation, 
redemption and salvation which it would not be logically possible to 
distort or deny within the area of discourse given concretion by those 
ideas. Thirdly, while people outside the form of life, and the 
strictures and constraints imposed by it, may dispute the credibility 
of the knowledge claimed by believers concerning God's revelation to 
them, they cannot refute it. This is not because it is so esoteric as 
to be beyond human contradiction, as some might hold. It is because 
to refute knowledge of God by experience, it would be necessary to 
have some kind of experience of a countering nature. The traditional 
counter arguments of Flew and others as regards suffering are not, 
given the line I have followed, damaging. They cannot inn 
case 
consti- 
tute contradictory experiences as such. Only if the moral and 
spiritual ideas resident in the teachings of Christ and the Apostles 
be declared inurical to the concept of a loving God would this be so. 
The ideas would have to become redundant in human society. But this 
is far from being the case, in spite of prevalent secular influences 
and agnostic ideologies. And we have found that it is not perhaps by 
acquaintance but by description that, principally, the pertinent ideas 
are known. 
What would it be not to possess the knowledge or forms of know- 
ledge to which the Christian believer lays claim? It will be 
Gathered from my experiential view of revelation, that to be said not 
to know God would be to be deficient in understanding of ideas - 
soteriological ones in particular and, generally, ideas appertaining 
to the concept of God taken to be creator, the preserver and the 
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power of the future. These ideas emanate from, and acquire their 
logical status in, the proclamation of the Christ event by which the 
Apostles indicated what encounter with God means. Not to know God is 
to be unaware of those teachings ranging from the principles of the 
Law, through to the Prophets and culminating in the theology of the 
Ptew Testament which, as Pannenberg shows, finds its focal point in 
historical events relative to the life of Jesus. Such ideas, I have 
maintained, may be considered instantiated in so far as they generated 
a form of life of the believing community. Since this is not a mere 
tautology, to be a believer and to be in a position to experience God, 
or to encounter God, is to be in a position to apprehend how the funda- 
mental propositions which lie at the bottom of the Christian Theistic 
language game inform one in this respect. It is to recognise in those 
propositions an ultimacy which takes care of the issue of contention 
between believer and unbeliever, namely the existence and extant 
activity of God in human affairs. It leads to a situation which I have 
attempted to discuss, wherein to deny experience of, or encounter with 
God, would place the Christian in a self contradictory position. 
Lest I be yet again accused of failing to identify anything other 
than ideas which comprise the substance or a: knowledge claim, I must 
again point to a possible confusion in such a criticism. It has been 
a feature of my case to accept as a truism of Christian dialogue that 
physical, perceptive identification for God is a meaningless concept. 
Admittedly, I have not found it a simple task to give coherence to 
the notion which must replace the request for extant clues as to God's 
identity, namely the concept of bodiless agent. fly answer to this has 
been to find in the ideas of the kerygma and its associated doctrines 
(and the earlier ideas of the Jewish covenant) the sufficient clues to 
identify God's activity in the world, especially as that activity 
focuses upon Jesus. 
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Although it has been my constant endeavour to stress the 
conceptual foundation for my view of revelation and so to eschew 
attempts to find for that concept some kind of empirical ultimacy, I 
have not been able to put aside the essentially empirical grounding 
in historical and contemporary events. Yet because priority has been 
given to the logic of what it means to say that, in Christ, men are 
able to meet God in a realistic manner, it has not been necessary to 
try to show how prediction might apply to Christian Theistic propo- 
sitions in this area. I have, of course, frequently alluded to the 
predictive element in the Biblical literature itself, and have 
discussed Pannenberg's idea of God as conceived to be the Power of the 
Future, presiding over this and every age. I have indeed argued that 
there is a sense in which it would be intelligible to say that, in 
responding to the kerygma of the Apostolic message concerning Christ, 
a hitherto agnostic might become aware of new vistas and understanding 
which correctly earn the title of knowledge. To that extent one could 
use a predictive formula in respect of such propositions of the nature 
'If then'. As regards the central issue of my study, however, it has 
been clearly impossible to define the verb to know apart from logical 
connotations. This has been, in part, because I have recognised, 
along with several philosophers, the significant role played by the 
knower in the process of, and in the production of, knowledge. But 
more strongly it has followed from my consistent wish to use 
Wittgenstein's notion of fundamental propositions allied to his con- 
textual view of meaning, and his reference to the form of life as 
being explanatory of what that meaning is. Hence, there cannot be a 
predictive quality in saying as I have done that, to speak of God 
making Himself known, would require confirmation in hypothetical terms. 
It cannot be achieved as it must in respect of any empirical propo- 
sition, where some fonfirning or denying fact must be capable of 
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being displayed. But I do not believe that this could count against 
the assertion that Christians may, legitimately, make a knowledge 
claim, consequent upon their understanding of the concept of revelation. 
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